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Abstract 
The 2009 Report to Congress on Head Start Monitoring indicated that Head Start 
grantee non-compliance findings have increased since 2008, implying that grantee non-
compliance is an issue for the Head Start field. The poor performance of grantees during 
Federal Monitoring Reviews demonstrates the critical need to investigate turnaround 
practices of Head Start directors who have successfully improved their low-performing 
programs to high-performing in compliance with the Head Start Performance Standards 
(HSPS) and successfully achieved a Federal Monitoring Review with no findings. The 
investigation of Head Start turnaround practices is not reflected in the current literature. 
However, business and K-12 settings have contributed to scholarly literature regarding 
organizational turnaround. The purpose of this study is to examine the dynamics of the 
turnaround process in Head Start programs as described by directors of underperforming 
programs that experienced turnaround and the leadership behaviors implemented to 
facilitate performance improvements. 
The study employed a qualitative cross-case analysis, guided by Kotter’s (1996) 
Eight-Stage Change Model as the conceptual framework to investigate Head Start 
turnaround practices. The qualitative methodology enabled the researcher to analyze the 
relationship between the strategies the leaders engaged in and the changes within their 
programs. The findings revealed four themes as described by the Head Start turnaround 
directors: a) Organizational Noncompliance, (b) Managing Self, (c) Managing Others and 
(d) Systems Turnaround. Additionally, the findings unveil the introduction of the Four-
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Stage Turnaround Model. Moreover, the researcher proposed six recommendations, three 
recommendations for the Office of Head Start (OHS) and three recommendations for 
Head Start directors. The Head Start field will benefit from informed research in an effort 
to build a capacity for successful turnaround strategies. This effort will minimize the 
potential of performance issues plaguing Head Start programs threatening the continuity 
of quality of educational services for children.   
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction  
The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 promised a “war on poverty” by 
introducing community programs to advance the poor.  The Head Start project was born 
out of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). President Lyndon B. Johnson 
envisioned a social competence program to provide low-income children educational and 
supportive services to help them overcome the challenges of poverty.  Head Start 
promised to provide high-quality preschool programming to prepare children for school. 
Today more than 25 million children and their families have benefited from the 
comprehensive services of Head Start (Zigler & Styfco, 2010). 
Head Start is a federal program administered through the Office of Head Start 
(OHS), a division within the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services’ (DHHS) 
Administration for Children and Families (ACF). OHS provides competitive Head Start 
grants to over 1,600 grantees across the 50 states, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands.  
Grantees include nonprofits, for-profits, community action agencies, tribal nation 
programs, and agencies serving migrant and seasonal workers (Zigler & Styfco, 2010). 
Grantees are awarded five-year renewable grants to provide comprehensive services to 
disadvantaged children and their families. Additionally, grantees will designate other 
local nonprofits or public agencies part of its duty for operating the Head Start program, 
these agencies are referred to as delegates. Grantees and its delegates are awarded funds 
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 to actualize Head Start’s mission to provide children with high-quality education, health, 
nutrition, physical, and disability services.  
Children served by Head Start are between the ages of three and four years old. 
Early Head Start programs serve children from six weeks to 36 months. Head Start and 
Early Head Start services are free to families who qualify. Family income must be at or 
below the Federal Poverty line. Parents are viewed as partners in their child’s education 
and are decision-makers in the management systems of the programs. Additionally, Head 
Start provides supports to the parents of the children served by helping them meet their 
goals towards economic self-sufficiency (http://eclkc.ohs.acf.hhs.gov).  
Performance standards. The OHS provides oversight of its grantees to ensure 
that the programs follow the Head Start Performance Standards (HSPS). In 1975, ten 
years after the inception of Head Start, ACF developed a set of performance standards 
that were issued in compliance with the Code of Federal Regulations (Federal Register, 
1975). Head Start programs are mandated to adhere to the HSPS standards to maintain 
their Head Start funding. 
In 1995, ACF designed Early Head Start (EHS) under the auspice of Head Start in 
response to the need to support pregnant women, infants and toddlers. Subsequently, the 
Head Start Performance Standards (HSPS) were updated to include provisions for EHS. 
In 1996, Federal Monitoring began as a process to ensure programs were operating in 
compliance with HSPS. 
In 2007, under the Bush administration, congress reauthorized the Head Act with 
a renewed focus. The Improving Head Start for School Readiness Act, better known as 
the Head Start Act of 2007 was developed to strengthen the quality of the program. 
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 Moreover, operating under a new guiding framework, the act encompasses state early 
learning standards, increased stringency in teaching qualifications, enhancement to the 
HSPS, a system of designation and renewal for grantees, and greater program monitoring 
(http://eclkc.ohs.acf.hhs.gov, 2013). 
Additional reform enacted in the 2007 Head Start Act includes a mandate that 
low-performing grantees must compete to renew its grant.  “Recompetition,” a concept 
developed under new regulations set by President Barack Obama mandating that any 
grantee which fails to provide high-quality services set by new federal quality regulations 
must compete for its grant against other potential community providers. In the past, Head 
Start grantees would automatically continue its funding despite its failure to comply with 
Head Start Performance Standards.  Under recompetition guidelines the low-performing 
grantee may also reapply for the grant. This system of designation renewal system also 
distinguishes grantees delivering high-quality Head Start services. Moreover, offering 
continued grants to high quality Head Start programs for a period of five years 
noncompetitively.  
Recompetition. In 2011, OHS announced that 132 of the 1,654 Head Start 
grantees will need to compete for its federal grant due to its failure to meet the mandated 
HSPS.  In 2012, 122 grantees were announced, as a second round of grantees, mandated 
to recompete for continued funding.  Under the rules of recompetition, 25% of Head Start 
grantees will be evaluated annually for compliance with the HSPS. Programs that fail to 
meet set standards will need to vie for grant funds against other community providers.  
The goal of recompetition is to raise the quality of services and defund low-performing 
grantees. Until now, a process of competition has never been part of the refunding of 
  3 
 programs. In some instances, grantees have been the long standing sole grantee of the 
Head Start Grant (Headstartredesignation.com).  
Monitoring reviews. The Office of Head Start (OHS) conducts triennial reviews 
to ensure that Head Start programs are complying with the HSPS. OHS conducts the 
reviews to ensure that Head Start programs do not have “systemic or substantial material 
failures” (Head Start Act, 2007). All Head Start programs are required to receive a 
Federal Monitoring Review at least once every three years. Annually, OHS conducts four 
types of Federal Monitoring Reviews: (a) First Year, (b) Triennial, (c) Other, and (d) 
Follow-up (Report to Congress on Head Start Monitoring, 2009). First Year reviews are 
conducted on grantees within their first year of operation, Triennial reviews are 
conducted every three years, Other reviews are usually desk reviews typically initiated 
due to grantee performance concerns when grantees are found deficient and 
noncompliant, and a Follow-up review is conducted when grantees fail to meet the 
mandated standards (Report to Congress on Head Start Monitoring, 2009). 
During the Federal Monitoring Review, the program is evaluated on its ability to 
provide evidence of meeting the HSPS. Federal reviewers act as fact finders who detect 
matters of program performance. During Federal Monitoring Review, grantee compliance 
outcomes are determined by the Federal Review Team. At the completion of the on-site 
review, grantees will achieve one of three determinations: (a) compliant, (b) 
noncompliant, and (c) deficient. A grantee with no findings identified during the review 
will be determined as compliant.  A grantee with one or more areas of non-compliance 
and no deficiencies is determined as noncompliant. Furthermore, grantees with one or 
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 more deficiencies are deemed deficient (Report to Congress on Head Start Monitoring, 
2008). 
Deficiencies are more serious than non-compliances. Head Start defines 
deficiency as a performance failure in one of the following eight areas: (a) a threat to the 
health, safety, or civil rights of children; (b) denying parents their rights to exercise their 
full roles and responsibilities related to the operation of the program; (c) failing to 
comply with the program standards; (d) misuse of funds; (e) loss of legal status, childcare 
license, debarment from receiving federal grants or contracts; (f) failure to meet or 
correct any agency requirement; (g) failure of the governing body to exercise its legal and 
fiscal responsibilities; and (h) failure to resolve an area of non-compliance (Head Start 
Act, 2007).  
Grantees are expected to correct non-compliances and deficiencies. Prior to 
recompetition, when a deficiency was identified, the federal reviewer would conduct a 
Follow-up review within six months to ensure the deficiency is corrected. Today, the 
stakes are higher and a deficiency finding will almost guarantee a grantee an immediate 
pathway to recompetition. Head Start grantees are expected to operate high-quality 
programs and provide services in compliance with the HSPS. Grantees and its delegates 
are expected to establish a process for monitoring to ensure compliance. Moreover, 
programs are expected to self-identify areas needing corrective actions to ensure 
compliance with HSPS. Annually, Head Start programs are required to conduct a process 
of self-assessment to determine areas needing quality improvements in addition to 
developing programmatic goals. Grantees are expected to provide documentation of their 
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 self-monitoring procedures and tools used to ensure the implementation of quality 
programming (http://eclkc.ohs.acf.hhs.gov).   
Additionally, OHS monitoring reviews efforts include: (a) increased unannounced 
visits for programs with identified concerns, (b) implementation of Classroom 
Assessment Scoring System (CLASS) to gauge teacher effectiveness, (c) software 
updates,  (d) Federal Monitoring Review reports, and (e) Monitoring Protocol guides. 
The Protocol. In 2007, OHS introduced the Monitoring Protocol, a 
comprehensive tool which encompasses the Head Start program content areas and 
includes a list of questions designed to measure grantee compliance with the HSPS.  
Annually, OHS develops a new monitoring tool to guide both Head Start programs and 
federal reviewers in gathering evidence regarding grantee compliance with the HSPS. 
The 2012 Monitoring Protocol is divided into eleven individual guides based on the Head 
Start service areas. The guides are divided as follows: (a) Program Design and 
Management; (b) Fiscal Management; (c) Safe Environments; (d) Education and Early 
Childhood Development Services; (e) Health Services; (f) Transportation Services; (g) 
Eligibility, Recruitment, Selection, Enrollment, Attendance (ERSEA); (h) Nutritional 
Services; (i) Disabilities Services; (j) Family and Community Services; and (k) Mental 
Health Services (Report to Congress on Head Start Monitoring, 2009). 
The Monitoring Protocol guides give federal reviewers direction during the 
Federal Monitoring Review process regarding interview questions, observations, and 
documentation review (Report to Congress on Head Start Monitoring, 2009). All Federal 
Monitoring Reviews are conducted within the context of the Monitoring Protocol. 
Federal Review Teams gather data regarding grantee compliance from observations, 
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 interviews, and verification and analysis of grantee documents. From the data gathered 
the federal review team makes initial findings regarding program compliance and 
forward a full report regarding evidence gathered to the Office of Head Start (Report to 
Congress on Head Start Monitoring, 2009). 
Problem Statement  
Evidence of low-performance. The most recent Reports to Congress on Head 
Start Monitoring (2008 & 2009) provides evidence of the need for Congress to provide 
supports to thoroughly investigate the reasons for the poor-performance of grantees 
during monitoring reviews. In 2008, OHS conducted 974 monitoring reviews. Of the 974 
reviews conducted, 565 Head Start grantees experienced a First-Year or Triennial Federal 
Monitoring Performance Review. Interestingly, three-fourths of the programs reviewed 
were identified as non-compliant. More specifically, 412 programs were found non-
compliant and 27 were determined as deficient.  According to the Monitoring Report to 
Congress for FY 2008, of the 439 noncompliant programs, a total of 2,139 compliance 
issues were cited; 95% were non-compliance findings and 4.1% were deficiency 
determinations. The majority of noncompliant and deficient determinations were 
associated with Program Design and Management (62%) and Fiscal Management 
(47.6%) service areas. Program Design and Management services include the following 
content areas: (a) program planning, (b) governing body, (c) Policy Council, d) on-going 
monitoring, (e) human resources, (e) communication, and (f) recording keeping and 
reporting. Fiscal management includes cost reporting, procurement, grant reporting and 
compensation (http://eclkc.ohs.acf.hhs.gov, 2012).  
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 In 2009, OHS conducted 986 monitoring reviews. Of the 986 monitoring reviews 
conducted, 475 Head Start grantees experienced a First -Year or Triennial Federal 
Monitoring Performance Review. Subsequently, most of the programs were identified as 
noncompliant. 357 of the 475 programs reviewed were found noncompliant and 22 were 
determined as deficient (Monitoring Report to Congress for FY, 2009).  According to the 
Report to Congress on Head Start Monitoring (2009), the number of noncompliant 
programs has increased since 2006. Furthermore, in 2006, 58% of Head Start programs 
had findings of one or more non-compliances. In 2009, the number increased to 75.2%. 
Albeit, the number of programs found deficient has decreased since 2006 from 32.8% to 
4.6% in 2009. The reduction in deficiencies is attributed to the Head Start Act of 2007 
which narrows the definition of a deficiency (Monitoring Report to Congress for FY, 
2009).  
Interestingly, of the 357 noncompliant and 22 deficient programs reviewed in 
2009, a total of 1,878 non-compliance issues were cited and 38 deficiency violations. On 
average four non-compliances were found of each grantee reviewed. Grantees reviewed 
in 2007 and 2008 experienced a similar average of non-compliances. Grantees reviewed 
in 2006 that were found noncompliant averaged six non-compliances. The majority of 
noncompliant and deficiency determinations in 2009 were associated with Program 
Design and Management, Fiscal Management, Safety Environments, and Education and 
Early Childhood Development Services (Monitoring Report to Congress for FY, 2009).  
Of the 357 noncompliant grants, 331 required follow up reviews. Notably, 22 of the 
programs corrected their non-compliances immediately while the federal reviewers were 
on site.   
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 Of the 331 grantees slated for Follow-up reviews, 80 received a Follow-up 
Review and 90 received Desk reviews. Subsequently, 89% of the grantees that received 
Follow-up reviews that year became compliant, 1.3% remained noncompliant, and 7% 
failed to correct non-compliances and its violations were elevated to deficiencies. Of the 
grantees which received a desk review, 97.8% became compliant and 2.2% failed to 
correct non-compliances and its status was elevated to a deficiency (Monitoring Report to 
Congress for FY, 2009). The poor performance of grantees during Federal Monitoring 
Reviews demonstrates the critical need to investigate turnaround practices of Head Start 
directors who have successfully improved their low-performing programs to high-
performing in compliance with the HSPS and successfully achieved a Federal Monitoring 
Review with no findings.  
The examination of the current turnaround literature presents a gap in the ECE 
field, more specifically Head Start programs. This gap validates the need for future 
research to investigate Head Start programs experiencing performance decline and in 
need of recovery. Turnaround literature has not been examined relative to early care and 
education programs or Head Start. The lack of literature has created a gap and warrants 
an emergence of scholarship to investigate causality of Head Start program decline and 
leadership’s capacity for turnaround efforts.  The emergence of an intervention plan for 
programs enriched from lessons learned from Head Start directors that have provided 
evidence of successful turnaround will assist early care and education leaders in gaining 
greater cognizance of symptoms of performance decline and strategies to remedy 
performance issues.  Head Start administrators will benefit from informed research to 
build a capacity for a successful turnaround. This effort will minimize the potential of 
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 performance issues plaguing Head Start programs threatening the continuity of quality of 
educational services for children.  There is an urgent and critical need to conduct research 
that informs Head Start grantees with strategies and documented successful models of 
programs moving from a state of low-performance to higher performance. It is important 
to create discourse in the literature about Head Start agencies experiencing performance 
decline and their recovery process documenting the steps of corrective action to 
achievement of program compliance. 
The field warrants a comprehensive examination of common themes in non-
compliance issues, whereas the cycle of recompetition is bound to continue and Head 
Start children are threatened with a loss of continuity in quality Head Start services.  
Theoretical Rationale  
Turnaround theory. To date there is not a documented model of turnaround 
strategies in the early care and education (ECE) field or Head Start programs. Studies of 
successful and unsuccessful attempts of turnaround are analyzed in the for-profit sector, 
not-for-profit, public sector, and schools. These studies offer detail on the stages of 
turnaround and the steps necessary to move an organization from a state of failure to 
recovery.  Within the literature, turnaround is theorized in three ways: As a “condition” 
(Armenakis, Fredenberger, Cherones & Field, 1995, p. 231), as a “process” (Short, 
Palmer, & Stimpert, 1998, p. 155) and as a “consequence or end state, of successful 
strategic actions” (Short, Palmer, & Stimpert, 1998, p. 155). Turnaround efforts will 
result in two divergent end states: failure or recovery. (Hager et al, 1999; Slatter, 1984; 
Stewart, 1984).  
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 School turnaround. There is an abundance of literature on turnaround theory in 
the corporate sector (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Barker & Mone, 1998; Bibebault, 1992; 
Castrogiovanni et al., 1992; Francis & Desai, 2005; Grinyer & McKiernan, 1990; Lohrke 
& Bedeian 1998; Oviatt & Bruton, 1994; Schendel & Patton, 1976) and more recently an 
expanded body of literature that includes turnaround of for-profits, churches, hospitals, 
public organizations, and schools.  There is an absence of research that investigates the 
turnaround practices implemented by Head Start directors. Subsequently, the researcher 
substituted K-12 turnaround literature as there are similarities in accountability structures 
and federal mandates. Accountability systems created by the government imposed onto 
organizations is not exclusive to Head Start.  School improvement has been a federal 
focus since the 1994 Improving America’s School Act. The Improving America’s School 
Act was a weak attempt to hold schools accountable for poor performance.  Under the 
Bush administration, the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001 imposed penalties to 
schools deemed as low-performing by the Department of Education due to low test scores 
and poor student achievement. Under the 2001 NCLB Act, schools are subject to 
sanctions for low-performance. Like Head Start, factors that outline the causality of low-
performance in schools are not definitively defined, but are often attributed to poverty 
stricken neighborhoods. NCLB is the impetus for many initiatives at the federal and state 
levels to improve schools and implement turnaround strategies (Duke, 2012).   
Increasing high-performing schools are the focus of the reauthorized NCLB Act 
under President Obama’s administration. With a new era of accountability, low-
performing schools are forced to develop a strategy to improve or face reductions in state 
funding or closure. Moreover, NCLB includes a provision that specifies that schools that 
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 lack evidence of adequate yearly progress (AYP) for two consecutive years will need to 
develop an improvement plan, provide professional development for staff using Title I 
funds, and offer families the option of transferring to another school.  If the school 
demonstrates three-years of deficiency by not meeting AYP, tutoring and afterschool 
programs must be offered to students. Furthermore, if the school demonstrates four-years 
of failing to make AYP, the school district is required to implement an immediate 
corrective action strategy. The strategy must be selected from a federally approved list.  
Strategy steps must include hiring an expert to advise the school, reduce the school’s 
management authority, replace staff, restructure, and update the current curriculum.  The 
most severe corrective action step is imposed if a school demonstrates five years of 
failing to make AYP. Consequently, the school is either closed or reopened after 
replacing all staff, managed under a charter, and the management of the school is 
contracted out (Herman et al., 2008).  
The federal government has invested in school turnaround attempts by providing 
funding and developing policy which mandates school turnaround. There are several 
competitive initiatives designed to fund school turnaround. President Obama’s Race to 
the Top fund offers 4.35 billion dollars to support education initiatives including school 
turnaround. Investing in Innovation grants provides 650 million dollars to support school 
improvement including innovation related to turnaround.   Additionally, school 
improvement grants provide funding to schools willing to subscribe to one of four 
prescribed turnaround models (Herman et al., 2008). 
Race to the Top. Race to the Top outlines four models of school turnaround:  (a) 
Turnaround Model, (b) Restart Model, (c) Transformation Model, and (d) School 
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 Closure.  The Turnaround Model includes replacing the principal, replacing most of the 
staff, implementing a strong strategy including restructuring governance, and 
implementing a research based curriculum to improve student outcomes. The Restart 
Model includes opening the school under new management. The new management team 
is selected from a competitive and arduous process.  Like the Turnaround Model, the 
Transformation Model includes principal replacement, but focuses on teacher 
professional development and extending teacher planning times, longer school days for 
students, and additional supports including community engagement. The Closure Model, 
requires that the school is closed and the students are redirected to a higher-performing 
school (Kutash et al., 2010).  There is a paucity of research to document the sustainability 
of success of in any of the school turnaround models (Murphy, 2008).  
Turnaround models are derived from practices and models from the business 
sector, albeit the success of school turnaround is not as well documented as business 
sector turnaround.  There is a paucity of literature that is demonstrative of successful 
school turnaround. A large majority of the literature details the strategies implemented by 
principals or districts to turn low-performing schools into higher performing successful 
schools. There is very little empirical research that documents the successful turnaround 
interventions and much less literature that lends itself as a guide to the sustainability of 
the successful turnaround.   
Turnaround support is not limited to the federal government. There are many 
groups that are invested in the success of school turnaround strategies. Unfortunately, 
there are a large number of failing schools. Many states and school districts have invested 
in improving student outcomes. States are developing accountability models to 
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 formatively access school efficacy and school district performance. Moreover, 
Universities have invested in turnaround by creating programs to develop principals as 
turnaround specialists. Bargaining unions have supported turnaround by updating union 
contracts to include provisions to terminate teachers in schools deemed in a turnaround. 
This effort offers school districts the flexibility to make the necessary staff changes to 
implement turnaround interventions. Charter schools provide turnaround support by 
becoming the solution to empty school buildings. More often, charter schools are or 
selected to manage schools when districts engage in the Restart Model. Additionally, 
through philanthropy efforts, turnaround initiatives are supported at the national and local 
levels (Kutash et al., 2010). 
Despite the growing support for turnaround efforts there are barriers to achieving 
widespread school turnarounds. States and districts are limited to turnaround expertise.  
Consequently, districts are limited because there is a scarcity of highly qualified experts 
that can document mastery in turnaround interventions. School districts are still 
developing the capacity to monitor and assess turnaround efforts. The uniqueness of 
turnaround requires districts to set up new infrastructures to ensure appropriate 
implementation systems in addition to successful turnaround interventions. Therefore, 
there are limited turnaround leaders and teachers experienced in turnaround. Moreover, 
there are limited universities that offer turnaround training, thereby, limiting the pool 
highly qualified staff to lead turnaround efforts. Other barriers to turnaround include the 
limited availability of management organizations that specializes in turnaround. This 
barrier will limit states selections to three of the four approved turnaround models 
(Kutash et al., 2010).   
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 Interestingly, some critics blame the education policies that create accountability 
systems for low-performance of schools.  Notably, Levine and Levine (2012) criticize No 
Child Left Behind (NCLB) and Race to the Top (RTTT) for the cycle of chronic low-
performance in K-12 settings.  Under NCLB, low achievement scores are reasons to close 
or restructure schools; similarly, in Head Start programs, grantees that perform poorly 
during the Federal Review risk losing their Head Start Grant, consequently, another 
organization may apply for its grant to provide Head Start services in the existing 
grantee’s community. Levine and Levine (2012) argue that low student achievement 
extends beyond low test scores and teacher accountability. They describe social factors 
that are attributed to low student achievement, for example, inequitable school resources 
in poor and more affluent communities.  Furthermore, the critics posit that crowded 
schools and rapid growth are all attributes to low student achievement.  
Additionally, Levine and Levine (2012) proffer systems of accountability 
modeled after business practices are creating unintended consequences like student test 
scores correlating with teacher performance, therefore creating an incentive for schools to 
cheat. The researchers assert that more businesses are investing in education due to the 
millions of dollars in funds available to corporations for developing software and tutoring 
services. Many private corporations are benefiting from business turnaround models 
intended to benefit the education of students. Levine and Levine (2012) argue that the 
turnaround model is “destructive to public education” (p. 113). Moreover, they posit 
replacing the turnaround model with individualized instruction and eliminate the business 
model trajectory. Whereas the researchers critique the turnaround model as an 
intervention for failing schools, they claim districts have limited influence over the 
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 implementation of turnaround as a model for improvement strategy. Moreover, the 
turnaround model is driven by federal mandate under President Obama’s Race to the Top 
(RTTT) initiative. 
At the Head Start level, there are no documented models of turnaround to choose 
from. However, there are organizations that take over grants of chronically low-
performing Head Start programs and ensure that children have access to Head Start 
services. These programs have a specialized capability to put in place a team of staff to 
ensure children have a Head Start program to attend without interruption. Community 
Development Institute Head Start (CDIHS) based in Denver, Colorado is funded by OHS. 
CDIHS provides interim services when a Head Start program grant is relinquished, 
suspended, or terminated. CDIHS is awarded a new grant at the same funding amount as 
the former grantee. According to CDIHS, they provide a staff of highly qualified 
consultants to support and continue Head Start program operations. Existing staff of the 
former grantee will need to reapply for their jobs and begin the hiring process as new 
employees. CDIHS will typically serve as the grantee for one year until a replacement 
grantee is selected (http://www.cdiheadstart.org).  
Organizational change. Organizational change is described by many scholars as 
a dynamic multifaceted process. Scholars posit that organizational change is categorized 
as either emergent or planned (Burnes, 2004b; Cummings & Worley, 2001; Pettigrew, 
2000). Emergent change is a process that derives from ongoing variations within the 
organization that occur and create change without intention (Pettigrew, 2000). Often in 
the nonprofit sector the impetus that drives change is unplanned. Factors that drive 
change are typically demands by regulatory bodies, shifts in the field, or change in 
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 funding warranting the development of a planned strategy. In Head Start, OHS is the 
impetus for change in low-performing programs. 
The notion of planned change has been adopted in both the for-profit and not-for-
profit sector (Medley & Akan, 2008). The theory of planned change is first introduced by 
Kurt Lewin (1947) and described as intentional planning for change developed 
throughout multiple stages. Lewin (1947) developed a three-step planned change model.  
Lewin’s planned change theory was utilized in the not-for-profit and social sectors 
(Cummings & Worley, 1997) to help understand and conceptualize planned change.  
Lewin’s theory was later applied in organizational development theories (Burnes, 2004b; 
MacIntosh and McLean, 2001).  Lewin’s (1947) three-step model is described in as 
follows:  (a) unfreezing, (b) changing; and (c) refreezing.  During the unfreezing stage, a 
process is developed to eliminate old unwanted behaviors and learn new behaviors. In the 
changing stage, people are motivated to change and learn new behaviors. In the final 
stage, refreezing, participants adapt to the new behaviors and commit to sustain the 
organizational change.  
Kotter’s eight-stage change model. Kotter’s (1996) book Leading Change 
provides a framework for leading planned change.  Furthermore, the model illustrates the 
importance of the change leader and their action steps implemented during the change 
process. Kotter’s (1996) change model builds on Lewin’s (1947) three-step planned 
change model. Although the book is intended to guide the business for-profit sector, this 
model is applicable to any organizational change.  Kotter (1996) posits that there is an 
eight-stage process necessary to lead successful sustained change within any 
organization. The change model employs the following steps:   
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 1. Establishing a sense of urgency 
2. Creating the guiding coalition 
3. Developing a vision and strategy 
4. Communicating the change vision 
5. Empowering broad based action 
6. Generating short-term wins 
7. Consolidating gains and producing more change 
8. Anchoring new approaches in the culture 
Kotter (1996) suggests that following this sequential multi-stage process is 
important to leading successful change. The author delineates that it is critical that the 
stages are followed in the requisite sequence to ensure the overall success of the 
transformation. According to Kotter (1996), change cannot be accelerated by skipping 
steps in the change sequence. The author asserts that critical mistakes within stages can 
stifle organizational transformation. Kotter describes vulnerability and crisis as triggering 
mechanisms for change.  The eight-stage change model is the guiding framework that 
will be employed in this study to analyze the change process of Head Start directors 
leading low-performing programs to high quality performing programs.   
The first four steps of Kotter’s (1996) change process moves the organization out 
of a state of complacency with the status quo. This phase is modeled after Lewin’s (1947) 
unfreezing stage. Likewise, steps five, six, and seven models Lewin’s (1947) changing 
phase, by creating shifts in culture and change unwanted embedded organizational 
behaviors. The final stage borrows from Lewin’s refreezing stage and ensures that the 
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 change is sustained by illustrating positive shifts in organizational culture. Kotter 
describes successful change as demonstrating sustained behavior change (Kotter, 1996).  
In the first step, Establishing a sense of urgency, Kotter (1996) delineates that 
leadership defines what the future should look like, aligns people with the vision, and 
inspires them to actualize the vision despite obstacles (Kotter,1996). The leader must 
communicate the urgent nature of the need for change. Staff will not only require an 
awareness of the problem, but the data that demonstrates the need for the turnaround. The 
team must understand that complacency and the current state of the organization will lead 
to organizational failure.   
In the second step, Form a powerful guiding coalition, Kotter (1996) asserts that 
the leader needs to develop a team to guide the activities to achieve the intended solution 
for change. This team must develop a set of shared values and continually grow the 
support of staff. The author avers that hierarchy should not matter and that champions of 
change are not hierarchal. Moreover, that it is more important that the guiding coalition is 
strong enough to lead the change (Kotter, 2007). Change efforts begin with a leader and 
grow throughout the team.  The guiding coalition will inspire others to action by clearly 
communicating the vision.  
Step three, Create a vision Kotter (1996) states that at this phase the leader 
communicates the transformation strategy and defines the vision for the desired state of 
the organization. Furthermore, vision is what drives the change and keeps the activities 
and changes aligned with the desired state. In step four, Communicate the vision, the 
leader uses all opportunities to ensure that staff are aware and understand the direction of 
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 the vision. Additionally, all staff should be clear on the vision and direction of the 
organization.  
In Kotter’s (1996) fifth step, Empowering others to act, the leader must ensure 
that the team has the resources and support necessary to carry out the vision. During stage 
six, Generating short term, Kotter (1996) asserts that short term wins offer the change 
agent feedback that their strategy is on the right track. Subsequently, it provides the team 
the motivational inspiration to push towards the goal. Kotter argues that short term wins 
encourage others to join in on the mission and believe that its goals are achievable. 
Moreover, short term wins minimize the power of doubters and naysayers (Kotter, 2007). 
In step seven, Consolidate improvements and produce more change, the change 
agent must motivate the group to continue its momentum and drive change. Kotter (1996) 
warns, claiming a premature victory can be detrimental and demotivate staff. 
Furthermore, the team should know that they are on the trajectory of achieving the vision, 
thereby, understanding that the vision is not actualized until the end ultimate goal is met 
and the new behaviors are sustained.  
The final stage requires the leader to Institutionalize new approaches. The author 
delineates that successful change is demonstrated when organizational behaviors have 
taken root and become established as norms and the team illustrates shared values. 
Moreover, staff clearly understand the benefits of the change and illustrate an acceptance 
of new norms and that reverting back to old behaviors are detrimental to the livelihood of 
the organization.  
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 Statement of Purpose 
President Obama’s reform of Head Start appears to regulate like the NCLB of 
Head Start. Obama’s mission is to ensure children have the best opportunities for school 
readiness. The Obama administration plans to increase the accountability in Head Start 
grantees that are chronically low-performing by enforcing recompetion as a solution for 
low-performance.  Forcing grantees to reapply for their Head Start grant and allow higher 
performing programs to vie for their grant. Turnaround involves a concerted effort to 
understand the reasons why the program is failing before executing a series of solutions 
(Murphy & Meyers, 2008). Congress needs to recognize the current condition of 
programs. Moreover, identifying common non-compliance issues will caution grantees 
and developing the appropriate improvement plan informed by research will prevent 
grants from suffering from the same conditions of non-compliance. Absent from the 
turnaround literature are the voices of Head Start directors that have experienced the 
condition of non-compliance and documented steps to move from a non-compliant state 
to the high-quality program performance.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the turnaround practices as identified 
by Head Start turnaround directors that improved their low-performing programs and 
transformed the programs to full compliance with all Head Start Performance Standards 
to achieve a successful Federal Monitoring Review with no findings. Subsequently, the 
research will provide a road map to guide grantees plagued by noncompliance, whereas 
increasing opportunities to operate within the guidelines of program compliance, in turn, 
guaranteeing more children access to high quality Head Start services. Additionally, the 
threat of recompetion and the recent increase of low-performing Head Start programs 
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 present an urgent need to focus on identifying the turnaround strategies employed by 
Head Start directors who facilitated successful organization change.  
Research Questions 
The following research question guides this study: 
What do Head Start Directors identify as the successful turnaround practices that 
improved their low-performing programs and transformed the programs to full 
compliance with all Head Start Performance Standards, consequently achieving a 
successful federal review with no findings? 
 The study explored the unique action steps of six Head Start turnaround directors 
and their actions steps towards program improvements. This study details their process of 
organizational change as described by the Head Start turnaround leaders. The interview 
protocol was designed to reveal the turnaround practices and gather if the practices 
implemented by the participants modeled any of the steps in Kotter’s (1996) Leading 
Change eight-step model.  
Summary 
Head Start was developed to serve preschool children in poverty to increase 
opportunities for academic success.  Head Start grantees are governed by OHS and 
subjected to the HSPS, a set of standards designed to ensure Head Start programs are 
continuously operating high-quality programs. Recently, many grantees have 
demonstrated a failure to maintain full compliance with the HSPS as documented in the 
2008 and 2009 Federal Reports to Congress on Head Start Monitoring. The reports 
indicate that grantees have demonstrated an increase in non-compliances during recent 
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 federal reviews. Grantees that operate outside of the HSPS are deemed noncompliant and 
thereby low-performing. It is vital that Head Start provide high-quality programs. 
Turnaround literature is prominent in business literature, more recently there has 
been an emergence of literature related to turnaround in K-12 settings. Regrettably, there 
is not a documented model of Head Start turnaround practices in early care in education 
field, more specifically Head Start. Therefore, the current research study addresses the 
gap within the field. The threat of low-performing Head Start programs, presents a 
critical need to investigate the practices implemented by Head Start directors who have 
successfully facilitated their programs transformation from low-performing to high-
performing subsequently, achieving a federal review with no findings. This study is 
particularly relevant as it introduces the field to Head Start turnaround practices.  
Many Head Start programs are threatened with performance decline and poor 
monitoring reviews. It is important that Head Start administrators are armed with the 
tools to analyze organizational factors that lead to performance decline and implement a 
successful strategy to correct concerns. The lack of documented research to guide 
improvement efforts in Head Start programs, presents a risk of a chronic system of 
failures among agencies and continuity of services for children.  Unlike schools, there is 
an absence of turnaround models to choose from to support Head Start grantees. The 
understanding of turnaround strategies in low-performing Head Start programs will help 
programs achieve program improvements and HSPS compliance. 
In the literature review that follows, the researcher will examine school 
turnaround literature and provide evidence of the absence of scholarship to document 
turnaround in early care and education programs. This discourse will set the stage to 
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 demonstrate the need to develop the methodology described in Chapter 3, to conduct a 
research study to understand the experiences of Head Start directors who have 
successfully transformed low-performing Head Start programs. In Chapter 4, the results 
are presented. The Chapter delineates the study findings into four major themes as 
derived from the data of six interviews with Head Start turnaround directors. Chapter 5 
provides a discussion and interpretation of the results, and includes implications of 
findings, in addition to study limitation, recommendations for future research and 
concludes with a summary of the entire dissertation.    
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 Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
Introduction and Purpose 
Chapter 2 offers an overview of the empirical and theoretical findings related to 
turnaround in K-12 settings. The literature offers discussion and strategies for K-12 
settings, but research does not suggest turnaround practices, leadership competencies, and 
approaches for early care and education, more specifically Head Start directors.  In sum, 
none of the existing turnaround research previewed examines the practices of early care 
and education leaders to turn low-performing Head Start programs to high-performing 
programs. 
For purposes of this study, the researcher will use the definition of turnaround by 
the Mass Insight and Research Institute (2007): “ a dramatic and comprehensive 
intervention in a low-performing school that: a) produces significant gains in 
achievement within two years; and b) readies the school for the longer process of 
transformation into a high-performance organization” ( p.8). Turnaround differs from 
typical improvement efforts that focus on actions to recover over time. Turnaround 
suggests dramatic and quick change efforts by administration to prevent closure or other 
high stake interventions (Public Impact, 2007).  This study will interview six Head Start 
directors who have successfully turned around their low-performing programs using the 
HSPS as criteria for high-performance and subsequently achieved a Federal Monitoring 
Review with no findings. The study is guided by the following research question:  
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 What do Head Start Directors identify as the successful turnaround practices that 
improved their low-performing programs and transformed the programs to full 
compliance with all Head Start Performance Standards, consequently, achieving a 
Federal Monitoring Review with no findings?   
 Kotter’s eight-stage change model is the guiding framework that will be 
employed in this study to analyze the change process of Head Start directors leading low-
performing programs to high-quality performing programs.  
The literature search strategy commenced with a Google Scholar search of key 
terms, Head Start turnaround and Head Start improvements, and the researcher yielded no 
research relative to the improvement or turnaround practices of Head Start programs. The 
results were expanded to school turnaround in which the researcher found literature 
relative to public school turnaround in the K-12 setting.  Education Research Complete 
and Academic Search were the primary databases utilized to gather literature published 
between 2000 and 2012. Literature sources included peer reviewed and other journal 
articles, as well as independent reports developed by research centers, and published 
books.  
The research studies presented in this chapter detail lessons learned in successful 
turnarounds in K-12 settings across the United States. This literature review is organized 
logically to synthesize the literature according to three distinct sections:  (a) the role of 
the district, (b) principals as agents of change and (c) leadership competencies needed to 
facilitate the successful school turnaround.  These sections will be followed by a 
discussion of the fidelity of these turnaround strategies to Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage 
change model.  Interestingly, none of the studies offer a specific prescription that 
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 guarantees the successful turnaround and most importantly, all of the literature reviewed 
fails to examine turnaround strategies of directors in Head Start programs.  
Review of the Literature 
To date, Head Start turnaround has not been the subject of scholarly literature. 
The researcher will rely on school turnaround literature as there are similarities in the 
settings. This viewpoint is crucial to the study because it is primarily focused on low-
performing schools and the efforts taken to turn around the entities.  The school 
turnaround literature offers valuable lessons of successful school improvement and an 
analysis of factors that influence school turnaround. Turnaround leaders analyze, 
diagnose, and then develop a turnaround plan.  The leader establishes a sense of urgency, 
implements quick actions, and executes short term goals (Murphy, 2008).   
The research on school turnaround is limited because it is generally qualitative 
and consists of case studies of schools that have successfully improved their performance 
(Public Impact, 2007).  School turnaround research emerged in the late 1990s, and there 
are several scholars that have contributed to the leadership on school turnaround literature 
(Duke, 2006; Fullan, 2006; Leithwood, Harris, & Strauss, 2010; Murphy & Meyers, 
2008).  Much literature is derived from cross-sector research on turnaround practices and 
analyzed to create a framework for districts and schools to develop turnaround plans 
based on research and best practices to transform chronically low-performing schools 
(Fredrick & Gift, 2009; Herman et al., 2008; Murphy, 2008;). Much of the turnaround 
research provides evidence that turnaround efforts are not sustained and often student 
achievement regresses, school re-culturing energies diminish,  and improvement efforts 
are limited ( Duke & Landahl , 2011). 
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 School turnaround models. Turnaround models used in schools are derived from 
practices and models from the business sector, albeit the success of school turnaround is 
not as well documented as business sector turnaround (Meyers, 2008).  According to 
Meyers (2008), there is a paucity of literature that is demonstrative of successful school 
turnaround. For example, in a study conducted by Aladejem, Birman, Orland, Harr-
Robins, Heredia, Parrish, and Ruffini (2010) approximately 1,000 low-performing 
elementary schools were examined to recognize schools that demonstrated drastic and 
continued improvement, only 47 schools met the criteria. Moreover, the researchers 
assert that few schools within the U.S. demonstrate dramatic and sustainable 
achievements.  Much literature details the strategy implemented by principals or districts 
to turn low-performing schools into higher performing successful schools. However, little 
empirical research documents the success of turnaround interventions and much less 
literature lends itself as a guide to successful turnaround (Meyers, 2008; Public Impact, 
2007).   
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) is the impetus for many initiatives at the federal 
and state levels to improve schools and implement turnaround strategies (Duke, 2012).  
In addition, President Obama’s reform of Head Start also has regulations that can identify 
low-performance and threaten a program with closure. Obama’s stated mission is to 
ensure children have the best opportunities for school readiness. The Obama 
administration plans to increase the accountability in Head Start grantees that are 
chronically low-performing by imposing the concept of recompetion and forcing grantees 
to reapply for their Head Start grant and allow higher performing programs to vie for 
their grant (http://www.whitehouse.gov, 2011).  
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 At the Head Start level, there are no documented models or studies of turnaround. 
With the threat of recompetion and the increase of low-performing Head Start programs, 
the field has an urgent need to focus on identifying the organizational change process and 
turnaround strategies employed by Head Start directors. These leaders are faced with the 
task of guiding their programs from a state of low-performing to high-performing Head 
Start programs, but not much is known about what they actually do to make the 
turnaround happen.  
The role of the district. External forces are the impetus for school turnarounds. 
Similar to Head Start, K-12 settings are guided by a hierarchal system of regulations.  
Turnaround mandates begin at the federal level, and are cascaded down from the state 
and local level to the district. School district leadership has the critical role in developing 
the turnaround direction, and district led initiatives could lead to the success or failure of 
the turnaround strategy. Murphy (2008) provides an overview of turnaround literature 
employed from his study of turnaround in corporate, nonprofits, and government 
organizations in an effort to provide insights for schools in need of a successful 
turnaround.  The researcher posits that turnaround leaders should analyze the reasons for 
decline and then develop a turnaround plan.  Districts actions should include quick 
actions, which include evaluative actions to gauge the problems and tighten cost. 
Moreover, Murphy (2008) provides insights for school turnaround. He posits that 
turnaround leadership should focus on efficiencies, organize and understand the need of 
the customer, understand the causes of decline, and change the school principals and 
provide support for the new leadership. 
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 The district determines who will lead the turnaround effort at a specific school 
and the financial and professional development support that will be provided for the 
turnaround leaders (Public Impact, 2007). Murphy (2008) asserts that changing 
management can include changing strategy or employing consultants to support the 
current leader.  The school district determines if the current principal will continue or if a 
new principal will lead the turnaround initiative. Several turnaround studies suggest that 
principal replacement is necessary to lead the successful turnaround (Murphy, 2008; 
Rhim, Kowal, Hassel, & Hassel, 2007).  Several private sector scholars posit that 
changing leaders is critical to the success of the turnaround effort (Abebe, 2009; Barker, 
Patterson, & Mueller, 2001; Pearce, 1992).  In a later section, a study by Duke (2006) is 
previewed. The researcher interviewed fifteen schools leaders and delineates that ten of 
the school districts replaced the principal as the first step in the turnaround process. In 
contrast, school turnaround research has not documented that principal replacement is 
necessary to the success of the turnaround effort (ED, 2004). However, Duke (2006) 
delineated that all schools experienced a change in leadership practices regardless of 
principal replacement. According to Murphy (2008), most for profit organizations 
recover by replacing the CEO and the top management team.  The researcher delineates 
that in most cases of organizational turnaround successful leadership is viewed as the 
critical facture.  He posits that leadership provides the sense of direction. The scholar 
distills that right leadership does not always warrant leadership change, albeit, this is the 
most common practice.  
Interestingly, three authors provide critical insights as to the role of school district 
leadership in guiding the turnaround process beyond principal replacement. Kowal and 
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 Abliedinger (2011), Public Impact (2009), and Robinson and Buntrock (2011) espouse 
the importance of communicating with stakeholders and informing them of quick, 
dramatics improvements that happen early on that indicate the strategy is working. 
Whereas demonstrating small wins quickly build stakeholder support for the turnaround 
strategy. All of the authors recommend providing turnaround principals the autonomy to 
make decisions is critical. Additionally, removing the complexity of red-tape and 
providing them the flexibility to terminate or deploy staff that fails to support the vision. 
The researchers are in agreement and do not have any contrasting arguments. The issue 
of principal replacement is addressed, but current literature is absent of significant data to 
support either the concept that replacing or retaining a principal to guide the turnaround is 
critical to the successful strategy to sustain turnaround.  All of the researchers’ findings 
are consistent with one another (Duke, 2006; Kowal & Abliedinger, 2011; Public Impact, 
2009; Robinson & Buntrock, 2011).   
Kowal and Ableidinger (2011) provide guidance for states, school districts, and 
principals on the leading indicators of school turnaround based on research from business 
and health sectors. Kowal and Ableidinger define leading indicators as early 
demonstrations of success. The researchers build on the scholarship of Hassel and Hassel 
(2009) which demonstrates the successful leadership actions of turnaround leaders.  
Similarly, the scholars posit that early signals offer leaders feedback as to strategic 
direction indicating what is going well and areas that need a change in strategy.  
According to Kowal and Abliedinger (2011) successful turnaround leaders focus 
on small wins early and use it to gain momentum.  The researchers contend that 
turnaround leaders need the autonomy and flexibility to develop their team. Hassel and 
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 Hassel (2009) describe this as the “big yes” whereas the leader is given the support to 
make decisions that will lead to quick improvements.  Kowal and Abliedinger’s (2011) 
posit that turnaround leaders develop a vision and strategies with activities that are 
aligned with the goal and employ communication activities to regularly communicate the 
vision and goals with the staff and leaders. Furthermore, turnaround leaders empower 
others to act by removing organizational barriers to achieve the vision. However, as 
turnaround leaders recognize failed actions, consequently they eliminate activities that 
are not producing the expected outcomes and invest in activities that are doing well.   
In another study, Public Impact (2009) provides seven steps for district leaders to 
achieve the successful turnaround based on cross-sector research. The researchers posit 
that district leaders should commit to the successful turnaround by providing ongoing 
support to school staff and community stakeholders. Public Impact (2009) delineates that 
districts should prepare for multiple attempts at the turnaround process, consequently, 
new efforts may require a new principal. The researchers aver that the district’s decision 
of determining which schools will be considered turnaround schools and the intervention 
strategy are critical to the successful turnaround. Additionally, the researchers assert that 
districts must develop a pool of turnaround principals that possess the leadership capacity 
and turnaround strategy to eliminate the cycle of poor performance. Similarly, Kowal and 
Abliedinger (2011) and Public Impact (2009) argue the importance of providing 
turnaround principals the support and autonomy to make staffing decisions, in addition to 
holding them accountable for results. Both studies determine that, districts must 
recognize the importance of selecting the right teachers for turnaround schools and ensure 
they possess the skills needed to support the turnaround. 
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 Robinson and Buntrock (2011) examined the turnaround strategy of Cincinnati 
Public Schools. The researchers determined that turnaround begins with the district and 
the turnaround “leaders must be supported and held accountable by a strong 
infrastructure” (p. 8). The authors contend that there must be clearly established 
objectives and a plan to monitor performance. Similarly, Kowal and Abliedinger (2011) 
and Public Impact (2009) posit that turnaround principals must have the autonomy to 
remove obstacles to goal achievement. Likewise, the authors contend that principals are 
critical to turnaround success, and furthermore they motivate culture changes, develop 
strategy-focus and lead the change process.  
Robinson and Buntrock (2011) delineate that districts need highly qualified 
turnaround principals to guide the improvement strategy.  Robinson and Buntrock (2011) 
argue of the limited number of turnaround principals and recommends that school 
districts seek turnaround leaders from sectors outside of education.  Additionally, the 
researchers note the importance of the district communicating with stakeholders. 
Interestingly, Robinson and Buntrock (2011) and Public Impact (2009) detail the 
importance of including stakeholders in the improvement process. The researchers 
contend that community support can positively benefit turnaround efforts and minimize 
naysayers who may try to challenge turnaround efforts.  All of the authors previously 
cited contend that the school districts role is important to beginning the successful 
turnaround strategy. School districts make critical decisions about the selection of the 
principal; they provide autonomy, engage stakeholders, and hold turnaround leaders 
accountable.  
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 Interestingly, Head Start directors do not report to the school district.  OHS and 
congress mandate that all Head Start programs operate within the HSPS. Subsequently, 
the Federal Government awards funds directly to grantees to provide high-quality 
programming. When Head Start programs are low-performing, OHS mandates that 
grantees take immediate action to improve the program and often provide technical 
supports. However, the grantee is required to ensure the program is operating within full 
compliance with the HSPS (Zigler & Styfco, 2010).  The grantee holds the Head Start 
director accountable to ensure that changes are made, whereas, the school district would 
hold the principals accountable for the successful turnaround.   In this next section, the 
researcher will provide scholarship that emphasizes the critical role of the effective 
turnaround principal as change agents.  
Principals as change agents. Turnaround research emphasizes the importance of 
effective leadership to guide the successful turnaround (Leithwood & Strauss, 2009; 
Murphy, 2008; Steiner & Hassel, 2011; Thielman, 2012). The principal selected by the 
school district to head the turnaround school must guide and set the strategy.  Albeit, the 
district will set the stage for the turnaround and prepare and remove barriers to strategies.  
Evidence of successful principal actions during the turnaround process informs research 
about effective principal leadership behaviors. The significance in the role of the 
principal as a change agent is demonstrated in the work of Duke (2006); Theilman 
(2012); Duke and Salmonowicz, (2011); Tucker, Salmonowicz, and Levy (2008); 
Murphy and Meyers (2009); and Duke and Jacobson (2011). The researchers detail the 
behaviors and actions of successful turnaround leaders. Tucker et al., (2008) emphasizes 
the importance of turnaround training programs and provides evidence that principals 
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 trained as turnaround leaders demonstrate greater successes than of principals that were 
not formally trained as turnaround leaders. Conversely, Duke and Salmonowicz (2011) 
fail to provide evidence that the turnaround principals demonstrated incomparable 
performance. The implications of turnaround principals that emerge from the literature 
provide evidence that there are similarities in the actions of successful turnaround 
leaders.  
Duke (2006) contends that there are similarities in leadership behaviors within 
turnaround schools. The researcher studied fifteen schools that sustained turnaround 
improvements. All the participating schools were elementary schools. Nine of the schools 
were studied during 1997-1998. Of the remaining six schools, five were studied in 2004 
and the remaining school was studied over the period of 2004-2005 (Duke, 2006).  
Inclusion criteria for the study required that the schools must have completed a 
turnaround.  Duke (2006) documented the improvements demonstrated by the fifteen 
turnaround schools and developed a set of changes he identified as critical to their 
turnaround success.   
Duke (2006) delineates that all principals developed a mission that was motivated 
by a core belief. Additionally, Duke identified similarities in the strategies implemented 
by the principals in the turnaround schools examined.  They are: (a) a vision that children 
can be educated; (b) teamwork; (c) shared focus and accountability for the success of 
each student; (d) data decision making; (e) distributed leadership; (f) expanded learning 
time and experts support for students needing additional help; (g) collegial teams to plan, 
assess, determine student progress, curriculum and intervention strategies; (h) data 
sharing; (i) staff professional development; and (j) family and community engagement 
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 (Duke, 2006). Additionally, the principals examined reported that other leadership 
changes included:  (a) mission and focus, (b) style of leadership, (c) re-culturing, and (d) 
distributed leadership. 
Duke (2006) described changes made by 12 of the turnarounds principals to 
reinforce changes in school culture. Nine of the principals removed staff that lacked the 
capacity to help students improve their academic performance. Individuals were deployed 
to other schools, counseled out of the field or motivated to retire (Duke, 2006).  The 
researcher delineates that turnaround principals cannot lead turnaround efforts alone, and 
that the leadership functions must be distributed. The turnaround principals included 
teachers as part of the leadership functions.  All 15 turnaround schools demonstrated 
evidence of improved teamwork among staff which included regular sharing of 
instruction strategies and the development of vertical and horizontal teams.  Duke (2006) 
states that future research should include extending studies that substantiate 
characteristics of successful K-12 turnaround and develop a curriculum for turnaround 
leaders. Interestingly, the author does not provide a context that includes turnaround in 
early care and education settings, more specifically Head Start programs.   
Similarly, Thielman (2012) provides an account of the efforts of a principal’s 
leadership actions while facilitating the successful turnaround in a catholic high school. 
Unlike the turnaround case examined in Duke (2006), this turnaround effort was not 
motivated by Department of Education or other external forces. This turnaround effort 
was initiated by the principal and teachers committed to improving curriculum and 
teaching practices (Theilman, 2012). Theilman (2012) posits that regardless of the 
external impetus for improvement, the successful turnaround is driven by the internal 
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 efforts. Theilman’s (2012) case study documents the efforts of the principal and core 
team to drive the improvements within the high school.  
Most of the literature on school turnaround focuses on elementary and middle 
schools (Ferguson et al., 2010).  Several scholars posit that high schools are more 
difficult to reform than elementary schools (Duke & Jacobson, 2011; Ferguson et al. 
2010; Thielman, 2012).  High schools are typically larger than elementary schools, and 
the internal division often serves as impediments to the success of high school 
turnaround. Furthermore, past academic failures of students, ages of high school students, 
lack of parent involvement, behaviors, and absenteeism all serve as factors that hinder the 
success of high school turnaround (Duke & Jacobson, 2011). However, Theilman (2012) 
provides evidence of a successful high school turnaround.  Similar to Duke (2006) the 
study principal established a core belief among staff that they students they served had 
the capacity to learn and make academic improvements (Theilman, 2012).   
It is important to examine the leadership behaviors to document the successful 
practices implemented by principals engaged in turnaround strategy. In another study 
examining principal behaviors, Duke and Salmonowicz (2010) examined the first year 
turnaround efforts of a principal in a low-performing school. Duke (2006) provides an 
overview of actions of 15 principals. This study examined the decisions made by one 
turnaround principal.  This exploratory qualitative case study is of a first year elementary 
school principal leading a turnaround. The principal was interviewed via email or in 
person. The scholars employed a decision making conceptual framework to analyze the 
data. The Duke and Salmonowicz ( 2010) research was guided by the question: “How 
does a new principal begin the process of turnaround in a low-performing elementary 
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 school?” (p. 38).  Duke and Salmonowicz (2010) posit that principals make key decisions 
related to “performance, policies, program, process and personnel” (p. 39).  More 
specifically, when there is resistant staff not in support of the mission. Principals often 
make difficult decisions when they lack the support or flexibility to hire or terminate staff 
as needed. Duke and Salmonowicz (2010) delineate that the participant relied on beliefs 
to make critical decisions. Duke and Salmonowicz (2010) posit that there are critical 
lessons from their research. The authors contend that decisions made by principals were 
from judgments that lacked a process system for forming the best response. Principals 
lacked time for exploration of alternative options to resolve critical dilemmas that arise. 
 Duke and Salmonowicz (2010) delineate that principals need to understand the 
reasons for failure and pose critical questions about low-performance issues, where to 
focus efforts on intervention programs and the appropriate design and when to eliminate 
unsuccessful invention efforts in order to possess the capacity to conduct turnaround. 
Duke and Salmonowicz (2010) proffer that turnaround principals would benefit from 
training to support leaders in “good decision making” (p. 56). Interestingly, the 
participant principal was trained as a turnaround specialist. The researchers posit that 
turnaround leaders need to understand the environment in which they make decisions and 
reflect about the costs of the decisions made.  Limitations to this study include the small 
sample pool and the inability to generalize findings. Additionally, this study is limited to 
elementary schools and fails to mention efforts to turnaround low-performing Head Start 
programs.  Duke and Salmonowicz (2010) demonstrate the critical decisions made by 
turnaround principals and the need for specific training to support turnaround leaders.  
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 The studies examined thus far guide the reader in understanding that there are 
specific skills warranted of individuals leading K-12 turnaround. The following studies 
will preview the specific skills of turnaround leaders and the importance of targeted 
training programs to prepare principals with the competency skills necessary to lead as a 
turnaround principal. Over the years training programs have been developed to meet the 
increased demand for turnaround principals in low-performing schools (ED, 2004). 
Tucker et al., (2008) found that turnaround training programs have a “positive influence 
on leadership activities and outcomes” (p. 31). The authors found that principals who 
participated in turnaround training programs achieved better turnaround results than 
principals that did not. Similar to the work of Duke and Salmonowicz (2010) the authors 
examined principal leadership behaviors on a larger scale, specifically in 20 
underperforming schools. Of the twenty schools interviewed 10 principals completed a 
turnaround specialist program and the comparison group had not. On the contrary, the 
principal examined in Duke and Salmonwicz (2010) had not completed a turnaround 
specialist program.  The purpose of the study were to define the leadership actions 
demonstrated by principals to improve student achievement, identify measures of student 
achievement, and examine any differences in the change process as described by leaders 
in low-performing school who completed specialized turnaround and principals in 
comparison schools.  
 During the 2004-2005 school year, the 20 participating principals were 
interviewed twice. The researchers’ interview protocol included two semi-structured 
interviews. Student data from year end state assessments were collected from all students.  
Ten participants were offered formal turnaround training and support to aid in the success 
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 of the turnaround efforts and the other ten principals had not been offered turnaround 
support. Notably, Tucker, et al., (2008) found similarities in the practices and beliefs of 
the turnaround principals and the non-turnaround principals. The researchers found that 
both groups of principals demonstrated a high value on teamwork and partnership, 
commitment to increasing test scores, and data-driven decisions.  Similarly, the 
leadership practices mentioned by principals were: (a) benchmark testing, (b) actively 
analyzing data, (c) after-school remediation, and (d) on-going communication with staff. 
Interestingly, the research found that 19 of the 20 participants stated that teamwork was 
highly valued component of the change process. In contrast, the student’s assessment 
scores demonstrated significant differences in the two schools. The math and English 
scores of the elementary students lead by turnaround specialist surpassed those of the 
comparison schools. Interestingly, eighth grade scores did not demonstrate substantial 
results and there was only one eighth grade school in the study. The researchers proffer 
that there are commonalities in turnaround practices.  
According to Tucker et al. (2008), the students who attended schools led by the 
turnaround specialist demonstrated better test results in 2005 than students in the 
comparison schools. The researchers attribute the improvements to specialized 
turnaround training, communication of the mission to stakeholders and community, and 
ongoing and regular support. The researchers posit that turnaround specialist trainings are 
beneficial and have a positive influence on principal leadership actions and goals. Also, 
future research must take into account the importance of improving school cultures and 
its relationship to turnaround practices. Although this study offers a comparative 
narrative of the successes of turnaround principals, the study fails to include turnaround 
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 practices of leaders of in early care and education programs, consequently, the field lacks 
research relative to the leadership actions of Head Start directors turning around low-
performing programs.  
Notably, re-culturing is important task in the turnaround initiative in poor 
performing schools.  Tucker et al. (2008) recommended future research to examine 
culture and its relationship to turnaround practices. Murphy and Meyer (2009) present 
data on the importance of reculturing in turnaround. The researchers provide a narrative 
about critical elements necessary for the successful turnaround drawn from their preview 
of the corporate, government, and nonprofit fields. The researchers establish that people 
are critical to the success of a turnaround. Likewise, leaders of turnarounds must 
understand the attitudes of their employees as they, in turn, impact the culture. Negative 
and toxic cultures cannot sustain a turnaround. It is important for turnaround leaders to 
change the culture by restoring confidence by empowering the team, through 
collaboration, engendering respect, and recognizing the contributions of the staff. Other 
researchers for example, Fullan (2007), examines the importance of re-culturing in the 
improvement process. Similar to Fullan (2007), the researchers support the notion that 
principals must employ influencing and motivational skills to change the school culture, 
and furthermore, must establish an organizational shift in how employees view their work 
(Fullan, 2007; Murphy & Meyers, 2009).  
Murphy and Meyers (2009) engaged in a study of cross-sectional literature to 
develop a comprehensive model for successful organizational turnaround. The authors 
suggest that the leader begin by recognizing early warning signs of crisis, and then 
mobilize the team to focus on the mission and remove barriers to achieving the mission. 
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 The researchers proffer that employees are motivated by a vision of organizational 
success, increased opportunities to participate, challenges, shared successes, and 
recognition of success.  Additionally, the researchers assert that leader should engender 
transparency by communicating good and bad information about the organization, 
thereby building trust and momentum (Murphy & Meyers, 2009).  
According to Murphy and Meyers (2009), leaders can empower people by 
building teams and training staff.  Similarly to Tucker et al. (2008), the authors posit that 
organizational culture has a critical impact on the likelihood of sustaining the turnaround.  
Furthermore, turnaround leaders help develop new organizational norms and create shifts 
in employee behaviors. They do this by challenging the current situation, demanding a 
positive change, and warranting a commitment from all staff.  The researchers contend 
that turnaround leaders develop, a vision that the organization can change its path and 
improve, they commit to high standards, and a continuous process of ongoing 
improvement that that leads to increased successes (Murphy & Meyers, 2009). The 
dissertation research questions will probe for further exploration of how Head Start 
directors motivate and empower staff during the turnaround process in Head Start 
programs.  
In another study, evidence of successful turnaround implemented by principals 
includes the work of Duke and Jacobson (2011).  Duke and Jacobson (2011) examined 
the success of two Texas High School turnaround situations. Duke and Jacobson (2011) 
contend that there are several leadership characteristics shared by the principals. Both 
principals shared a focused strategy on improvements with small wins insight; the 
courage to terminate staff not committed to the goal developed the support from the team. 
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 Similarly, both principals built relationships with the middle schools and a focus on data 
to drive decisions regarding next steps for academic supports for students. Furthermore, 
both principals balanced improvements and monitored to eliminate barriers to continuous 
improvement. A significant difference in the turnaround efforts is that Weiskopf was a 
new principal and selected new staff to help lead the efforts unlike Garza. Limitations to 
the study include efforts to sustain the turnaround implemented by principals are not 
examined.  
Current literature details the importance of examining the behaviors and actions 
of successful turnaround leaders. The absence of research to document the behaviors and 
actions of Head Start leaders guiding turnaround demonstrates the critical need to 
facilitate a study that will provide evidence of such practices.  The early care and 
education field needs literature to document the actions of Head Start leaders that 
transcend programs from a point of low-performing to quickly improving. The literature 
review examines the action steps taken by competent turnaround leaders. It is critical to 
examine the unique competencies of turnaround principals. The next section of research 
suggests that turnaround leaders possess a unique set of competencies to lead the 
successful turnaround. 
Turnaround leader competencies. Turnaround leaders possess a unique set of 
skills that differ from principals that are successful in general school settings. Notably, 
the research presented by Duke and Jacobson (2011) alludes to the fact that there are 
unique competencies of turnaround leaders. According to Public Impact (2007) 
turnaround leaders must possess the competency and knowledge base to guide the 
dramatic improvement. Turnaround literature argues not to assume that principals of 
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 high-performing schools possess the capacity to successfully lead a turnaround school 
(Kowal & Hassel, 2011).  Turnaround principals possess a critical set of competencies to 
successfully lead a turnaround strategy (Kowal & Hassel, 2011).  
Turnaround principal competencies are unique, in comparison to typical 
principals leading high performing schools. Public Impact (2008) guides this concept by 
delineating that there are four unique core competencies of successful turnaround 
principals. Kowal and Hassel (2011), Aladjejem et al. (2010), and Herman, Dawson, Dee, 
Greene, Maynard, Redding, and Darwin (2008) build on the research of Public Impact 
(2008) and their research expounds on the concept of core competencies needed to guide 
the successful turnaround. According to Public Impact (2008) turnaround leader 
competencies represent “patterns of actions” hence, overlap in turnaround leader 
competencies and actions (p. 4). Public Impact (2008) developed a guide to identify 
competencies for principals in leading the successful turnaround.  Much of the literature 
contends that turnaround principals drive results (Public Impact, 2008; Rhim, 2011; 
Steiner & Barrett, 2012). Public Impact (2008) scanned cross-sector turnaround literature 
and derived from their research that there are a set of core competencies to successfully 
lead turnaround (Public Impact, 2008).  The researchers contend that there are four 
“clusters” of leader competencies.  They are: (a) driving for results, (b) influencing for 
results, (c) problem solving, and (d) showing confidence to lead.  
In the first cluster, driving for results, the turnaround leader will set high 
performance goals and develop a system to prioritize and monitor goals and activities. 
Turnaround leaders take risks, set clear expectations, and plan for hiccups and crisis with 
a clear plan to deal with issues before they occur.  In the second cluster, influencing for 
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 results, the turnaround leader focuses on creating a coalition to support and influence 
others. Moreover, the turnaround leader builds morale and empowers the team with a 
clear vision and ongoing professional development. Next, in the problem solving cluster, 
the turnaround principal demonstrates competencies in resolving conflicts. Finally, in the 
showing confidence to lead cluster, turnaround leaders visibly demonstrate the 
confidence and a commitment to the mission and vision of the turnaround (Public Impact, 
2008).  
Turnaround leader competencies are enacted in combination with critical action 
steps. Public Impact (2008) posits that there are three critical actions of competent 
turnaround leaders: (a) identify and focus on early wins to gain momentum; (b) dismantle 
organizational norms by creating discomfort with status quo and eliminate patterns that 
impede success; and (c) respond rapidly to measured outcomes, eliminate failed 
strategies, and sustain focus on progression.  Additionally, Public Impact (2008) proffers 
that there are 14 additional actions in combination with leader competencies that leads to 
the successful turnaround: (a) collect and analyze data; (b) make action plan based on 
data; (c) concentrate on big, fast payoffs in year one; (d) implement practices even if it 
requires deviation; (e) require all staff to change; (f) make necessary staff replacements; 
(g) focus on successful tactics; halt others; (h) do not tout progress as ultimate success; (i) 
communicate positive vision; (j) help staff personally feel problems; (k) gain support of 
key influencers; (l) silence critics with speedy success; (m) measure and report progress 
frequently; and (n) require decision makers to share data and problem solve (p. 6).  
Identifying the competencies and actions demonstrated by turnaround principals is 
critical to guiding the success of future turnaround schools. Whereas, the researchers 
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 provide evidence of the capacities necessary for successful turnaround leaders, they fail 
to provide evidence of the steps necessary for Head Start directors to guide low-
performing Head Start programs to high-performing programs.  
Similarly, Kowal and Hassel (2011) provide evidence of turnaround competencies 
as found in the work published by Public Impact (2008). In contrast, the researchers posit 
that there are shortages of leaders to guide turnaround in chronically low-performing 
schools. Kowal and Hassel (2011) posit that there is not a large supply of available 
leaders that possess the competencies necessary to guide the successful turnaround 
outside of the education field. The authors posit that there is a paucity of talent, and argue 
that turnaround leaders should be imported from cross-sector into the education field.   
According to Kowal and Hassel (2011) successful turnaround leaders focus early 
on small wins and use it to gain momentum. They develop a vision and strategy aligned 
with activities that ensure goal achievement. Turnaround leaders improve communication 
by sharing the vision and goals with the staff and leaders. Furthermore, turnaround 
leaders empower others to act by removing organizational barriers to achieve the vision. 
However, as turnaround leaders recognize failed actions, they eliminate activities that are 
not producing the expected outcomes and invest in activities that are doing well.  
Moreover the researcher asserts that, turnaround leaders are driven by the data. They 
drive momentum, while building credibility. Turnaround leaders develop goals after 
critical analysis. They are motivating and communicate to all stakeholders about the 
success of the turnaround. The researchers contend that open communication among 
stakeholders is effective for reducing the effects of cynicism. 
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 Kowal and Hassel (2011) proffer districts struggling to find competent leaders to 
should look to secure talent from other fields. The researchers suggest further study on 
the benefits of importing leaders from other sectors as turnaround principals. 
Interestingly, Kowal and Hassel (2011) identify the benefits of selecting leaders from 
other fields to guide the successful turnaround strategy, however, the researchers fail to 
address the gaps in knowledge about early care and education directors and the 
techniques used to guide low-performing Head Start programs to a state of improvement.    
Turnaround literature supports the argument that specific competencies are 
required of leaders in order to achieve turnaround success (Kowal & Hassel, 2011; Public 
Impact, 2008). Notably, Aladejem et al. (2010) found that principals that did not 
demonstrate competencies still achieved improvements.  Aladejem et al. (2010) 
conducted a retrospective qualitative study to document 11 schools that demonstrated 
improvement during the school years of 2000 through 2005. The schools either 
demonstrated slow improvement, within three and five years, or rapid and dramatic 
improvement within one to two years. Eight of the schools were determined as rapid-
improvement schools and the remaining three were designated as slow-improvement 
schools. Aladejem et al. (2010) aver that principals that achieved less turnaround success 
were more management type leaders and focused less on the change process. Principals 
that focused on the change process implemented quick strategies and reinforced the 
improvement through re-culturing efforts.  According to Aladejem et al. (2010) most of 
the study’s principals employed distributed leadership strategies. The researchers 
delineate that the implementation of distributed leadership practices were critical to their 
success.  
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 Aladejem et al. (2010) proffer that the turnaround principals distributed leadership 
styles included engaging staff in developing instructional policies and supporting data 
driven decisions. Study principals demonstrated competencies in motivating employees 
and setting high expectations for staff and pupils. Furthermore, Aladejem et al. (2010) 
posit that study principals focused on student outcomes, developed consistent school 
procedures, and improved the culture by enforcing a belief that change was of urgent. 
Limitations to this study include the small sample size of eleven schools and none of the 
school examined were Head Start programs. 
Similarly, Herman et al. (2008) demonstrate the commonalities of successful 
turnaround leaders. Herman et al. (2008) analyzed turnaround literature derived from ten 
turnaround case studies. The studies included a combination of 35 schools, six high 
school, eight middle schools, and 21 elementary schools. The case studies examined 
represent turnaround research during the school years of 1999- 2005.  The purpose of the 
study is to analyze ten case studies to provide similarities and findings to provide strong 
evidence of successful turnaround competencies. Herman et al. (2008) preface the study 
delineating that all of the case studies examined provided low evidence to support the 
significance of the data. Despite the low significance levels, the researchers deduced from 
the study commonalities in successful turnaround leadership. Similar to work of 
Aladejem et al. (2010), the researchers found commonalities in the practices of 
turnaround principals specifically, in developing a clear vision and expectations.  The 
principals developed a culture of change renouncing status quo and setting high goals of 
all staff and mandating their commitment to the change process. 
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 Turnaround principals enforced the message that everyone must change. 
According to Herman et al. (2008) new principals analyzed data about student 
achievement before creating changes. The researchers contend that the turnaround plan 
must be ground in data and analyzed to ensure the appropriateness for the change 
initiative.  Herman et al. (2008) posit that the turnaround principals studied and 
eliminated barriers to change. Additionally, the principals monitored staff and pupil 
performance and were more accessible to manage student behaviors in addition to 
observing classroom instruction.  
Interestingly, Herman et al. (2008) delineates similar findings to the work of 
Aladejem et al. (2010). Both studies found that the principals employed distributed 
leadership practices engaging staff and other stakeholders. According to Herman et al. 
(2008) all participants established goals related to teaching instruction and establish 
procedures to regularly monitor progress. The researchers posit that turnaround leaders 
develop successful strategies by establishing one or two short term goals that are highly 
achievable. Once the goals are achieved, turnarounds leaders declare quick wins by 
publicly announce the accomplishments of the strategy. The researchers assert that 
highlighting quick wins will gain parent confidence in the success of the strategy and 
minimize the effects of naysayers (Herman et al., 2008). 
Herman et al. (2008) provide evidence of commonalties in turnaround leader 
competencies and actions in alignment with other turnaround studies (Aladejem et al., 
2010; Public Impact, 2008). The researchers contend that this study offers low-level 
evidence, however argues that the study provides strong recommendations to lead to the 
likelihood of the successful turnaround strategy. Albeit, the researchers provide evidence 
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 of turnaround commonalities, they fail to examine the cohesion of successful practices of 
Head Start directors’ turnaround around low-performing Head Start programs to 
improved high-performing programs. 
The research studies presented in this chapter describe the role of the district, 
principals as change agents, and the specific leadership competencies needed to facilitate 
the successful K-12 turnaround in schools. The school district sets the turnaround 
strategy by analyzing the causes for low performance before prescribing the turnaround 
strategy. The district selects the right leaders, ensures autonomy for the principals to 
make critical decisions, and provides the appropriate professional development and funds 
to support the turnaround at the school.  
The literature provides evidence that principal action steps are complex and 
crucial to the successful turnaround. Most importantly, the principal begins with 
developing a vision and gaining buy-in from all stakeholders. Furthermore, the literature 
provides evidence that turnaround principals demonstrate similar actions. Their actions 
and competencies are unique to principals of their kind. Consequently, it cannot be 
assumed that principals currently leading high performing schools will successfully 
turnaround low-performing schools. Turnaround principal demonstrate a unique set of 
competencies. There are four core competencies of turnaround principals: (a) driving for 
results, (b) influencing for results, (c) problem solving, and (d) showing confidence to 
lead (Public Impact, 2007). Interestingly, the core competencies are aligned with Kotter’s 
(1996) eight-stage change model. This model is tightly aligned with the leadership 
actions and competencies of turnaround leaders reviewed in this chapter. Despite, the 
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 alignment with Kotter’s (1996) change model the literature fails to document evidence 
relative to Head Start directors.  
Examining the literature according to Kotter’s model. The literature reviewed 
demonstrates the breadth of coverage relative to turnaround leadership. Albeit, the studies 
examined fail to demonstrate turnaround practices in Head Start whereas it guides the 
researcher in developing a framework to examine the phenomenon of Head Start 
turnaround. This section summarizes the relationship between Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage 
change model and the variables that provide evidence of successful strategies for 
turnaround and major variations, if any, in the strategies reviewed. 
Step 1 of Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change model requires Establishing a sense 
of urgency.  Making staff changes, requiring all staff to change, and the mandate for 
quick and dramatic change are evidence of actions that validates turnaround leaders’ 
establishment of the sense of urgency in the nature of turnaround. Actually, the fact that a 
school is engaged in turnaround represents the sense of urgency.  All of the studies 
examined in this literature review document the sense of urgency. Some studies signal the 
sense of urgency by making changes to leadership. The concept of changing principals is 
discussed in several studies as a signal to stakeholders that a change was necessary.  
Frederick and Gift (2009) proffer that guiding the turnaround with a new 
leadership strategy is beneficial. In contrast, Murphy (2008) warns that many weak 
turnaround strategies include retaining the existing school leaders. In the research by 
Theilman (2012), the researcher examined two principals who achieved success in their 
turnaround strategy. One principal was a new leader and the other principal was the 
existing principal and retained to facilitate the turnaround. Interestingly, Murphy (2008) 
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 delineates that there is point where school recovery is unattainable regardless of 
leadership replacement.   
Turnaround literatures asserts that the leader must establish a sense of urgency, 
and implement quick actions that include evaluation to understand the problems and 
reduce, a process to develop and execute short term goals ( Murphy, 2008).  Turnaround 
principals must develop a strategy that resolves where to focus intervention efforts and 
when to eliminate unsuccessful intervention efforts. These competencies are necessary to 
conduct a successful school turnaround (Duke & Salmonowicz, 2010).  
Much of the literature examined supports Kotter’s (1996) Step 2, Form a Guiding 
Coalition (Public Impact, 2008; Murphy & Meyers, 2009; Tucker et al., 2008; Duke & 
Jacobson, 2011).  The researchers support the idea of building a team to guide the vision, 
moreover, they posit that all staff must commit to the change. Similarly, the literature 
supports Kotter’s (1996) Step 3, Create a vision, as most of the literature examined 
provides evidence of the importance of developing a vision.  Duke (2006) establishes that 
turnaround leaders establish a mission and focus. Similarly, Hassel and Hassel (2009) and 
Kowal and Ableidinger (2011) document the importance of developing a mission and 
focus to the successful strategy. 
A number of the studies examined provide evidence of support for Kotter’s 
(1996) Step 4, Communicating the change vision (Herman, 2012; Public Impact, 2008; 
Public Impact, 2009; Rhim, 2012). Turnaround leaders communicate the message to all 
stakeholders that there is a need to change. Interestingly, Theilman (2012), Duke and 
Salmonwicz (2010), Hassel and Hassel (2009) and Kowal and Ableidinger (2011) all 
provide examples to support Kotter’s Step 5, Empowering others to act.  For example, 
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 Duke and Salmonwicz (2010), Public Impact (2007), and Public Impact (2008), discuss 
the importance of removing staff that do not support the vision in addition to removing 
obstacles to achieving the change. Similarly, Duke (2006) asserts that principals must 
have the autonomy to remove staff that fails to support the vision. Negative and toxic 
cultures cannot sustain a turnaround. It is important for turnaround leaders to change the 
culture and restore confidence by empowering the team, collaboration, engendering 
respect, recognizing the contributions of the staff (Murphy & Meyers, 2009).   
Recognizing successes and contributions of staff are in alignment with Kotter’s 
(1996) Step 6, Generating short term wins. Many studies mention the importance of 
establishing small wins during the early stages of the turnaround process ( Hess & Gift, 
2009, Kowal & Ableidinger, 2011; Murphy & Meyers, 2008). Additionally, Duke and 
Jacobson, (2011) and Kowal and Hassel (2011) reported the advantages of highlighting 
small wins. The authors posit that generating small wins increases momentum, 
documents the successes of the strategy, diminishes the power of naysayers, and 
encourages buy-in with stakeholders to support the turnaround strategy. In contrast, Duke 
(2006) did not report findings that emphasized the importance of generating short term 
wins.  None of the studies provided explicit evidence of the need to develop small wins.  
Kowal and Hassel (2011) provide evidence to support Kotter’s (1996), Step 7, 
Consolidate improvement and produce more change. Turnaround leaders eliminate failed 
efforts and focus on successful strategy efforts.  Duke and Salmonowicz (2010) research 
found that Turnaround principals’ strategy included a focus on successful intervention 
efforts and they knew when to eliminate unsuccessful intervention efforts. Turnaround 
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 leaders focus on data and monitor progress regularly to gather when to eliminate failed 
efforts (Kowal & Hassel, 2011).  
Finally, several studies provide evidence to support Kotter’s (1996) Step 8, 
Institutionalize new approaches (Herman et al., 2008; Hassel & Hassel, 2009; Kowal & 
Hassel, 2011; Murphy & Meyers, 2009; Public Impact, 2007, Public Impact, 2008). 
Tucker et al. (2008) in particular, emphasized the importance of re-culturing to create a 
culture that supported student learning. Re-culturing was documented to create new 
organizational norms and change behaviors. None of the literature examined represent a 
stark contrast in turnaround practices. Each article examined supports at least two of 
Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change model. Among the studies examined, the following 
studies support seven or more of Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change model: (a) Kowal 
and Abliedinger, 2011; (b) Public Impact, 2008; (c) Hassel and Hassel, 2009; (d) Kowal 
and Hassel, 2011; (e) Theilman, 2012; and (f) Herman et al., 2008. These studies reflect 
support of Kotter’s (1996) change model and the actions of leaders improving chronically 
low-performing programs. It will be interesting to examine Kotter’s framework and its 
relationship to Head Start directors’ turnaround practices.  
Conclusion 
With the threat of recompetion and the increase of low performing Head Start 
programs, the field has an urgent need to focus on exploring the organizational change 
process within low-performing Head Start program and turnaround strategies employed 
by Head Start directors who guide their programs from a state of low-performance to 
high-performing Head Start programs. 
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 Chapter 2 provides evidence that turnaround in early care and education settings, 
more specifically Head Start have not been explored in the literature and scholarly 
research. This gap validates the need for future research to investigate and answer the 
following question:  
What do Head Start Directors identify as the successful turnaround practices that 
improved their low-performing programs and transformed the programs to full 
compliance with all Head Start Performance Standards?   
The researcher will interpret the data to analyze the change process employed by 
Head Start directors to investigate if there is any alignment with Kotter’s (1996) eight-
stage change model.  
The lack of literature has created a gap and warrants an emergence of scholarship 
to investigate the successful turnaround of Head Start programs. Whereas the literature 
has substantiated cross-sector turnaround literature, it fails to include Head Start.  This 
literature review substantiates the need for further exploration.  
In Chapter 3 the researcher will describe the methodology for conducting research 
to answer the questions regarding how Head Start directors turnaround low-performing 
programs. In addition the chapter previews the design and execution of the qualitative 
study. Furthermore, it details the design of the study, rationale, study participants, 
instrumentation, ethical considerations, issues of trustworthiness, and process for data 
analysis to report findings to the field. 
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 Chapter 3: Methodology 
Introduction: The General Perspective 
To date, there is not a documented model of turnaround application in the 
literature detailing instances of troubled Head Start programs being improved. 
Consequently, the existing research identifies turnaround in the context of schools, 
nonprofits, churches, and organizational turnaround. The purpose of this study is to 
examine the dynamics of the turnaround process in Head Start programs as described by 
directors of underperforming programs that experienced turnaround and the leadership 
behaviors implemented to facilitate performance improvements in full compliance of the 
Head Start Performance Standards (HSPS) for Federal Review accountability.  
The employment of a qualitative design guided this study in documenting Head 
Start turnaround practices and created a road map for other Head Start programs to 
facilitate program turnaround from low-performing and operating out of compliance to 
high-performing programs operating in full compliance with the HSPS. Furthermore, the 
qualitative design offered in-depth reflective insight into leadership practices, monitoring 
procedures, organizational culture, and turnaround practices implemented by Head Start 
directors. Currently, this phenomenon is not explored, so there is a critical need to 
introduce discourse about the practices of Head Start directors as they facilitate the 
improvement processes. The introduction of their respective reflections on how they 
facilitated change will provide programs that are currently low-performing a road-map to 
lead to improvements that ultimately benefit the children served. The researcher ascribed 
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 meaning from the data provided by Head Start turnaround directors as they detailed the 
improvement trajectory in achieving full compliance status. First, the researcher will 
provide an understanding of the turnaround procedures employed by Head Start directors. 
Then, the researcher will analyze the data and to understand if the participants’ actions 
reflect instances of Kotter’s (1996) model (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The research 
employed the use of an open-ended interview and demographic questionnaire to gain 
understanding and gather credible evidence to help answer the question: 
What do Head Start directors identify as the successful turnaround practices that 
improved their low-performing programs and transformed the programs to full 
compliance with all Head Start Performance Standards?   
The chapter begins with a discussion of the basic tenets of qualitative 
methodology. Next, the context of the study is reviewed describing how the participants 
were selected and study criteria. Then, the researcher’s positionality as an insider is 
explained. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the instrumentation, procedures, and 
data analysis. Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief analysis of how the study 
addressed reliability and trustworthiness. 
A cross-case analysis offered the researcher robust data that extended beyond one 
specific case but offered the researcher an opportunity to examine the practices of 
multiple directors (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Analyzing the strategies, behaviors, and 
specific conditions experienced by various directors increased the opportunities for 
generalization and added significance within multiple cases. Additionally, a cross-case 
analysis explicated the phenomenon by analyzing comparisons and relations across 
numerous cases. Cross-case analysis permitted the researcher to dig-deeply to understand 
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 the methods employed by Head Start directors in the United States who have improved 
their Head Start programs from a state of low-performance to high-performance 
operating within full compliance with all HSPS for Federal Review accountability. 
The study included an in-depth, one-on-one telephone interview with directors 
identified from the list of the eligible Head Start programs provided by OHS. The 
directors were interviewed to gain understanding about the dramatic improvements made 
during the time between their most recent federal review, for the purposes of this study it 
will be referred to as federal review 2 (FR2), and the review previous to FR2, in which 
the program was cited for six or more non-compliances or one or more deficiency 
findings, this review will be defined as federal review 1 (FR1). Additionally, participants 
were asked to respond to an electronic semi-structured questionnaire to gather personal 
demographic and organizational structural data. The results of the study inform the early 
childhood and education field about effective turnaround strategies that can be used to 
lead change efforts. 
The Research Context 
Participants were selected from a list generated by OHS identifying grantees that 
met the study criteria.  Forty-one grantees were identified as meeting the criteria. The 
selection criteria for participants included: (a) each participant must be a grantee or 
delegate operating a Head Start program; (b) at the grantee’s FR2, the program must have 
achieved a full compliance finding; and (c) the grantee must have previously received a 
finding of six or more non-compliances or one or more deficient findings from their FR1 
during 2007- 2009. 
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 The researcher invited all eligible grantees and its delegates to participate in the 
study. The participants represented Head Start grantees across 25 states: located in 
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New York, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  The 
programs are operated by a mix of private nonprofit (n= 19), public schools (n=9), 
universities (n=2), and Native-American Tribal (n=11) programs. 
The Research Participants 
The participants included Head Start directors who have led their programs from 
non-compliant or deficient status to achieve full compliance over the past two reviews. 
This accomplishment demonstrates substantial improvement in program performance.  
The list of grantees that met the selection criteria provided by OHS included 41 grantees 
and its delegates.   
All of the eligible Head Start directors were invited to participate via email. The 
selections of participants were determined by the number of respondents that agreed to 
participate. A total of six programs agreed to participate. However, rich data about Head 
Start directors’ competencies and action steps were gathered.  
Creswell (2007) suggests deliberately sampling individuals that have first-hand 
knowledge who can best inform the phenomenon being studied.  For this study 
purposeful sampling were employed. Interview criteria required that prior to the 
interview the participant needed to confirm that they were the responsible person for the 
strategy and improvement process regarding the turnaround. Subsequently, all of the 
interviewees confirmed their leadership in the turnaround effort. The interviews and 
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 associated demographic questionnaire began in April 2013 after Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) approval. The interview process commenced over four months. Interviews 
were conducted from April through July 2013. The audiotaped interviews were sent to a 
local professional transcriptionist for transcription. Once the interviews are transcribed 
the research data coding and analysis immediately followed. 
The researcher intended to collect demographic information collection from the 
participants which included age, gender, race, organization reporting structure,  
educational background, length of time served as a Head Start director, tenure with the 
current Head Start program, current title, and specific training related to turnaround or 
change management. The demographic questionnaire, found in Appendix B, was 
distributed electronically prior to the initial telephone interview. In addition to the 
questionnaire, the researcher requested the participant’s report of findings from FR1 and 
FR2 in addition to the most recent program information report (PIR).  
Only three of the six respondents completed the demographic survey. 
Interestingly, several respondents did not disclose their FR1 and FR2 data and PIR. It is 
presumed that the respondents did not want to share confidential documents. As an 
additional challenge, it appeared that the respondents and potential participants were 
fearful of identifying information being deduced from the study data to indicate 
participants to OHS and staff. It is the researcher’s intent to protect respondent’s privacy 
and maintain confidentiality to mitigate the risk of negative consequences. Therefore, 
participants in the study are not identified. The researcher has taken care to only identify 
the programs with a letter as a program identifier. The researcher does not pinpoint 
specific geographic location, programmatic information, unique program traits, and 
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 gender of participants in order to protect the identity of the participants. Therefore, the 
contents in the demographic survey were not analyzed for the purposes in this study.  
Researcher as Insider 
The researcher is a former Head Start director and has worked in the capacity of a 
Head Start director hired to conduct a turnaround.  This relationship served as a benefit 
when interviewing the participants. Whereas allowing the researcher to gain a deeper 
understanding and offer opportunities for self-reflection when analyzing the data. At the 
start of each interview, before the questions began, the researcher disclosed to the 
participants the status as a former Head Start director. The status as an “insider” may 
have offered the respondents the freedom to speak comfortably without fear or judgment. 
Additionally, the participants were comfortable describing their experiences as they knew 
they were engaging with someone that were aware of the nomenclatures of Head Start 
and possessed an understanding of the challenges as a Head Start director. As an insider, 
the researcher is fully aware of the issues that arise with program improvements within 
Head Start programs. Interestingly, the researcher easily developed a rapport with the 
interviewees. Likewise, the interviewees seemed to reduce inhibitions to share 
information. According to Thurman (2001), the rapport between the researcher and 
participant is critical to obtaining rich data.  
Instrumentation  
Head Start directors selected were asked to participate in one telephone interview 
and complete one questionnaire to gather demographic data about the director and Head 
Start program.  The questionnaire was administered online, and data were collect using 
Qualtrics, a web-based survey collection software. Each interview ranged between 40 and 
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 75 minutes long. Directors described common challenges and contextual variations which 
influenced their turnaround practices. The interview questions, found in Appendix C, are 
researcher-developed and based on Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change model. 
Standardized open-ended interviews were employed to understand the directors’ 
perspectives in their own words about their lived experiences regarding program 
improvement. Standardized open-ended interview protocols were utilized using the same 
questions for each participant. This approach was employed to increase the comparability 
of responses, reduce interviewer bias, and facilitate the organization of data analysis 
(Patton, 2002).   
The questions on the interview protocol (see Appendix C) were designed to 
ensure that it did not permit yes or no responses. The interview questions engaged the 
participants to detail their experiences in their own words without limitations or 
restrictions (Gall, Gall & Borg, 2003). Consequently, this style of interview is more 
difficult to code due to the amount of detail in the participants’ responses (Creswell, 
2007).  Interview questions focused on how the Head Start turnaround directors 
facilitated the change process, described challenges during the process, and the culture 
and climate of the program during the change process. More specifically, the questions 
focused on strategies used to facilitate the improvement process, monitoring practices, 
communication, and professional development.   
Only two programs released their FR1, FR2 and PIR documents for review. 
Subsequently, this presented a challenge in reviewing the participants FR1 and FR2 
documents.  As an alternative, the eligibility listing from OHS was reviewed. The listing 
contained data from FR1 and FR2 for all participants. Therefore, this information served 
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 as a suitable substitution for missing data and provided evidence of programs non-
compliances and deficiency findings. Notably, all of the participants were confirmed by 
OHS as meeting the study criteria.  
Procedures 
The researcher employed pilot testing of the interview questions with two Head 
Start directors in Western, NY. Both directors facilitated significant improvements in 
their respective programs and their input allowed the researcher to test the protocol for 
timing and clarity of the question format (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2003).  Subsequently, no 
significant changes were made to the interview protocol after the pilot interviews. 
Whereas during the interview process an additional question emerged regarding fiscal 
matters and was added to the Protocol, see Appendix C.  Creswell (2007) suggests 
employing the use of a protocol to record information and collect interview data in an 
organized fashion. The protocol contains twenty-one interview questions, found in 
appendix C, focused on the state of the Head Start program before the improvement 
process began, the period between FR1 and FR2, and after the improvement. The 
questions guided the conversation to gain an understanding of the changes implemented 
by the participants that led to program improvements.  
Participants were contacted via email and requested to participate. Participants 
were informed of their rights and offered detailed information regarding the purpose of 
the study and confidentiality.  Respondents were made aware that their participation was 
voluntary, confidential, and their right to withdraw from the study at any time without 
consequence. As discussed previously, the names and program identities are protected 
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 and therefore each program is assigned a letter as an identifier. Letters A-F will be used 
to identify each program.  
Prior to the initial telephone interview, each participant electronically received the 
demographic questionnaire and interview questions at least one week prior to the 
scheduled interview. Additionally, the participants were asked to upload their FR1, FR2 
and PIR.  As previously mentioned, participant follow-through in this area were minimal. 
The participants received an email link with access to the questionnaire for the duration 
of the study. In an effort to reduce low response rates, participants received emails 
informing them of the pivotal role they played in informing research to improve program 
quality for Head Start children and families.  Head Start directors that did not respond to 
the survey received an email prompt to complete the questionnaire in addition to a second 
email encouraging them to complete the demographic questionnaire. Three of the six 
respondents completed the electronic survey. This presented a challenge when attempting 
to analyze demographic survey data across programs. Additionally, participant 
recruitment was a challenge. The researcher sent multiple emails to potential participants 
in an effort to gain interest in the study. Moreover, all of the eligible participants that met 
the study were contacted either via telephone or email to increase participation. 
Interestingly, some potential candidates refused to participate, others did not respond, and 
some respectfully declined. There were several potential interviewees that agreed to 
participate, scheduled for an interview and failed to follow through with the interview.  
Non-respondents were approached a second and even a third time, until a response was 
achieved. However, the researcher did not always get a response.  
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 Graciously, six of the 41 eligible Head Start grantees participated in the study. Six 
Head Start turnaround leaders were interviewed on the telephone and recorded using an 
iPhone to digitally record the interview. Additionally, an iPad were utilized as a back-up 
to ensure the successful recording and mitigate the risk of a failed recording. According 
to Kvale and Brinkmann (2009), audio recording interviews increase the accuracy in 
coding. All interviews were transcribed employing a professional transcriptionist. In 
seeking to ensure rigor in this qualitative study, the researcher engaged in full 
transcription assuring that the interviews gathered everything that the participants said 
including grammatical errors and pauses in speech. Hard copies of the transcriptions, as 
well as the digital voice recording, will be maintained for a period of five years. The hard 
copies of the transcription will be stored in a locked file cabinet. The data will be 
destroyed after a period of five years.   
Individual interviews were read twice and then categorized and coded to discover 
common themes.  In an effort to gain transactional validity the researcher invited the 
participants to review the transcripts and agree that their perspectives were accurately 
interpreted (Cho & Trent, 2006). The participants were offered one week to make any 
corrections to the transcripts, and if no changes were initiated by the participants, the 
transcripts were transcribed as recorded. Additionally, the researcher simultaneously 
listened to each recording and matched it to the transcribed data to assure its accuracy. 
Transcribed data were entered into the qualitative software program, Atlas.ti for coding 
and analysis.  
  65 
 Data Analysis   
All of the interviews were coded by the researcher to ensure consistency of 
coding across participant interviews. Data analysis included coding and categorizing for 
themes. Transcripts were coded using Atlas.ti, a qualitative software tool. The researcher 
collected and analyzed the turnaround actions steps described by the study participants to 
answer the research question guiding the current study. Then the researcher analyzed the 
findings to determine if the Head Start turnaround directors’ actions steps demonstrated 
any relationship to Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change model.   
Analysis of the data were conducted using thematic qualitative coding. The 
coding was conducted in a line by line format. Open codes were developed by reading the 
text and not based on the established A priori codes. The researcher found that the A 
priori codes developed limited the analysis of the data to Kotter’s change model. Open 
coding helped ensure that coding was developed based on participant discourse and not 
based on the researcher’s inherent biases. After open coding, axial codes were used to 
categorize the open codes around dominant codes and relationships. Uniquely, the 
Atlas.ti software provides the user the capability to examine the most dominant codes 
based on groundedness, the number of text passages associated with a code in addition to 
density, the number of codes connected to a single code. These techniques enabled the 
researcher to develop multiple levels of analysis to examine the significance of codes.  
After all the transcripts were coded, relationships between codes and the contextual 
framework of the study were finalized and four themes emerged from the data (Friese, 
2012).  
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 The researcher employed an internal audit to ensure consistency of themes and 
categories identified in the data. The researcher conducted an internal audit and ensured 
for inter-rater reliability by employing check-coding with a second coder for interviews 
one, two, and three to affirm a reliable data analysis process (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
To confirm agreement between the researcher and second coder, each transcript were 
coded and then inter-rater reliability checked. The first and second coder discussed the 
process and codes were selected. In instances where the researcher and second coder did 
not agree as to how to code a particular passage, the researcher made the final 
determination. The estimated agreement established from the three rounds of coding 
ranged between 85 to 90 percent. 
Triangulation helps to ensure the validity of data collected (Creswell, 2007). It 
was the researcher’s intention to conduct additional data analysis by demonstrating a 
thorough review of the grantee’s federal review documents from FR1, FR2 and the PIR. 
Unexpectedly, this data was not made available by all respondents.  Alternatively, the 
researcher employed other convergence methods to affirm reliable and valid data 
regarding the programs studied.  Participant data were compared to the federal review 
data received to the data acquired from OHS in addition to interview data across 
participants. Whereas it was analyzed for consistency and commonalities across the data 
previewed the six participant interviews. Data that appeared contradictory were given 
additional scrutiny, which included member checking. Through member checking the 
researcher selected participants to verify information and add input. Additionally, the use 
of a second coder increased the opportunities to reduce for inconsistencies across findings 
by employing a method of cross-checking data (Huberman and Miles (2002). 
  67 
 In an effort to ensure rich and robust qualitative data the researcher assured rigour 
in the study maintaining an audit trail, keeping a detailed record of data collection and 
analysis for confirmability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Audit trails are useful if the 
methodology changes the researcher can document the details of the change and the 
rationale (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).   
Summary 
Chapter 3 provides a description of the research method, the study design, 
participants, instruments, procedures, data collection and analysis and finally, 
trustworthiness is discussed. Findings from this study, as well as the connection to the 
research literature previewed in Chapter 2 will be presented in Chapter 4. Research study 
conclusions and recommendations for future studies are described in Chapter 5.  
Additionally, in Chapter 5 the researcher compares the findings with Kotter’s eight-stage 
change model and makes connections to the turnaround leader actions steps. The field 
needs to understand the organizational complexity, leadership behaviors, and strategies 
necessary to operate high-performing Head Start programs. Therefore, it is critical to 
examine the turnaround practices of leaders in Head Start programs, in an effort to not 
only explicate the phenomenon of Head Start turnaround, but to increase the opportunity 
to improve Head Start services for the children and families served. 
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 Chapter 4: Study Findings 
 This chapter presents an analysis of the qualitative data gathered through the 
interviews with the Head Start directors who led during successful program turnarounds. 
The purpose of the study was guided by the research question: What do Head Start 
directors identify as the successful turnaround practices that transformed their low-
performing programs into high-performing programs that meet Head Start Performance 
Standards? 
The chapter is divided into four sections: (a) Organizational Noncompliance, (b) 
Managing Self, (c) Managing Others, and (d) Systems Turnaround. Notably, the four 
areas serve as the overarching themes for the study. In the first section, Organizational 
Noncompliance, the researcher provides the context regarding the reasons the Head Start 
director’s attributed to their programs non-compliant and deficiency status. The following 
section, Managing Self, explores the turnaround competencies the leaders were 
dependent upon to facilitate them in leading the turnaround. Next, Managing Others, 
details the unique steps that each director implemented to help staff redirect their work to 
ensure full compliance. The final section, Systems Turnaround, provides a summary of 
the actions steps that provides evidence of the turnaround.   
The results presented in this study were derived from semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews with six Head Start directors across the United States. Each interview ranged 
between 40 and 75 minutes long. Directors described common challenges and contextual 
variations which influenced their turnaround practices. Despite their challenges all of the 
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 directors dramatically improved their programs. Collectively, the six programs were cited 
by OHS with 63 non-compliances and seven deficiencies.  All of the directors 
demonstrated common approaches in facilitating their respective turnarounds. Each 
director discussed their experiences educating stakeholders about the changes within 
Head Start and described how they utilized technical assistance (formal or informal) to 
educate themselves about expectations and implications for compliance with the new 
HSPS within their organizations.   
Each program participant was assigned a letter ranging from A to F as a program 
identifier, as shown in table 4.1. Programs were located across the United States. Two 
programs were located in the northeastern region, three from the Midwestern region, and 
one from the southeastern region. Program sizes ranged from small to large.  
Table 4.1 
Participant Data 
 
Program 
Identifier 
 
 
Program A 
 
 
Program B 
 
Program C 
 
Program D 
 
Program E 
 
Program F 
Geographic 
Identifier 
Northeastern Midwestern Northeastern Midwestern Midwestern Southeastern 
Size of 
Program 
Small 
program 
Small 
program 
Large 
program 
Small Large Small 
Range of 
enrollment 
0-300 0-300 600-1000 0-300 600-1000 0-300 
 
Organizational Noncompliance 
OHS cited 63 non-compliances and seven deficiencies across the six study 
programs. The Head Start turnaround leaders attributed multiple factors for their 
programs noncompliant or deficient status. These reasons are categorized in four areas: 
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 (a) Finance, (b) Shared Governance, (c) Human Resources, and (d) Monitoring Systems. 
Interestingly, all six directors cited lack of understanding of changes made to the HSPS 
after the adoption of the 2007 Head Start Act as a factor in the noncompliant or 
deficiency findings.   
Finance. Five of six directors agreed that the fiscal procedures and financial 
matters were not their areas of expertise and subsequently were disconnected from HSPS 
for fiscal operations and attributed this factor for the fiscal related non-compliances.  
Four of the six the directors worked their way up the ranks with early roots as a teacher 
and lacked experience working with the financial aspects of the program.  The director 
from Program F stated: 
I kept getting phone calls from our program specialist saying you need to fix this, 
why did you do this wrong, and I would go, and one time I said, I don’t do that, 
the finance person does that and they said well you better figure it out because the 
finance person is not responsible, the Head Start director is.   
The directors discussed their previous disconnect with the fiscal matters prior to 
their turnaround efforts. Fiscal managers maintained the responsibility and monitoring for 
this area and shared reports and financial data with Head Start directors when requested. 
Program B, summarized, “Fiscal procedures are not on my radar.  I’m busy doing school 
readiness calls and making sure that transportation is in line and documents are 
completed. We spend very little time studying the fiscal procedure manual.”  Five of the 
six interviews demonstrated that the Head Start directors were reliant on the fiscal 
manager for financial data and lacked the skills to monitor the fiscal content area.  
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 Shared governance.  The turnaround leaders detailed the need for turnaround in 
the area of governance. Head Start directors found that their governance procedures did 
not parallel structures and functions as outlined in the HSPS. Four of the six directors 
recalled the importance of ensuring that the governance component paralleled HSPS. 
Head Start directors needed to understand their role in providing supports to the board in 
knowing their responsibilities. Program E, emphasized the need to improve governance 
processes in their program. 
I remember the first time that I brought to their attention [board] that we needed a 
board member that will be representing the accounting background, and then 
another one who is a lawyer. We need to look for someone that is going to help us 
take another look at those pieces that heads that program.  
Program E’s recount provides evidence of the need to ensure the board structure is 
aligned with the HSPS. The board was not clear on their role to monitor and provide 
subject matter expertise in specific areas.  Additionally, director’s found that the Policy 
Council was weak and parent engagement was minimal.  
Human resources.  All participants reported that they did not have a thorough 
understanding of the changes made to the HSPS after the 2007 Head Start Act. 
Consequently, directors lacked clarity on subsequent changes to staff qualifications and 
updates that affected other program areas.  Programs were cited for expired Child 
Development Associate Credentials (CDA). Staff lacked the required credentials to teach 
in specific rooms. Changes to the HSPS forced changes in staff roles. The director at 
program B stated, “There were all these changes that really changed the focus of service 
delivery for family advocates.” Job descriptions failed to clarify expectations and failed 
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 to outline the appropriate educational requirements.  Several directors cited their staff’s 
lack of qualifications and their failure to follow established procedures despite previous 
training as challenges for meeting HSPS.  
Ongoing monitoring systems.  Five of the six directors’ attributed a lack of 
ongoing monitoring procedures as other reasons for their program’s noncompliance 
status. Other reasons cited included, failure to thoroughly analyze data and failure to 
follow-up on pertinent program information.  One of the Head Start programs failed to 
correct a non-compliance. Consequently, the non-compliance was elevated to a 
deficiency by OHS. Programs were plagued with late reporting and failed record keeping. 
Notably, one of the programs was threatened with a shut-down from OHS, but 
successfully won the appeal and permitted to continue operations.  
The Head Start programs either did not have monitoring procedures in place or 
failed to understand the intricacy involved with program monitoring to ensure HSPS 
compliance. One program reported that programmatic information were either not 
documented, inaccurate, or not completed on time. Programs reported concerns with 
integrity of the available data and their lack of documenting programmatic 
accomplishments.  
Program A’s director detailed her recollection reviewing the PIR report prior to 
implementing the improvement plan. 
If you look at the PIR from that year, there were things like 134%, and you can’t 
have more than 100%.  So it was just a mess and in sort of asking questions about 
where the data came from, I think a lot of the data came out of people’s heads. 
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 Program A’s description provides evidence that the integrity of data was 
questioned when metrics were inaccurate. Consequently, staff lacked an understanding of 
how metrics were derived and had little information to evaluate the effectiveness of 
program services. Additionally, programs reported that systems to foster continuous 
improvement were not in place. The programs lacked goal follow-up and reported 
concerns with timeliness and accuracy of reports. Three of the six directors indicated 
concerns with service related data. The directors stated that data were gathered on an 
annual basis in lieu of analyzing data at varying points of the program year to inform 
decision making regarding program improvements and follow-up on trends.  
Managing Self 
This section examines the theme managing self. The directors’ stories provide 
evidence that turnaround directors possess competencies that reflect abilities in building 
inner strength and creating personal change. Drawing upon the data from the Head Start 
director interviews revealed significant information related to their leadership 
development in preparing for the implementation of the turnaround process. This section 
describes the trajectory of the Head Start turnaround leaders as they focused on managing 
themselves by engaging in preparing self and technical assistance. Interestingly, the 
directors’ stories provide evidence that they engaged in formal technical assistance (TA) 
and informal technical assistance while employing a strategy for program improvement.  
Self-development.  All of the directors discussed the importance of staying 
current with new research and upcoming Head Start developments. The director at 
program B detailed the importance of self-reflection and staying current on research. 
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 Spend some time in self-reflection and spend some time just reading… none of us 
take the time, or have the time to sit down and pick up a journal and read it. Head 
Start had great articles about parent engagement, to be more proactively engaged 
as to what’s on that horizon, it is very difficult to balance head down time with 
heads up time…turn off that computer, turn off all work, and spend some time 
just reading documents trying to keep up with things.  
Program E illustrated the challenges experienced by Head Start directors in 
making time for self-reflections and reading journals. The director affirmed engaging in 
self-development is necessary to stay current with new advances. Similarly, Program E 
described her work with a life coach to support with self-reflection. “I went through 
doing all these things and all of the changes, I needed a life coach… [I was] determined 
and committed, but I needed to get to know myself better.”  Program E’s reflection 
illustrates the importance of self-development during the turnaround process. The data 
revealed that Head Start turnaround leaders continuously engaged in current research and 
shared the information with staff.  
Technical assistance. The turnaround leaders recognized the urgency in 
facilitating progression towards full compliance with HSPS and assure a successful 
review. Each director began their trajectory towards full compliance in similar directions. 
All of the directors focused on self-development and engaged in formal or informal TA. 
Formal TA is provided through OHS or a paid consultant. Informal TA materializes in 
either one or a combination of the following approaches. Informal TA included (a) 
previous experiences, (b) support from other Head Start directors, (c) Head Start 
trainings, (d) attending Head Start Association meetings, and (e) OHS tools. 
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 Formal TA. Four of the six turnaround leaders received technical support 
provided by OHS. Notably, the directors share contrary opinions about the helpfulness of 
the support from OHS.  Program B, did not find the support provided by OHS helpful. “I 
can’t tell you that I think I got much in the way of consultative support,” stated Program 
B’s director. In contrast, Programs E and F found the support useful, but sought guidance 
from a consultant to assist with their journey towards improvement. “I just felt like she 
was the answer to my prayers,” stated the director from program F as she described her 
delight in working with a consultant.   
So I don’t want to say that our region has not been helpful.  I guess what I’m 
saying is, is that some of the information is confusing and hard to understand and 
I needed the consultant…a consultant who actually does more than just answer 
your questions.  It was a consultant that comes in and if you’re willing to open up, 
looks at everything and says this is not right you’ve got to fix this, you’ve got to 
fix this. 
Program F described the need to have a consultant that provided individualized 
support with guidance regarding non-compliance issues within the program. The director 
at Program F continued her conversation and described her fear of being vulnerable with 
OHS officials.  
We were very leery of sharing information with people because you want to be 
able to talk to your consultant and say, this is what we’re doing, is this okay and if 
it’s not okay help me fix it, not tattle on me…so you need to have a consultant 
that you can trust, so that’s why they said that if I was going to get a consultant I 
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 had to get an outside consultant who knew what they were doing and they had to 
sign a confidentiality agreement. 
The respondent’s board and Executive Director required her to work with a 
consultant not connected to OHS. These concerns described by the director illustrate the 
programs fear of sharing vulnerable performance information with OHS officials in 
concern of penalties. Consequently, she hired a consultant and kept questions with her 
OHS officials general.  In contrast, the director at Program D detailed her experiences 
working with the program specialist provided by OHS. 
We’ve had the same one for the last two or three years but, you know, for the two 
or three years before that we were constantly having a new grant specialist. I 
finally had somebody that I was familiar with and was familiar with me which 
that really wasn’t a big problem, it was just that I’m one that likes to be familiar 
with who I’m talking to and once that was stabilized with the federal people then I 
got to be a little bit more comfortable in asking questions.   
The director at Program D was satisfied with the TA OHS provided her program. 
The information provided by the Head Start directors illustrate that in addition to getting 
technical support directors ask questions of people they trust to ensure they are 
implementing the appropriate steps towards program compliance.  
Informal TA. All of the directors engaged in some form of informal TA. 
Interestingly, some directors engaged in formal and informal TA. This section details the 
directors’ preparation engaging in informal TA by drawing upon one or more of the 
following: (a) previous experiences, (b) support from other Head Start directors, (c) Head 
Start trainings, (d) attending Head Start Association meetings, and (e) OHS tools. 
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 Previous experiences. Three of the six directors leaned on their previous 
experiences to prescribe a strategy for turnaround. The director at Program A leaned on 
her prior knowledge leading a troubled program to guide the turnaround effort. She also 
stated that she received specialized training from OHS some years prior to her start with 
her current program. The director believed this training coupled with her previous 
experiences helped prepare her for the turnaround effort. Program A illustrated, “I had 
taken a program, a much larger program than this, from not being horrible but improved 
them over those years.  So I fell back on a lot of what I’d already done.” The director 
employed her previous experiences and training to facilitate the successful turnaround 
strategy. Distinctively, the respondents from Programs A, B and C drew upon their 
previous experiences to support their turnaround effort. The directors from Programs A 
and C had previous Head Start experience. 
Support from other Head Start directors. The Head Start directors interviewed 
described an informal system of support with other Head Start directors. Two directors 
that hinged on previous experiences described how they combined prior knowledge along 
with support from other Head Start directors to support their improvement strategy. Head 
Start directors connected at conferences and local Head Start Association meetings. 
Notably, four of the six directors interviewed described the importance of connecting 
with other directors to learn about how other programs were responding to Head Start 
changes, more specifically how other programs managed challenges in maintaining 
program compliance with the HSPS. Interestingly, at conferences and local Head Start 
Association meetings, directors commonly warned each other of reasons why their 
programs were cited for non-compliances or deficiencies. Additionally, Head Start 
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 directors shared information about best practices and updates on Federal Review 
experiences.  Notably, the director at Program F kept a running log of citations other 
programs received and used the information to develop a list of common non-
compliances to guide decisions about improvements in her own program.  
Everywhere I went I asked every person I knew how their monitoring review 
went and what they got counted down on, and I had an ongoing list…I have five 
pages of notes about things to make sure were going right that I needed to fix, or 
make sure were fixed, or make sure I was doing because somebody else got 
caught on it.  I said what were you written up for, so what did you get written up 
for, and I made sure it was done. 
The director described her process for gaining information about common Federal 
Review findings and utilized the information to assure her program was not cited for the 
same issues. Albeit, the director stated she experienced challenge from her superiors on 
making the recommended changes.   
People were like I don’t think we have to do this, I mean in my agency.  We’ve 
been reviewed so many times before and nobody said anything.  I said yes, but 
this agency over here got written up for it, maybe we didn’t get caught.  It’s like 
saying it’s okay for me to drive drunk or speed because I’ve never been caught.  
Yeah, but this person over here got caught so we shouldn’t drive drunk or speed. 
The director demonstrated her trust in the guidance she received from other Head 
Start directors. The director’s superiors looked for specific communication from OHS. 
The respondent described her concerns with OHS communication.  
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 Part of the things that come from the Office of Head Start are ambiguous 
sounding and they’re not really good about clarifying and they’re not sending out 
policy clarifications for all the questions that people are asking, and so you have 
to make educated guesses and it’s hard,  so I always aired on the side of caution.  
If I wasn’t sure I presented it to the executive director and the board and said 
look, these people were written up for this, this is a problem, do we want to 
change it or not. 
The director provides evidence that turnaround leaders want to make decisions 
that position their program to maintain program compliance and gather information from 
directors that have experienced error. The circle of trust appears to be unique to program 
directors.  Four of the six directors asked questions from other Head Start Programs they 
trusted to ensure the appropriate trajectory towards meeting full compliance with the 
performance standards.  Program B illustrated: 
I remember when I went to the [local association] meetings, I remember 
contacting at that time, someone based solely on the fact that her program is small 
like ours, her program is rural like ours.  I’m going to call and see if she would 
mind helping me, and I was very lucky that I got hold of someone who was very 
gracious, came to my program for an entire day… I said, I don’t know that I know 
how to write a grant.  I don’t know what a grant should contain, and again, that 
was a different era when there was not such a fear of if I give you my trade secrets 
are you going to go after my grant. But I developed a nice relationship with that 
particular director and I still have contact with her.  There was another Head Start 
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 director that I knew and is indeed a very respected director in this community that 
I often would call and ask questions of.   
The director at Program B illustrated the informal TA system that turnaround 
leaders engaged in by contacting directors they trusted that led programs in good 
standing. Interestingly, the director at Program B stated that exchanges of trade 
information were more frequent prior to recompetition. Consequently, the threat of 
recompetition has created a fear that other Head Start programs will compete for their 
grant if they were to be recompeted.  Turnaround leaders connect with individuals they 
trust whether OHS officials, consultants, and other directors. Program F illustrated:  
Hire somebody that’s going to help you or call another Head Start director or 
somebody else, get somebody that you trust that knows what they’re doing that 
will come in and open up to them enough that they can see what you’re doing 
wrong, because if you’re hiding it they’re not going to be able to fix it.  You have 
to be willing to open up and let people see that you’re not okay in order for them 
to be able to fix it.  
Being comfortable with the technical assistance enables turnaround leaders to be 
transparent and vulnerable in an effort to begin to recognize and fix the non-compliances.  
Head Start trainings. The turnaround directors discussed the impact of engaging 
in professional development either through training or learning from other programs in 
good standing. Program C details the importance of attending Head Start specific 
trainings. 
I get so much information by attending. Head Start has a leadership institute that 
they do in the fall and then again in the winter and at that leadership institute they 
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 tell you everything like Yvette Sanchez Fuentes was there, through the National 
Head Start Association, they tell you everything that’s coming down, what you 
should be doing, the reason behind everything and I attended those leadership 
institutes and I just grew and in talking with other colleagues and listening to 
other people’s stories, also the local Head Start Association [meetings], I became 
involved in that.   
The data revealed that Head Start turnaround leaders continuously engaged in 
Head Start trainings and OHS Leadership Institutes.  
Head Start Association meetings. Turnaround leaders connected with other 
directors at local Head Start Association meetings. Four of the six directors reported their 
active engagement with their local association. The director at Program F described her 
active engagement at her local association meetings. 
I started going to the [local] Head Start Association meetings when I would meet 
in the director’s class, and I would ask questions. In fact one person said, you ask 
all the questions and said you’re monopolizing the time and I thought yeah I 
probably am because other people don’t have questions, but I asked questions and 
we passed monitoring without findings. 
The respondent described the importance of asking questions at Association 
meetings and utilizing the information as a tool to support with programmatic 
improvements.  
OHS tools. The Head Start directors all cited the importance of using the tools 
made available by OHS. All of the directors detailed the importance of staying connected 
to communication on OHS’s website Early Childhood Learning & Knowledge Center 
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 (ECLKC). The directors illustrated the importance of actively perusing the ECLKC 
website and utilizing it as a tool to get new and helpful information to remain current on 
Head Start changes. Program E explained: 
Finding those resources on ECKLC, you know, I realize as I go out to national 
and state conferences or meetings that people don’t access the resources that are 
there.  I think we hear about it over and over again but people don’t actually take 
the time to go and look.  I think there’s something new on ECKLC almost every 
week. 
Turnaround directors recognize the importance of Head Start communication and 
resources on the ECKLC website. Interestingly, the Protocol is a resource available on 
the ECKLC website. Four of the six directors stated that they used the Protocol to help 
support their program with preparing for the federal review and to monitor for 
improvements. Program E explained their use of the Protocol with all program 
constituents. 
Print out the protocol as soon as you can and even if it’s not printed yet, get the 
year prior, they’re all online and make sure that everyone has a copy or at least 
part of their section, but it’s best to have the whole thing because you want to 
know a little bit from others as well…you have to have the parents, board and all 
of the staff, and I’m talking from housekeeping all the way to the board, everyone 
needs to know what’s going on, that the review is coming and what is in that 
protocol.  For me I think that’s the Holy Grail as they say. That’s what they 
[federal reviewers] are following and that’s what helps us along.  
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 Program E affirmed the benefits of using the Protocol as a tool to support 
improvements and compliance. The program ensured that information was shared across 
program content areas, among parents and board members. Despite their divergent 
commencement steps toward full compliance each director demonstrated commonalities 
in facilitating their action steps towards full compliance. Each director engaged self-
development and gained technical support. The next section will detail their steps as they 
utilized the skills gained to manage others.  
Managing Others 
The findings confirm that turnaround directors used information gained from 
technical assistance to manage self and influence their decisions towards change and 
target improvement efforts. After the directors gained the appropriate technical 
assistance, turnaround directors demonstrated confidence to pursue and achieve 
turnaround goals. The respondents developed a clear vision and communicated 
expectations with staff as they led their low-performing program into full compliance 
with HSPS. The directors employed their turnaround competences to facilitate their 
subordinates and constituents into transforming their own self-interest into concern for 
shared goals. The turnaround directors provided important lessons on how to manage 
others during the turnaround.  All of the directors affirmed that they encouraged 
participation from their subordinates, parents and board. The directors shared power and 
information, enhanced staff skills through professional development, and helped staff to 
develop shared goals. Program Director A provided her recollection regarding staff 
commitment.   
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 One of the factors for success had to be that there was this sort of core committed 
staff that wanted, that believed in the program that wanted it to work...There was 
a real commitment to compliance, to quality, and so staff were willing to change, 
they were willing most all of them knew that there was something not right...I 
mean for the most part people were from the cooks through teachers, to 
everybody else, were committed and they wanted it to be successful and they 
wanted the program to be recognized. I mean there’s probably, the usual like 10% 
that don’t care much about anything. 
The study participants contend that there are challenges in gaining staff 
commitment to support the new direction. Notably, the director from Program B, detailed 
her experiences with staff that lacked commitment to the goal.  
I say all the time don’t ever say one bad apple won’t spoil the whole bunch, 
because one bad apple will destroy you. And one person was and I use the term 
she became toxic and I attempted so many times, I do believe in staff intervention 
and staff support, and staff growth, let’s groom you to be a better employee rather 
than just toss you out, but we could not get there. 
The turnaround leaders highlighted the challenges faced with staff during the 
change process. Turnaround directors confirm that not all staff commit to the vision and 
often staff decided to leave the program. The turnaround leaders illustrated the 
importance of reculturing to overcome the effects of turnover and to gain staff support.  
Reculturing. The turnaround leaders focused their efforts on reculturing by 
building relationships with staff in effort to shift the culture from this is how we have 
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 always done it to a culture of accountability and staff compliance. The director at 
Program F describes the challenges of engaging staff in a cultural shift.  
Some of them [staff], especially the new people, bought in almost immediately, 
and they just started working at it.  There’s a couple of staff that were resistant the 
whole time.  We’ve been, we’ve done it this way before, it’s never gotten us in 
trouble, there’s no sense in changing now.  Then there were the others that didn’t 
want to change it and resented it but did it anyway. 
The directors demonstrate that staff must be coached through the change process. 
One example of the shifting the culture and the importance of relationship building is 
described by Program A’s director.  
We all knew we had past baggage whether it was scars from all the big changes 
we had to make that year, whether it was scars or fears over job changes, but if we 
were going to move this agency forward we needed to be a cohesive unit.  So we 
invested a good day and a half to two days really focused on that, before we ever 
began to really unearth this stuff that needed to be taken care of.    
The director engaged the staff in a retreat to uncover issues and work towards 
healing and cohesiveness. Similarly, Program E utilized the support of an organizational 
coach to engage the management staff in monthly retreats in addition to reorganizing to 
ensure the appropriate structure for compliance. Each director ascribed their efforts to 
changing culture and building relationships very differently. Three of the six directors 
described reculturing efforts and relationship building to include staff retreats.  
 At first we had some staff that have been here longer than me and I remember 
hearing this is not broke why are we going to try to fix it.  This is the way we’ve 
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 always done it. The staff really weren’t happy with change… We really had to try 
to stay the course and work on helping them understand why the change was 
necessary and I think that was something that we just never really did was share 
the Performance Standards with the staff, here’s the standard, here’s what we 
have to do, here’s the change that’s coming.  
 Turnaround leaders implemented efforts to reculture that included steps to gain 
staff support. All of the turnaround leaders assured that staff were aware of the 
performance standards and received communication about changes.  The Head Start 
turnaround leaders ensured that staff had access to policies. At one program the director 
placed all of the policies on-line but quickly learned that the bus driver and other staff 
that did not have access to internet lacked access to the policies and procedures. She 
corrected the change by creating operating guidelines that were accessible to all staff. 
“We were very proud that we had converted every policy to a PDF and had uploaded it to 
our website and we love that and the federal review team that came loved that, but our 
bus driver would not.” 
The respondent believed that creating an electronic version of the policies would 
provide easier access for staff. She and her team recognized the importance of making 
policy binders available for staff that did not have access to computers or were not 
comfortable navigating policies electronically.  Turnaround leaders demonstrated that all 
staff must have access to policy documents to ensure alignment.  Each director made 
reference to the importance of aligning staff to support the vision. The respondents 
gained staff support by providing professional development opportunities and ensuring 
staff understood the implications of the change process. The turnaround directors made 
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 gains in shifting staff attitudes. Program A described the attitudinal shift at her program. 
“There was more of a sense of accountability that things are focused on the performance 
standard versus the way that we’ve always done them.” The turnaround directors 
nurtured a culture of accountability. 
Communication. The turnaround directors engaged staff in regular 
communication which included staff meetings to ensure staff were aware of new 
developments. The director from Program B described why she decided to have regular 
monthly staff meetings. “In reviewing how did these simple errors that really were just 
simple human error happen? That became one of the possibilities that maybe we needed 
to go back to a staff meeting every single month.” The respondents demonstrated that 
regular staff meetings provide staff with continuous systems of communication to 
provide clear expectations and offer staff opportunities to ask questions.    
All of the respondents described the importance of continuous communications. 
The director at Program A described her communication at meetings. “It’s a very 
purposeful, very sort of set communication on the things that we need to be on top of to 
be in compliance.” She continued.  
So part of our meetings now is there’s an action item list that gets updated by me 
after every meeting, so things don’t drop off until they get addressed or we just 
decide that it no longer is an issue or it no longer makes sense, but things just stay 
on there, and I think that’s a big part of what made the changes stick in some 
ways and why we keep moving forward is there is follow-up and accountability. 
The respondent believed the follow-up and accountability is critical for the 
sustainability of program improvements. Program A described the importance of 
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 turnaround leaders following up on actions items and holding staff accountable for task 
completion.    
Professional development. The respondents transformed their organizations to 
consist of people that wanted to work collectively to achieve program compliance.  The 
directors supported staff work through professional development and continuous 
communication. The director at program E provided a description of how professional 
development is offered to staff through mentoring. “So when a staff member comes in 
they also have a mentor or someone that is supporting them ongoing.” Program E 
illustrated the importance of providing ongoing support to staff to assure they are 
successful in their roles.  Moreover, Program E provided detail on the importance of 
professional development for staff. “I think spending a lot of time and effort in promoting 
education for staff members, continuing education, professional development goals…so I 
think quality is also investing in the staff members that work for the agency.”  
 Turnaround directors invested in staff training to ensure staff were competent in 
meeting program outcomes. Through training and support the turnaround leaders 
redefined employees work and attitudes.  The turnaround leaders demonstrated their 
understanding that compliance with HSPS is the sole responsibility of the Head Start 
director. The respondents’ strategies included a plan to monitor the effectiveness of staff 
through monitoring plans. 
Monitoring plans for continuous improvement. This section details the 
competencies necessary for turnaround leaders in monitoring and evaluating program 
operations to ensure compliance. The turnaround leaders shared their practices improving 
operations for organizational efficiency and full compliance with the HSPS. All of the 
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 directors interviewed detailed the importance of monitoring and ongoing efforts to 
evaluate their programs, albeit each director achieved this in divergent ways.  Program C 
noted:  
The directors of the different component areas make visits once a month and they 
visit the programs, they do a report, they give it to the programs, any concerns 
they have, they tell the program it has to be completed.  When there’s an issue and 
they feel like there’s something that could be a health and safety, they would 
inform me and I would tell the program immediately it would have to be 
corrected. 
The respondent described the importance regular site visits and being aware of 
health and safety related issues. The director at Program D, described her approach to 
continuous improvement. Program D invited independent auditors to inspect her program 
to ensure continuous improvement. She explained what she would say when she invited 
community inspectors to audit her program. Program D’s director stated she would say, 
“Come and do an inspection and let us know what we need to improve on.” She 
continued: 
I didn’t sit back and wait for somebody to come and find it, I wanted to find it 
first, so we started getting, our fire department to come in and do our fire safety 
checks periodically, we work with our food program, we have the CACFP 
program and we used their reports to get better.        
The respondent illustrated the importance of turnaround leaders in being proactive 
in getting information about program performance. The director did not wait for OHS to 
inform her of noncompliance. She invited independent auditors to monitor her program. 
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 Moreover, the respondent demonstrated that as concerns are identified the turnaround 
leader must track and follow-up on goals to ensure the program is on the trajectory 
towards achieving the goal of full compliance.   
Three of the six programs discussed their use of the Protocol as a monitoring tool 
to guide program improvements. The programs used the protocol to support self-
evaluation and inquiry. Program E described their use of the protocol: 
I think that we went through the protocol and we started preparing probably a year 
in advance… If there’s something from the previous protocol that we thought was 
really helpful, we continue to use it and I think that all staff is involved in that, not 
just the management team, our parents, educators, family advocates, health staff, 
everybody is part of going through the protocol… But staff already knows what 
we’re looking for, they already know that we’re following the protocol and many 
start preparing themselves, they read it and then we host discussion groups about 
the protocol and we practice asking the questions and the interviews.  
Program E demonstrated that monitoring is an ongoing process and effective 
monitoring tools are beneficial when all staff are familiar with the tool and are aware of 
expectations. Program E continued, “Questions are asked kind of like pop quizzes for the 
other staff…We all have the mindset the self-assessment is coming, the federal review is 
coming and be prepared.”  
Turnaround directors confirm that staff read performance standards by 
establishing checks or mini quizzes to ensure staff are aware of the policies and 
procedures. Additionally, turnaround directors developed timelines to monitor program 
goals and support staff in assuring that timelines were met. Program B explained:  
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 We would have a management team meeting with very clear cut delegation of 
duties, very clear cut timelines and follow-up..[I would ask] did you get this done 
and if the answer is no please don’t waste 15 minutes saying well but you know 
here’s why, nope it’s not done let’s just change the timeline and if we can’t 
change the timeline what can I do to pull you away from what you’re doing 
because that has to happen. 
Turnaround leaders assured timelines were met and provided staff the support 
necessary to meet target dates to mitigate the risk of failure. The turnaround leaders 
provided evidence of the importance of reviewing documents and supporting staff with 
follow through. Program D illustrated: 
We have at least three meetings with our classroom staff, it’s a staffing with them 
and they have the opportunity to bring each individual file with them and they go 
through the whole file with us and if there is a referral that the parents haven’t 
followed up with then we will offer support on helping them help the parents.   
Program E provided evidence of the importance for program directors to 
demonstrate leadership that promotes inquiry and evaluation. Program E summarized: 
Creating leadership to create a culture of change, a way to always promote inquiry 
and evaluation…from self-assessment to just meeting to get ideas so I think any 
program that continues growing and expanding and being successful is a program 
that always looks at their policies, procedures and looks at what’s new, what’s 
happening and takes those decisions to make changes.   
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 The directors affirmed that establishing regular checks to ensure staff follows 
policies as prescribed is critical. The director from Program B described her process for 
monitoring transportation safety.  
One of our members of management team made a spot review form for the buses.  
It takes three minutes and all of us, which is again that cohesiveness again... [we] 
take one of those forms we brought to the bus, we step onto a bus whether it’s 
here at the middle of the day or the end of the day and just a quick scan that says 
number of children on the bus, is everyone in a safety seat and buckled in 
properly, are all folders stored properly, any questions. 
This description illustrated the importance of monitoring to ensure that staff are 
following operational guidelines and performance standards. Monitoring plans also 
provide targets and specific deadlines. Monitoring plans provide directors with a 
continuous process of gathering staff progress on goals and program outcomes. All of the 
directors discussed the importance of monitoring plans. Additionally, monitoring plans 
ensure that staff do not follow policies with creativity. Monitoring plans provide Head 
Start directors greater opportunities for staff accountability and compliance with HSPS. 
Each monitoring plan for the respondent’s differs in detail but is common in its goal to 
ensure compliance with HSPS and accuracy of data. 
Systems Turnaround 
The turnaround leaders provided evidence that they implemented an effective 
improvement strategy for failed systems. The directors’ first steps included gaining skills 
in self-development and connecting with resources to gain technical assistance. The 
leaders applied the skills gained and through its application focused their turnaround 
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 strategy in four specific areas that showed dramatic performance decline. The four areas 
are: (a) Finance, (b) Shared Governance, (c) Human Resources, and (d) Monitoring 
Systems. The turnaround directors employed their skills to manage themselves and 
manage others in order to make changes in the areas that were low-performing. This 
section will explore the actions steps that the directors engaged in as they improved 
performance. The findings revealed that there are specific competencies of a Head Start 
turnaround director and their individual strategies indicate that there are commonalties in 
actions steps taken by the directors to guarantee full compliance with HSPS.   
Finance. The turnaround leaders made significant improvements in the fiscal 
area. The dramatic turn in performance is seemingly related to the directors building an 
internal capacity to learn more about fiscal processes and procedures. The leaders 
confidently articulated financial matters and an understanding of their role and 
responsibility to monitor the fiscal areas of the program. Five of the six turnaround 
leaders reported that they gained knowledge of fiscal matters.  The director at Program F 
described her confidence in fiscal matters.  
By the time we did the grant that year I knew how to do a grant.  That grant was 
done and then that finance person quit a month before we were monitored and the 
week we were monitored our finance person had only been in twice… I knew 
what was going on, and I was able to answer all the questions. 
The respondent’s recollection demonstrated her confidence in fiscal matters and 
that her dependency on finance staff for information had ended. The director confidently 
answered fiscal related questions during the monitoring visit.  Three of the six 
respondents reported they were more aware of the fiscal aspects for the program for grant 
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 reporting and could confidently monitor the fiscal content area for program 
improvements.  The director at Program F described the skills she gained in the 
turnaround process.  Program E discussed the importance of connecting with the finance 
staff on a regular basis.  
I’m more involved with fiscal, monetary, but I think again it is a constant area that 
the Head Start director, the program director has to keep up with like every week. 
I talk to the fiscal department almost every day. 
The respondent illustrates that turnaround leaders are intentional with connecting 
to fiscal matters within the organization. The leaders understood that it was their 
responsibility to ensure that fiscal matters were in compliance with the HSPS. Table 4.2 
provides a summary of the turnaround improvements implemented by the directors.  
Table 4.2 
Finance Before and After 
 
Prior to Turnaround 
 
 
Turnaround Evidence 
Directors had minimal knowledge of HSPS 
related to finance.  
Directors educated themselves on fiscal 
areas of HSPS 
Directors were dependent on finance staff 
to manage and monitor fiscal matters 
Directors developed competencies in fiscal 
matters 
Lacked clarity regarding their role with 
finance related matters 
Gained clarity regarding the director’s role 
in monitoring and understanding finance 
matters 
Minimal communication with finance staff Regular communication with finance staff 
regularly 
 
Shared governance. Directors made board members and parents feel valued 
which led to greater commitment and increased parent and board engagement. Improving 
  95 
 shared governance required a paradigm shift. The directors expanded professional 
development to include parents and board members to make certain they were aware of 
the HSPS. The directors aligned board activities with HSPS and assured that board and 
Policy Committee members approved agenda items as needed. Moreover, turnaround 
directors identified board and parent training needs to provide coaching and support. As a 
result, the board and parents expressed interest and subsequently became more engaged 
in governance activities. The director at Program A illustrated the transformation in 
shared governance at her program. 
So no they really weren’t involved, they’re involved now, once we got past that 
initial hurdle and could really start working on like engaging parents and getting 
our parent committee strong and getting our parent council strong.  Now they’re 
part of any discussion we have about like the sequestration stuff, how do we make 
these changes, how do we make the cuts, what do we do, how do we solve this 
problem, like they’re definitely a part of those conversations now. 
Program A’s recollection detailed evidence of shared governance as parents were 
encouraged to be part of the decision making process. 
Board members were provided professional development, subsequently members 
gained understanding of their roles and responsibilities in supporting and monitoring the 
Head Start program. Program F detailed how the board and Policy Committee monitor 
the program.  
Board members are part of the self-assessment teams and so we use the 
monitoring protocol from 2010 is what we’ve been using so they go through just 
like they were a monitor, and say all the things that need to be fixed and then we 
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 do our self-assessment results and self-assessment improvement plan and then 
after the improvement plan they always want follow-up answers, what was done 
to fix it, how did you fix it, what still needs to be done and everything like that.  
So like I said they ask questions, a lot of questions. 
The board members engaged in active inquiry and demonstrated their awareness 
of the implications of noncompliance, thus provided follow-up on the improvement plan. 
All of the Head Start directors reported that they were accountable to the board and 
dependent upon their subject area expertise to provide program support. Moreover, 
directors ensured that the board composition reflected the required subject area expertise 
as outlined in the HSPS. Board members and parents demonstrated efficiency when they 
illustrated awareness of the HSPS and its implications on the program. As program data 
improved, reports were made available to parents and board members to review and 
effectively monitor. Program A detailed the changes to reporting at her program: 
There’s a set report that goes out every month to staff, but also it goes out to the  
board and Policy Council and it has all the elements that you have to report to the 
board including numbers of meal served, why I don’t know, but that’s what it says 
in the 2007 Act so that’s what we tell them.  But it’s a very purposeful, very sort 
of set communication on the things that we need to be on top of to be in 
compliance.  I’m not sure there was anything like that there prior to me getting 
here. 
The respondent demonstrated the shift to reporting procedures that encompassed 
structured communications to assure compliance with the governance requirements 
outline in the 2007 ACT. Turnaround leaders shared program goals and objectives with 
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 their governing board and Policy Committees, they ensured its members were aware of 
the HSPS and supported the program in making improvement to gain compliance.  Table 
4.3 provides a summary of the improvements in the area of shared governance.  
Table 4. 3 
Shared Governance Before and After  
 
Prior to Turnaround 
 
Turnaround Evidence 
 
Board activities were not aligned with 
HSPS 
Governance activities paralleled HSPS 
Board members needed to gain clarity on 
roles and their duty to monitor and provide 
expertise 
Board members provided clarity regarding 
roles and responsibilities 
Parents minimally engaged in Policy 
Committee activities 
Board members demonstrate active 
engagement and knowledge of updates to 
HSPS 
Board members required professional 
development that informed them of updates 
to HSPS 
Board members provided professional 
development that included information on 
new HSPS and its implications 
 Directors engaged in supportive activities 
to provide board members effective tools to 
monitor 
 Board structure was aligned with HSPS 
Directors monitored board composition to 
ensure compliance with HSPS 
 Aligned board activities to support 
effectiveness 
 
Human Resources. The directors espoused their commitment to quality by 
ensuring that the Human Resource functions of the organization transformed to a state of 
compliance. The directors were aware of the factors for the noncompliant and deficiency 
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 status. The directors made immediate improvements by ensuring that all staff met the 
educational requirements mandated in the HSPS.  All six respondents stated they 
experienced turnover within their organization during the improvement process due to 
staff performance or failure to meet the educational requirements as stated in the HSPS. 
As a result, job descriptions were updated to align with mandated educational 
requirements. Program D described the importance of holding staff accountable for 
meeting the educational requirements.  
Our job descriptions clearly state what’s expected of our staff. If you’re not 
qualified then are you willing to get qualified or certified, a degree if it required a 
degree and if they don’t follow through with that then you have to hold them 
accountable.  This is what you said, this is the timeline, where are you at with 
that. 
The director demonstrated the importance of ensuring staff followed through with 
the education plans and holding staff accountable to assure program compliance. 
Turnaround leaders hold staff accountable and provide staff with clear expectations.  As 
roles changed, staff were provided clarity as to the implications and new reporting 
structures.  Program hiring practices were enhanced. Directors assured that candidates 
met the mandated educational requirements prior to hire. Staff roles were redefined to 
ensure operational efficiency and effective service delivery. Policies and procedures were 
changed to reflect the changes in the HSP. Program D illustrated:  
We went into really looking at our program plans and our policies and procedures.  
We’ve always followed Head Start Standards, however, we didn’t have in detail 
policies and procedures for each of the standards that we follow.  So at the 
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 moment, now, we have revised them and every so often our policies and 
procedures are things that we review as things have been changing.   
The director recognized that policies and procedures needed to be reviewed 
regularly to ensure compliance. Table 4.4 summarizes the transformation from low-
performing to program compliance in the Human Resources area.  
Table 4.4 
Human Resources Before and After 
 
Prior to Turnaround 
 
 
Turnaround Evidence 
Staff lacked qualifications Changed hiring practices to ensure all staff 
met requirements 
Job descriptions failed to reflect HSPS Job descriptions were updated to reflect 
HSPS 
Staff unclear of roles Directors provided clarity to staff about 
roles and expectations 
Current organizational structure did not 
reflect HSPS 
Programs reorganized or hired “right” staff 
Policies and procedures did not reflect 
changes in HSPS 
Updated policies and procedures to reflect 
changes in HSPS 
 
Ongoing monitoring systems. Turnaround leaders demonstrated important 
lessons for ongoing monitoring. The respondents recognized that effective monitoring of 
performance is essential to the successful improvement of their program. Thorough 
analysis of data revealed there are multiple dimensions of monitoring. Directors actively 
monitored multiple areas of the program for compliance. Directors monitored for: (a) 
staff performance and compliance, (b) data for accuracy and follow-up, (c) timely 
reporting, (d) fiscal performance, (e) governance policies, (f) program effectiveness, (g) 
service delivery, and (h) Head Start changes.  All of the turnaround leaders described the 
importance of implementing checks to ensure staff were performing and meeting 
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 expectations, moreover directors monitored staff performance to ensure that procedures 
were followed without creativity. Program E illustrated: 
We started doing more ongoing, doing weekly monitoring, bi-weekly monitoring, 
quarterly monitoring, annually monitoring, and we have reminders.  So with that 
monitoring in place, the milestones in place, it really supported us and improved 
our program for this.  
Respondents monitored data for accuracy and to ensure staff follow-up on goals. 
Checks and reminders were developed to ensure reports were completed on time. 
Moreover, directors monitored to ensure financial reports were accurate and made 
available to the Policy Committee and board members.  
The directors monitored to ensure that Policy Council and board Members were 
trained and actively part of the decision making process. Additionally, directors evaluated 
program performances on a regular basis and ensured service delivery met the 
expectations outlined in the HSPS.  
I think we’ve evolved a lot in the last year so I think that’s one of the most 
important things to be successful. Implementing a checks and balance system, 
making sure that you’re meeting your HR piece, ERSEA, your educational piece, 
your health and safety piece, your parent engagement piece, making sure that staff 
members that are coming in have the background screenings and physicals, and 
making sure of the minor details. The minor details can put out of compliance.   
Program E identified the importance of monitoring and ensuring the plan included 
a system for monitoring minor details. The director warned that missing the minor details 
can lead to noncompliance. Turnaround leaders consistently monitored for updates and 
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 changes that affected the program and delivery of services. The directors stayed 
connected to association meetings, checked the ECKLC website and stayed connected to 
other programs to monitor in order to remain aware of new developments that could 
affect their programs compliance status. The director at Program C explained:  
Focus on going to the Head Start specific training.  That’s where they [directors] 
need to be, Head Start  specific training, actually go to the training, actually to it, 
and listen to what’s going on and what’s being said.  So Head Start training! 
That’s where you get the information and of course you know you get the e-mails 
and alerts and you go on, if you have questions you can go on that ECKLC 
website, you got to like live it and breathe it. 
The director described the importance of external monitoring to understand new 
developments within in Head Start. She described the importance of maintaining an 
awareness regarding changes within Head Start. The directors focused monitoring efforts 
in multiple areas. The monitoring improvements are summarized in Table 4.5. 
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 Table 4.5 
Monitoring Systems Before and After 
 
Prior to Turnaround 
 
 
Evidence of Turnaround 
Several participants reported that they did 
not have a clear understanding of ongoing 
monitor 
Turnaround leaders demonstrated and 
understanding of the complexity of  
ongoing monitoring 
Failed to thoroughly analyze data and 
follow-up on pertinent program 
information 
Developed checks to analyze data and 
monitored to ensure follow-up 
Five of six directors attributed lack of 
ongoing monitoring as reasons for 
noncompliance 
Developed strong ongoing monitoring 
plans 
Participants programs plagued with late 
reporting 
Developed target dates and a system of 
reminders for staff to ensure timely 
reporting 
Failed record keeping Monitoring included checkpoints to ensure 
reports are completed 
Program information not documented, 
inaccurate, or not submitted on time 
Directors ensured program information 
were accurate and timely 
Integrity of data questioned Directors monitored data 
Staff lacked understanding of how metrics 
were derived 
Directors provided staff training to ensure 
staff competency to develop metrics 
Leaders failed to evaluate the effectiveness 
of program 
Directors engaged in regular evaluation for 
program effectiveness 
Programs lacked follow-up on goals Monitoring plans included goal follow-up 
Directors reported concerns with service 
related data 
Monitored data for accuracy 
Data analyzed annually Improved data with quarterly analysis 
 
 The Head Start turnaround leader competencies in Managing Self and Managing 
Others provided support in developing the appropriate action steps in the areas of 
Finance, Shared Governance, Human Resources, and Monitoring Systems. The directors 
successfully improved operations and brought their programs to a state of 100% 
compliance with HSPS. The data revealed that there are commonalities in their 
approaches to transforming their low-performing programs. The directors’ stories provide 
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 evidence that the combination of their competencies in Managing Self and Managing 
Others and their specific action steps positioned them to achieve a successful Federal 
Review with no findings and in full compliance with the HSPS. Figure 4.1 provides an 
overview of the turnaround leader competencies.  
Four-Stage Turnaround Model.  
As participants addressed strategies for turnaround, a four-stage framework was 
suggested, referred to here as the Four-Stage Turnaround Model. The conceptual 
framework of the Four-Stage Turnaround Model is shown in Figure 4.1. Notably, the 
model begins with the individual and works outwardly. This inside-out approach 
illustrates the types of changes that the turnaround leader needs to consider, providing a 
guide for marshaling personal capabilities, accessing available technical assistance 
resources, leading others through turnaround strategies, and assessing needed change in 
targeted organizational systems.  
The first stage, Preparing Self, builds the leader’s personal capacity for change. 
The second stage, Accessing Resources, provides technical assistance resources to help 
guide the change effort. Next, Leading Others is the stage in which the leader utilizes 
competencies gained in the previous stages to direct the change efforts of staff and 
stakeholders. Finally, Turnaround Systems the last stage includes actions steps and 
accountability systems to ensure change in the specific targeted areas.  The first three 
stages of the model underlie the effectiveness of the final stage, Turnaround Systems. 
Preparing Self. Preparing Self is the initial stage as illustrated in Figure 4.1. At 
this stage the participants developed self-efficacy skills and generative capabilities to 
guide the turnaround strategy. Moreover, the directors engaged in self-reflection and 
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 developed the inner strength for change. Preparing Self activities varied among 
participants. However, all participants engaged in one or more of the following: (a) self-
reflection to assess their personal readiness to guide the improvement strategy, (b) 
gaining personal confidence and support from superiors, (c) working with a personal 
coach, and (d) staying connected to developments within the field.   
Self-reflection to assess readiness to guide the improvement strategy. During this 
stage turnaround leaders assess their personal readiness to facilitate the change effort. 
The former director at Program D engaged in a process of assessing personal readiness 
for change.  
A lot of departments had to make budget cuts and for the director at that time it 
was very stressful and she decided that, she had been in Head Start for a long time 
as well, and she decided that for her family and for herself that leaving the 
program was what was in her best interest because of the high stress that was 
going on at that time.  I think it was just too much for her. 
The director at Program D recounted the Preparing Self process of the former 
director.  Conversely, Preparing Self does not always assume that the leader moves 
forward with the change process. The turnaround leader makes critical decisions about 
facilitating the change process. As illustrated in the participant’s narration, the turnaround 
leader may find that the organizational and personal goals are not congruent and may 
choose an alternative path and therefore decide not to lead the turnaround effort. 
However, once the participant decides to move forward with leading the turnaround 
strategy, the individual must gain personal confidence and will benefit from support from 
the organization’s leadership staff.  
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 Gaining confidence and support from superiors. Gaining support from superiors 
is illustrated by participants as vital to their turnaround success. The participants 
described the importance of gaining personal confidence in addition to support from their 
superiors in preparing for the change process. Program A described the personal factors 
attributed to the turnaround success during this stage and the importance of gaining 
support from the CEO and leadership team in preparing for the turnaround.  
Personal factors would be the experience I had and the fact that I’m pretty 
fearless…I was confident that it could be done.  I think institutionally there was 
strong support from the president and CEO who is my direct supervisor and the 
rest of the senior leadership team. 
The director at Program A demonstrated self-efficacy skills in preparation to 
execute the course of action necessary to turnaround the specific content areas. The 
participant determined the requisite level of self-efficacy skills necessary to facilitate the 
action steps to improve the Head Start program and ensure turnaround systems are 
achieved.  The participant described an attitude of fearlessness and the confidence to 
move forward with the change. Additionally, support from supervisors and peers are 
recognized by the participant as a strong support in developing the belief that the 
outcome could be achieved.  
Working with a personal coach. “I went through doing all these things and all of 
the changes, I needed a life coach… [I was] determined and committed, but I needed to 
get to know myself better.” Program E’s reflection illustrated the importance of preparing 
self during the turnaround process and gaining a better understanding of self. The 
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 recollection of the director at Program E demonstrates the individual’s readiness to 
improve self in order to facilitate the process of leading others.  
Staying connected to developments within the field. Engaging in research and 
staying attuned to new developments within the field are essential to the change process. 
The participant from Program B described the importance of engaging in research and 
staying connected to new developments.    
As a management team, the leadership of this program are a lot smarter than we 
were then and have taken a much more proactive approach to constantly reading, 
trying to stay ahead of what requirements are and expectations…I honestly have 
to say Head Start has changed so fast in the last couple years… I truly can’t 
hardly even get through all the e-mails we get on a daily basis with new webinars 
requested and new information requested.  So there’s been a rapid change.  But I 
think trying to stay more engaged with local state and federal regs.  
The participant illustrated the need to read and stay connected to the rapidly 
changing Head Start environment. The turnaround leader described the need to gain an 
understanding of what was new and developing in order to assess the resources necessary 
to help facilitate the turnaround process.   
Accessing Resources. Next is Accessing Resources, the second stage of the Four-
stage Turnaround Model, illustrated at the center of Figure 4.1. At this stage, the directors 
provided an assessment for the types of resources necessary to guide the turnaround 
strategy. During this stage, the participants assessed the personal need for Formal and 
Informal Technical Assistance or a combination of the two. Formal Technical Assistance 
includes the support of an OHS consultant or engaging with an independent consultant. 
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 Formal technical assistance provides well-defined relationships either through legal 
contracts or terms defined by OHS. Additionally, Formal Technical Assistance Resources 
define expectations, detail outcomes and determine specific functions and expectations 
for both the director and consultant. The consultants provided technical assistance to help 
the directors develop the skills and capacity to lead the change. Additionally, participants 
assessed the need to engage in one or more forms of Informal Assistance. Informal 
Assistance materializes in either one or a combination of the following approaches: (a) 
previous experiences, (b) support from other Head Start directors, (c) Head Start 
trainings, (d) attending Head Start Association meetings, and (e) OHS tools. Informal 
Technical Assistance differs from Formal Technical Assistance in that resources are not 
outlined with specific outcomes and defined relationships. Directors self-elect to engage 
with Informal Technical assistance resources on as needed basis.  The turnaround leader 
illustrates engaging in two forms of Informal Technical Assistance: Previous experience 
and OHS tools.  
  The director before me always had the Prism out. She always had that, we never 
really used it though.  I never understood what it was but I learned, well I took 
what I learned from the director before me and used it and then started to build on 
that…She had a lot of experience and she had a lot of years under her belt as far 
as working for Head Start.  So I took what I learned from her and I started 
building on it, so I got the Prism and the Protocol, to me they’re the same thing…I  
started breaking it down and getting managers together and giving them each the 
area where they were covering.  
  108 
 The director at Program E recollected accessing multiple Informal Technical 
Assistance Resources, the director drew upon previous experience and utilized OHS tools 
to support the turnaround. The director demonstrated the intersection of previous 
experiences and OHS tools in providing the skills to lead others in guiding the systems 
turnaround. The director also provided a checklist to the supervisors to measure the 
programs compliance with the standards.  The participants engaged in a process of 
preparing self and assessed the need for technical assistance resources to provide specific 
turnaround strategy supports. The participants utilized the skills gained to lead others.  
Leading Others. The third stage, Leading Others, is illustrated in the outer circle 
of Figure 4.1. At this stage, the participants engaged staff in reculturing, improved 
communication, executed ongoing monitoring systems and provided professional 
development for staff, parents and board members. After the directors gained the 
appropriate resources to provide technical assistance, the turnaround directors 
demonstrated confidence to pursue and achieve turnaround goals. The respondents 
developed a clear vision and communicated expectations with staff as they led their low-
performing program into full compliance with HSPS. During this stage, the directors 
employed their turnaround competences to facilitate their subordinates and constituents 
into transforming their own self-interest into concern for shared goals.  The directors 
shared power, information, enhanced staff skills through professional development, and 
helped staff to develop shared goals. Turnaround directors invested in staff training to 
ensure staff were competent in meeting program outcomes. Through training and support 
the turnaround leaders redefine employees work and attitudes.  The turnaround leaders 
focused their efforts on reculturing by building relationships with staff in effort to shift 
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 the culture from this is how we have always done it to a culture of accountability and 
staff compliance. The turnaround directors engage staff in regular communication which 
include staff meetings to ensure staff were aware of new developments. The directors 
supported staff work through professional development and continuous communication. 
Additionally, monitoring is essential during this stage. The directors developed a process 
to ensure effective implementation of monitoring tools which are beneficial when all staff 
are familiar with the tools and are aware of expectations. Turnaround directors developed 
timelines to monitor program goals and support staff in assuring that timelines were met. 
The program director at Program D details the actions steps necessary to facilitate staff in 
gaining the knowledge and demonstrating high quality performance.  
Our monitoring it goes hand and hand with our communication and the training of 
the staff…We started doing more ongoing, doing weekly monitoring, bi-weekly 
monitoring, quarterly monitoring, annually monitoring, ..and we have reminders.  
So with that monitoring in place the milestones in place it really supported us and 
improved our program.  We had a lot of professional development around the 
reflective practices and reflective supervision so I think that having that one-on-
one [meetings} with staff, individual staff, lots of the things come up there so 
when the quarterly or monthly or weekly monitoring happens I mean we already 
have an indication of where we need to go or what’s going on.   
The director affirmed that establishing regular monitoring, communication and 
providing professional development reinforce staff in following policies as prescribed. 
Moreover, monitoring plans ensure that staff do not follow policies with creativity. 
Executing strong monitoring plans provide Head Start directors greater opportunities for 
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 staff accountability and compliance with HSPS. Each monitoring plan for the 
respondent’s differs in detail but is common in its goal to ensure compliance with HSPS 
and accuracy of data. 
Turnaround Systems. The Head Start participants provided important lessons on 
how to lead others during the previous three stages of the Four-stage Turnaround Model. 
However, the final stage, Turnaround Systems, illustrated in Figure 4.1 demonstrates how 
the directors utilized the skills gained in the previous stages to inform the targeted 
turnaround areas. The leaders applied the competencies gained in the former stages, 
Preparing Self, Accessing Resources, and Leading Others and through its application 
focused the turnaround strategy in four specific areas that demonstrated dramatic 
performance decline. The four outer legs depicted in Figure 4.1 represent the systems 
targeted for improvement and its connection to the Preparing Self, Accessing Resources, 
and Leading Others stages. In the current study, the participants focused turnaround 
efforts in human resources, finance, shared governance, and ongoing monitoring. The 
model provides flexibility in that the outer legs can be increased or decreased depending 
on the systems targeted for improvement. The unlabeled boxes depicted in Figure 4.1 
illustrate the flexibility in the Turnaround Systems stage of the model.  For example, if a 
director has determined that non-compliance concerns are only in the shared governance 
area, one outer leg would be depicted in the model. Moreover, if the director determined 
change necessary in the fiscal and shared governance areas there would be two outer legs 
depicted and so on. However, the researcher contends that the Preparing Self, Accessing 
Resources, and Leading Others Stages are critical and do not provide the same flexibility 
as the outer legs. In sum, the Preparing Self and Accessing Resources stages supported 
  111 
 the participants in developing capabilities and strategy. In the Leading Others stage, the 
participants influenced staff change and performance to operate in alignments with the 
HSPS within the designated systems. 
 
Figure 4.1. Four-Stage Turnaround model.  
Chapter 5 presents the implications of the findings. The researcher analyzes the 
directors’ actions steps and its applicability to Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change model. 
Additionally, the chapter provides discourse relative to the implications of the study for 
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 OHS and Head Start directors, provides a review of the methodological limitations to the 
study, and recommendations for future research.  
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 Chapter 5: Discussion 
Chapter 4 presented findings regarding the steps turnaround leaders identified as 
critical to the success of their improvement strategy. The directors identified their 
processes towards program improvement. Interestingly, the participants shared 
commonalities in their actions steps. Each of the six turnaround leaders interviewed 
achieved a successful review with no findings after implementing their improvement 
strategy.  
The findings from this study contribute to the field as pioneering research 
regarding turnaround practices in Head Start. This study addressed the gap in research 
relative to Head Start turnaround practices. There is an absence of research that 
investigates the turnaround practices implemented by Head Start turnaround directors. 
Subsequently, the researcher substituted K-12 turnaround literature to gain a scholarly 
perspective on turnaround principals. The researcher found that school turnaround 
literature provides a better fit to explore turnaround within Head Start programs than 
other turnaround literature.  
Chapter 5 presents the implications of the findings. First, the researcher analyzes 
the participants’ actions steps and its applicability to Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change 
model in addition to providing a comparison of the findings to the turnaround literature 
examined in Chapter 2. Next, the chapter examines implications of the study for OHS and 
Head Start directors. Then, a review of the methodological limitations to the study are 
examined and finally a review of the recommendations for future research. 
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 Implications of Findings 
Kotter’s model.  Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change model is developed as a 
guide to the business for-profit sector, but Kotter contends that the theory is applicable to 
any organizational change.  Kotter (1996) avers that his eight-stage process is necessary 
to lead successful and sustained change within any organization. Moreover, Kotter argues 
that the change model is sequential and employs the following steps:   
1. Establishing a sense of urgency 
2. Creating the guiding coalition 
3. Developing a vision and strategy 
4. Communicating the change vision 
5. Empowering broad based action 
6. Generating short-term wins 
7. Consolidating gains and producing more change 
8. Anchoring new approaches in the culture 
Kotter (1996) delineates that following this sequential multi-stage process is 
important to leading successful change.  This section provides an analysis of the study 
participants’ action steps during the respective turnarounds to investigate if they 
employed any of Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change model. Additionally, the researcher 
will explore if the steps were applied in the requisite order.  According to Kotter (1996), 
change cannot be accelerated by skipping steps in the change sequence. Kotter (1996) 
asserts that critical mistakes within stages can stifle organizational transformation. 
Establish a sense of urgency. Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change model begins 
with establishing a Sense of Urgency. Kotter (1996) proffers that change leaders must 
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 eliminate status quo and create a sense of urgency by informing all staff that the change is 
necessary. Kotter (1996) delineates that change leaders make staff modifications, require 
all staff to change and mandate for quick and dramatic improvement. The study findings 
imply that the Head Start directors’ actions are in alignment with the first step in Kotter’s 
(1996) model. The director at Program A illustrated how a sense of urgency was 
established: 
The CEO basically stepped in and sort of hands on came down here and took sort 
of a hands on approach and changed a lot, got rid of some staff and so I think 
that’s where I see the beginning of the change process happening and honestly if 
the CEO hadn’t done that before I came in I don’t think I would have been 
successful. 
The CEO’s hands on approach, in addition to, making staff changes demonstrated 
a sense of urgency. The participants made staff changes when necessary to indicate that 
change was critical. The directors also communicated the necessity of change among 
staff through meetings and by updating policies and procedures. Findings were in 
agreement that the participants established a sense of urgency by making immediate 
changes within themselves and sought technical assistance to develop the skills necessary 
to create change.  
Turnaround literature describes creating a sense of urgency by changing 
leadership. Frederick and Gift (2009) delineate that guiding the turnaround effort with 
new leadership is beneficial. The study findings reveal that five of the six turnaround 
programs changed leaders. Five participants were hired to make improvements within the 
program. Interestingly, all of the participants successfully improved their respective 
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 programs. These findings imply that a leadership change may illustrate a sense of 
urgency, but does not indicate the success or failure of the strategy. All of the directors 
engaged in the Managing Self process through self-preparation and technical assistance. 
Study findings imply that regardless of the change in leadership, the turnaround leader 
must engage in a process of preparing self to organize and develop the inner strength to 
facilitate the change process. Concomitantly, the leader must establish a process to gain 
technical assistance. Based on the findings of this study, changing leadership does not 
indicate a sense of urgency, or the success of the improvement process.  
Create a guiding coalition. The second step in Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change 
model encompasses assembling a group to lead the change to ensure that all staff commit 
to the effort. All of the directors led the turnaround change and attributed their 
supervisory staff as major contributors to the successful change effort. Findings were in 
agreement with Kotter’s (1996) second step. All of the respondents led their change 
efforts and provided guidance to their respective coalitions. Additionally, the directors 
took an active role in guiding the turnaround effort by engaging in ongoing monitoring. 
Not all staff committed to the change efforts, but the directors engaged in a process of 
reculturing to ensure the change effort advanced. Murphy and Myers (2009) aver that it is 
critical to change the culture and restore confidence by empowering the team. Study 
findings are consistent with the researcher’s assertions. The directors worked with their 
leadership teams to ensure they were committed to the change process. The respondents 
recognized the importance of ensuring their leadership teams were committed to the 
change effort.  
  117 
 Kotter (1996) contends that it is important for the change leader to guide and 
develop the leadership team. The study findings suggests when participants recognized a 
lack of staff commitment they either managed staff out of the organization or worked 
with the team by engaging them in leadership retreats to resolve issues and develop a 
sense of cohesion. Furthermore, the directors developed inner strength and gained the 
knowledge to lead the effort. Respondents ensured their leadership teams were committed 
to communicating the vision and empowering staff to change. In the following account, 
the director at Program E described the supportive efforts of the guiding coalition: 
We always make group decisions and stick together, the same way that the 
managers do, the site supervisors also do at their level.  So I think just the culture 
of working together towards one common goal is something that really changed 
and using reports as a way to come together as managers and be united and 
understanding what’s going on in the different components.   
The director’s recollection illustrates the importance of cohesion and working 
towards a common vision. The program’s leadership staff demonstrated support for the 
vision within multiple levels of management.  These findings reveal that developing the 
coalition is critical to the turnaround leaders’ success. The respondents developed a team 
committed to the vision.  
Create a vision. Kotter (1996) establishes that change leaders must develop a 
vision for change. Similarly, Duke (2006) suggests that turnaround leaders must create a 
mission and vision. Kowal and Ableidinger’s (2011) research is in agreement that 
developing a vision and focus are critical to the successful turnaround strategy. The study 
findings imply that the turnaround leaders’ vision and focus were driven by the OHS 
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 mandate to immediately comply with all HSPS and remedy the program from its non-
compliant and deficient state. Despite the impetus for the vision, the directors supported 
the change vision and implemented processes to communicate the vision.  The director 
from Program A depicted the importance of creating a vision and communicating the 
vision: 
Being a leader your often times not popular and particularly through change 
because people want to hold on to the way that they did things and certainly no 
one wants to be told that they’re doing things wrong. So being a little thick 
skinned and having a vision and remaining true to it and communicating and over 
communicating, you can never communicate enough.  You think people know 
why and where we’re going and sometimes people don’t get that message so 
putting that message out multiple times. 
The director validated the importance of developing a vision for change as she 
supported the vision throughout the process. Furthermore, the director recognized the 
benefit of communicating the change vision regularly throughout the change process. 
These actions also demonstrate alignment with Kotter’s next step.  
Communicating the change vision.  Kotter (1996) maintains that change leaders 
must communicate the vision. Several turnaround studies provide evidence in support of 
Kotter’s fourth step (Herman, 2012, Public Impact, 2008, and Public Impact, 2009). The 
Head Start leaders’ action steps provide evidence in alignment with Kotter’s (1996) 
assertion. The findings affirm that Head Start leaders communicated the change efforts 
through staff meetings and direct communication. All of directors stated that they 
understood the importance of communicating the message multiple times in various 
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 media formats. The Head Start turnaround leaders ensured staff were clear about the 
change efforts. Additionally, staff were provided opportunities to hear the change 
message multiple times throughout the improvement process in order to empower them in 
understanding the vision and new direction. 
Empowering others to act. Kotter (1996) argues that it is critical for change 
leaders to eliminate barriers to achieve the intended change. Kotter suggests that this can 
be accomplished through experiments within the strategy. Findings related to turnover 
indicate that the Head Start turnaround leaders eliminated barriers through staff turnover. 
Conversely, participants also provided support to staff to remove barriers in meeting the 
required education requirements. Program C described how the Head Start program 
provided staff tuition reimbursement to remove financial barriers to ensure staff meet the 
education requirements for teachers.  
We supported the staff. Staff that needed to go to school or get a CDA, we have a 
tuition reimbursement program, so we made sure that they took advantage of that 
so they could fulfill what they needed to do. 
 The director’s recollection demonstrates that removing barriers to change also 
empowered staff to support the vision. As documented in the findings, participants 
clarified roles by updating job descriptions and reorganized to ensure operational 
efficiencies. Additionally, participants provided cross-content training. The findings 
imply that Head Start turnaround leaders engaged in actions steps to eliminate barriers to 
change.  
Generating short term wins. Kotter (1996) posits that short term wins offer 
change leaders evidence that their strategy is on track. Consequently, the leader is 
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 empowered to push towards the goal. Kotter (1996) argues that short term wins 
encourage others to support the goal. The findings show that respondents realized 
personal short term wins when they monitored the program and found that policies were 
being adhered to by staff. Conversely, none of the directors indicated a process for 
generating short term wins with staff. Opportunities to reward and celebrate small wins 
are not described by the turnaround directors. Notably, one of the six directors detailed 
the importance of providing staff assurances of their progress during the change process, 
but the findings do not support Kotter’s (1996) assertion. Inquiry should be made into 
directors implementation of short term wins in a future study.  Kotter (1996) contends 
that short term wins are critical to the change process, but the study evidence maintains 
that generating short term wins are not critical during the turnaround of Head Start 
programs. It appears that the directors’ development of inner strength during the 
Managing Self process motivated directors to achieve the goal. Moreover, the directors 
continually communicated the necessity for the change effort and engaged staff in a 
process of reculturing in an attempt to change behaviors and motivate staff to improve.  
Consolidate improvements and produce more change. Kotter (1996) establishes 
that change leaders need to consistently motivate individuals to continue momentum and 
drive change. Program B described the process in ensuring that victories were not 
claimed prematurely:  
I think that became a whole culture shift…never feeling like we arrived. 
Constantly going, okay this is good, but now we need to raise the bar and that’s 
the old [adage] when you meet the bar you raise the bar. And we had that hanging 
all over everybody’s office-when you meet the bar you raise the bar. 
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 The director extended staff thinking beyond the incremental evidence of 
improvement and extended it towards the greater vision. Kotter contends that the 
turnaround leader must be careful not to claim victory to soon and continue improvement 
efforts until the goal is actualized. The study findings are consistent with Kotter’s (1996) 
assertions. All of the turnaround leaders detail the importance of continuous 
improvement. Findings reveal that participants continually monitored staff for 
compliance with policies and HSPS. Moreover, the directors attributed ongoing 
monitoring systems as critical to ensuring compliance and a process for continuous 
improvements to sustain the change. 
Institutionalize new approaches.  Kotter (1996) claims that in this final stage, 
successful change is evidenced by staff illustrating the embodiment of the shared norms 
and new behaviors. Study findings are consistent with Kotter’s (1996) claim. One of the 
study programs contends that it has sustained the change as evidenced by a second 
concurrent Federal Monitoring Review with no findings. The director at Program E 
maintained that staff have successfully adopted the change. 
I think they’ve adopted it now.  It didn’t happen overnight.  I think it’s an ongoing 
improvement as well, but I think it’s working well.  It did take a few years; I 
would say maybe two years to get into the swing of that.  But now it’s just 
happening, I mean yes there’s always ways to improve, sometimes meetings are 
too long, or they ask for management support, but I think overall they’ve adapted. 
The director confirmed that the adoption of change required a few years to 
institutionalize, but concedes that the behavior change have been embodied by staff. All 
the directors indicated that they were successful at achieving behavior changes among 
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 staff, but agree that the process for change is continuous. The turnaround leaders agreed 
that strong monitoring efforts are critical to ensure that policies and procedures are 
adhered to and staff commit to the new behaviors. 
Kotter (1996) argues that his change model must be followed in sequence. The 
Head Start directors did not provide evidence that they followed the steps in order. 
Moreover, the findings indicate that the order and the number of steps the change leaders 
engaged in are insignificant. This finding is in contrast with his assertion that change 
cannot be accelerated if steps are skipped and that success is achieved by following the 
steps sequentially. Study findings support seven of Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change 
model. Additional findings reveal that not all of the steps in his change model are critical 
for the successful turnaround. Furthermore, steps can be skipped without detriment to the 
strategy. 
Limitations of Kotter’s change model. The study provides an analysis of Kotter’s 
eight-stage change model. The findings support much of Kotter’s change model.  
However, the results imply that Kotter’s model has limitations. Kotter’s asserts that for 
the successful change to occur all of the steps must be engaged in and acted upon in the 
required order. Whereas the study participants did not engage in all of Kotter’s eight 
stages and did not adopt the requisite order. Conversely, they all achieved successful 
change.   
Additionally, the study does not provide evidence that that the participants 
engaged in Kotter’s stage 6 Generating Short term Wins. The respondents did not 
communicate ways in which they rewarded staff for short term wins. However, the 
respondents did indicate that there were instances that provided evidence of high-
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 performance behaviors indicating the turnaround process was effective. The study 
suggests that the timeframe of the turnaround did not allow the directors to make time for 
celebrating successes with staff during the change process. The participants described the 
importance of meeting HSPS and implementing change quickly to ensure high-
performance and a successful Federal Monitoring Review.   
Interestingly, Kotter’s model fails to provide change steps for the turnaround 
leaders in preparing for the improvement strategy. The model describes steps to guide the 
strategy; however, action steps necessary for preparing self in facilitating the turnaround 
strategy are not described. However, the Four-Stage Turnaround Model outlines the 
importance of the change leader developing inner strength, self-awareness and personal 
skills necessary to prepare to set the turnaround strategy. The study findings indicate the 
importance of building strength, reflective skills, and generative capacities within the 
turnaround leaders to prepare to guide staff and stakeholders through the change process. 
The study reveals that the Preparing Self stage is critical to the turnaround success. 
Conversely, Kotter’s model fails to detail stages of the leader’s self-preparation as the 
change leader.  
Additionally, the study implies that Kotter’s model does not warrant a requisite 
order. The findings reveal that the participants did not follow Kotter’s steps in sequential 
order and despite this fact each participant demonstrated success. The research findings 
imply that Kotter’s prescriptive approach is not necessary. The Head Start turnaround 
leaders achieved success and engaged in seven of Kotter’s eight stages. However, some 
adaptations were made. More specifically, the participants replaced the rigidity of the 
model and modified it by engaging with stages that best fit the culture of their specific 
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 Head Start program.  Notably, the findings imply that the seven stages of Kotter’s (1996) 
model correlate with the Four-Stage Turnaround Model, as shown in Figure 4.1. The two 
models seem to operate in congruence. However, the Four-Stage Turnaround Model 
includes provisions for the turnaround leader to develop the capacities to guide the 
turnaround strategy; Kotter’s model fails to do so. Kotter’s model provides prescriptive 
stages for organizational culture.  However, the study findings imply that the Four-Stage 
Turnaround model (see Figure 4.1) is more applicable for the culture Head Start 
programs.  Table 5.1 provides a summary of the steps that each respondent engaged in.  
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 Table 5.1 
Participants’ Activity Levels with Kotter’s (1996) Eight-Stage Change Model. 
 
Head 
Start 
Leader 
 
Step 1 
Establish a 
sense of 
urgency 
 
Step 2  
Create a 
guiding 
coalition 
 
Step 3  
Create a 
vision 
 
Step 4 
Communicate 
the change 
vision  
 
Step 5  
Empower 
others to act 
 
Step 6  
Generating 
short term 
wins 
 
Step 7  
Consolidate 
improvements 
and produce 
more change 
 
Step 8 
Institutionalize 
new approaches 
A X X X X X  X X 
B X X X X X  X X 
C X X X X X  X X 
D X X X X X  X X 
E X X X X X  X X 
F X X X X X  X X 
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 Turnaround literature. As noted previously, School turnaround literature is 
examined in Chapter 2 as it most closely resembles Head Start Programs. The researcher 
conducted an exhaustive review for Head Start turnaround literature and yielded no 
findings. The turnaround literature examined illustrates the strategies of principals in K-
12 educational settings. This section will provide evidence of the applicability of the 
theories relative to the actions steps for successful change. The literature is organized into 
three sections: (a) Setting the stage, (b) Head Start Turnaround Leaders as Change 
Agents, and (c) Head Start Turnaround Leader Competencies.  
Setting the stage.  Several turnaround articles assert that changing the leader is 
critical to the turnaround success (Murphy, 2008, Rhim, Kowal, Hassel & Hassel, 2007). 
Duke (2006) provides a contrasting argument that changing the leader is not critical to the 
successful turnaround. The findings in this study are consistent with the research that 
supports the change in leadership. All of the Head Start directors achieved a successful 
review with no findings and were cited by OHS as operating in full compliance with 
HSPS. Five of the six programs experienced a change in leadership. Findings maintain 
that all of the Head Start turnaround leaders experienced a success regardless of decisions 
to change or maintain the current leadership.  
Communication with stakeholders is critical to the successful turnaround. 
Robinson and Buntrock (2011) and Public Impact (2009) research supports this assertion. 
In agreement with the research assumptions, the findings reveal that the turnaround 
participants identified the importance of including stakeholders during the improvement 
process. The leaders engaged parents and board members throughout the process. 
Turnaround literature asserts that engaging stakeholders can positively support the effort 
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 and minimize opportunities for pessimists to deter positive efforts. The Head Start 
turnaround leaders actions steps provide evidence that they engaged stakeholders through 
professional development and ensured they were provided clarity regarding roles.  
Head Start turnaround leaders as change agents.  Themes in this study 
corroborate with the findings of previous research studies which contend that turnaround 
leaders lead the change, reculture, develop a vision, understand reasons for decline, and 
possess unique competencies.  
The turnaround leaders are critical to the change effort. Several researchers 
provide evidence regarding the significance of the turnaround leader’s role (Duke, 2006; 
Duke & Jacobson, 2011; Duke & Salmonowicz, 2011; Murphy & Meyers, 2009; Tucker 
et al., 2008). Tucker et al. (2008) contend that principals trained as turnaround leaders 
demonstrate greater success than principals that were not formally trained. Based on the 
findings in this study, all of the Head Start turnaround leaders engaged in either formal or 
informal technical assistance to prepare for the improvement effort. Interestingly, one of 
the participants indicated she received specialized training prior to her current turnaround 
role. Despite this fact, findings reveal that the Head Start directors did not demonstrate 
variations in success which can be attributed to turnaround training. All of the directors 
engaged in formal or informal technical assistance or a combination of the two. All of the 
turnaround leaders achieved a successful Federal Monitoring Review. The study findings 
imply that engaging in technical assistance is critical to the successful review.  
Reculturing is essential to the successful turnaround effort. Murphy and Meyer 
(2008) detail the importance of reculturing. Likewise, Fullan (2007) supports the claim 
that turnaround leaders must employ influencing and motivational skills with staff in 
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 order to change culture and shift employee behaviors. All of the Head Start turnaround 
directors engaged their programs in some form of reculturing. Findings reveal that the 
respondents recultured by communicating the vision and gaining staff support. 
Additionally, participants developed a culture of accountability among all staff. Duke’s 
(2006) study demonstrates that turnaround principals removed staff that failed to 
illustrate the capacity to improve performance by counseling them out or motivated staff 
to retire. Study findings support Duke’s (2006) research. The Head Start turnaround 
directors established comparable practices with resistant staff.  
Duke and Salmonowicz (2010) assert that principals need to understand the 
reasons for failure and pose critical questions about the reasons for low-performance and 
focus efforts on developing improvements and understanding when to eliminate 
unsuccessful strategy efforts. The researchers contend that turnaround leaders need 
support in decision making. Moreover, they proffer that turnaround leaders need specific 
training. The findings of this study demonstrate support with this research. All of the 
Head Start turnaround leaders provided that they had a clear understanding for the 
reasons for their programs performance decline prior to the start. The respondents used 
that knowledge in addition to technical assistance to develop an improvement strategy. 
All of the directors detailed the importance of technical assistance and support with 
individual questions as requisite to the success of their strategy.  
Tucker et al. (2008) espouse that turnaround leaders develop a vision to improve 
the organization, commit to excellence, and develop methods for continuous and ongoing 
improvement. The findings from this study support the research of Tucker et al. (2008).  
All of the Head Start turnaround leaders developed a vision, committed to excellence, 
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 and developed strategies for ongoing improvement. The participants monitored their 
programs for compliance and engaged in informal and formal technical assistance.   
Head Start turnaround leader competencies. Turnaround literature asserts that 
there are unique competencies of turnaround leaders that are not typical to leaders leading 
high performing programs (Public Impact, 2008). Public Impact (2008) delineates that 
there are specific competencies exclusive to turnaround leaders. This present study does 
not contrast the competencies of Head Start Directors in high-performing programs to 
low-performing programs in need of turnaround. Present study findings show that Head 
Start turnaround leaders illustrate similar competencies. The research developed by 
Public Impact (2008) indicates that turnaround leader competencies represent “patterns of 
actions” (p. 4). The researchers assert that there are four unique competencies of 
turnaround leaders and clustered leader action steps in the following areas: (a) driving for 
results, (b) influencing for results, (c) problem-solving, and (d) showing confidence to 
lead.  
Driving for results. Public Impact (2008) posits that turnaround leaders develop a 
clear plan for change. Study findings are consistent with this assumption. The Head Start 
directors planned for changing during the Managing Self stage. The directors developed 
inner strength and gained skills as they received technical assistance.  
Influencing for results. The researchers assert that turnaround leaders develop a 
coalition to support and influence others. The findings affirm this assertion. The Head 
Start turnaround leaders’ increased morale with staff by engaging in retreats and worked 
with staff to resolve issues and develop team cohesion. Additionally, through the process 
of reculturing, the directors communicated a clear vision and provided staff with 
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 professional development.  The Head Start directors’ actions support the researchers’ 
assertion. The findings imply that participants demonstrated critical turnaround 
competencies operating during the Leading Others stage.  
Problem solving. The researchers contend that turnaround competencies include 
skills in problem solving. Findings are in support of the researchers claim. The 
turnaround leaders interviewed demonstrated competencies in resolving conflict. The 
participants faced conflict when staff illustrated resistance to the vision and change 
process. The Head Start turnaround leaders made critical decisions related to staff and 
organizational operations. The participants demonstrated competencies in this area as 
they successfully resolved problems.   
Showing confidence to lead.  Public Impact (2008) posits that turnaround leaders 
demonstrate the confidence to lead. Findings were in agreement with the researchers’ 
position. Head Start turnaround leaders demonstrated confidence in leading the change 
effort after they engaged in the Managing Self stage. Directors established the knowledge 
to lead the change and confidently communicated the vision for change to staff, parents, 
and board members.  
In congruence with the current research, the study findings also reveal that Head 
Start turnaround leaders espoused the importance of accurate data to monitor their 
respective programs. Kowal and Hassel (2011) found that turnaround leaders are driven 
by data. Moreover, the researchers assert the following: (a) turnaround leaders develop 
goals after critical analysis, (b) motivate and communicates success to all stakeholders, 
(c) develop a vision and strategy aligned with activities to ensure the goal, (d) improve 
communication by sharing the vision and goals with staff and leaders, and (e) empower 
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 others to act by removing barriers to achieve the change. Kowal and Hassel’s (2011) 
research illustrate similarities to Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage change model. The findings 
reveal that Head Start turnaround leaders demonstrate actions that support the work of 
Kowal and Hassel (2011). Head Start turnaround leaders developed goals for change after 
they understood the reasons for decline. Table 5.2 summarizes the findings that support 
and contrast turnaround literature.  
The respondents engaged stakeholders in problem solving, training, and updated 
them on programmatic improvements. Additionally, the participants communicated the 
vision and strategy and ensured that goals were achieved through ongoing monitoring 
systems. The Head Start turnaround directors focused on improving communications and 
goal sharing through reculturing efforts. Furthermore, they removed barriers to achieve 
the vision by managing out staff that did not support the vision. Whereas, remaining staff 
were trained and provided clarity about changes to their work.  The findings of the 
research appear to support much of the school turnaround literature.  
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 Table 5.2 
Comparison of Turnaround Leader Findings 
School Turnaround leaders Head Start Turnaround leaders 
Changing the leader is critical to turnaround. 
(Murphy, 2008; Rhim, Kowal, Hassel & Hassel, 
2007) 
Findings are in support. Changing the leader is 
critical to turnaround success.  
Communication with stakeholders is critical to 
the successful turnaround. (Buntrock, 2011; 
Public Impact, 2009) 
Findings are in support. Turnaround leaders 
supported parents and board members throughout 
the improvement process.  
Formally trained turnaround leaders experience 
greater turnaround success (Tucker et al., 2008). 
Findings are in contrast. The findings indicate that 
Head Start turnaround leaders both formally and 
informally trained shared turnaround success. 
Reculturing is essential to the successful 
turnaround. (Murphy &Meyer, 2008; Fullan, 
2007;Duke, 2006). 
Findings are in support. Head Start turnaround 
leaders engage their staff in some form of 
reculturing.  
Turnaround leaders need to understand the 
reasons for failure (Duke & Salmonowicz ,2010) 
Findings are in support. Turnaround leaders 
demonstrated a clear understanding of the reasons 
for their programs decline. 
Turnaround leaders need specific training and 
support with decision making (Duke, 2006). 
Findings are in support. Head Start turnaround 
leaders engaged specific training in the Managing 
Self phase.  
Turnaround leaders develop a vision, commit to 
excellence and engage in ongoing improvement 
efforts (Tucker et al.,2008). 
Findings are in support. Head Start turnaround 
leaders committed to the vision, guided the 
program towards excellence and implemented 
monitoring systems to ensure compliance and 
ongoing improvement. 
Turnaround leaders have unique competencies 
(Public Impact, 2008)  
Findings are in support. The turnaround leaders 
illustrate unique competencies. 
Turnaround leaders are driven by data (Kowal & 
Hassel, 2008). 
Findings are in support. Head Start turnaround 
leaders espoused the importance of ensuring the 
accuracy of data to monitor program efficiency.  
School Turnaround leaders developed goals for 
change.  
Findings are in support. Head Start leaders 
developed goals for change 
School turnaround leaders motivate and 
communicate successes with stakeholders. 
Findings are in support. Head Start leaders 
motivated and communicated success with 
stakeholders 
School turnaround leaders develop a vision and 
align actions steps with strategy. 
Findings are in support. Head Start leaders 
developed a vision and aligned action steps  with 
strategy 
School turnaround leaders improved 
communication by sharing vision and goals with 
staff and leaders 
Findings are in support. Head Start turnaround 
leaders improved communication by sharing 
vision and goals with staff and leaders. 
School turnaround leaders removed barriers to 
ensure change was achieved. 
Findings are in support. Head Start leaders 
remove barriers to ensure change 
  133 
 Limitations 
This study has several limitations. The study data was derived primarily from the 
recollections of the six participants and relied on self-reported data. Additionally, there 
were 41 Head Start Grantees that met the study criteria and six participants agreed to 
participate. The small participant pool makes it difficult to generalize across the Head 
Start field.  A study encompassing a larger group of participants may yield divergent or 
additional findings. Additionally, the lack of demographic data of the participants may be 
a limitation. The researcher purposely concealed the demographic data of the participants 
to ensure the confidentiality of each participant. However, the study did not seek to 
explore or contrast demographic data. It sought to investigate turnaround practices and 
understand the specific action steps implemented by Head Start turnaround leaders who 
successfully improved their low-performing programs to a high-performing program.  
Findings from this study may not be relevant in non-Head Start settings. 
Uniquely, Head Start programs are subjected to the HSPS, therefore OHS Federal 
Monitoring Reviews and HSPS compliance are not applicable in non-Head Start settings. 
However, this could be remedied through an investigation of the systems and regulatory 
requirements for non-Head Start settings.  The study participants expressed concerns 
about providing vulnerable program information in fear of the perceived possibility of 
repercussions with OHS. The participants were cautious of the data they revealed. 
Respondents expressed considerable concerns about the researcher providing 
geographical and identifying information that could be detected through deductive 
measures to reveal the program’s identity. This fear may have prevented directors from 
sharing other critical data that may have added to the study findings.  
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 Recommendations 
As a result of the lessons learned, study participants offer valuable insights as to 
the specific issues that affect low-performing programs during the turnaround of a Head 
Start program. The lessons the participants provide offer detail regarding the turnaround 
leadership competencies and the actions steps necessary to turnaround troubled Head 
Start programs. From the present study, six recommendations emerge. The researcher 
proposes three recommendations for OHS: (a) anonymously survey Head Start directors 
to understand their perspectives for causes for chronic noncompliance, (b) establish a 
sense of trust between OHS consultants and Head Start Grantees, and (c) develop 
measures to validate and formalize informal learning communities among Head Start 
directors. Additionally, the researcher proposes three recommendations for Head Start 
directors: (a) employ the use of the Four-Stage Turnaround model as a road map for 
turnaround success, (b) develop a system to formalize informal learning communities 
between directors, and (c) establish mentoring systems between Head Start directors. 
Implications for OHS. Turnaround literature contends that external forces are the 
impetus for school turnaround (Murphy, 2008; Public Impact, 2007; Rhim, Kowal, 
Hassel & Hassel, 2007). Turnaround mandates begin at the federal level, and mandates 
are communicated down from the state and local level to the district. The same holds true 
for Head Start programs. Congress approves and develops the changes to the HSPS. The 
HSPS are approved and OHS monitors programs to ensure that Head Start programs are 
operating in compliance. Murphy (2008) asserts that districts should evaluate the reasons 
for performance decline and take quick actions to gauge the problem and develop a plan 
for operational efficiencies.  
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 OHS’ Reports to Congress (2008 and 2009) identify that there is a serious 
problem with chronic non-compliance among Head Start Grantees. There is a paucity of 
evidence that indicates that OHS has provided a comprehensive evaluation among Head 
Start Grantees to investigate the causes of decline.  The researcher asserts that this is a 
critical opportunity for OHS to improve Head Start services. As the study findings reveal, 
all of the participants attributed their lack of understanding to the changes made to the 
HSPS as a contributing factor to their programs non-compliant and deficient status, 
additionally the respondents’ detailed their concerns with the ambiguity of the HSPS. 
OHS must investigate opportunities to understand participant concerns and develop 
multiple opportunities to clarify to Grantees about the continuous changes in operating 
under the HSPS. The researcher proposes that OHS anonymously survey Head Start 
programs to understand the reasons for chronic non-compliance. Moreover, from the 
survey data develop trainings and communications that provide clarity regarding full 
compliance and best practices.  
Interestingly, the participants gained a better understanding of HSPS expectations 
after they engaged in self-development and technical assistance. Study findings reveal 
that participants expressed concerns in sharing information with OHS consultants. The 
researcher concedes that OHS provides supports for directors but contends that OHS 
should explore opportunities to improve the consultative process and investigate 
relationships between OHS consultants and Grantees. Study findings reveal that trust is a 
major concern. As evidenced in the participants concerns with the researcher protecting 
the identities of the respondents. It is recommended that OHS work to establishing a 
sense of trust between Head Start directors and OHS consultants in an effort to improve 
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 the effectiveness of technical assistance, by separating the role of the OHS consultant and 
technical assistance. OHS should define and separate roles for OHS consultants and OHS 
technical assistance staff. Whereby, OHS technical assistance staff provides grantees 
support without punitive measures for noncompliance and establishing trust. 
Subsequently, this act would create positive communication and feedback between OHS 
staff and the grantees in an effort to increase performance and effectiveness within 
programs. 
Additional findings reveal that participants sought programmatic supports through 
informal methods. Participants engaged other Head Start directors to gain better 
understanding of common non-compliances and program practices. These actions should 
signal to OHS that there is a unique community of collaboration among Head Start 
directors. OHS should recognize the utility of collaboration among programs and 
empower Grantees to support one another. Interestingly, the unintended effects of 
recompetition, may ultimately damage the collaborative nature between Head Start 
directors. Study findings reveal that some directors may become hesitant to share trade 
secrets since recompetetion has developed a pathway for programs to compete for Head 
Start grants.   
The researcher asserts that OHS should capitalize on the utility of collaboration 
and develop measures to validate this informal method of technical support. Furthermore, 
developing a formal system of technical support between directors in good standing and 
struggling non-compliant Head Start programs will increase opportunities for programs to 
come into full compliance with HSPS. Findings reveal that participants trusted other 
Head Start directors operating programs in good standing. It is recommended that OHS 
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 explore developing mentoring programs between the programs and establish systems of 
support without consequences. As allies, Grantees can support one another and ultimately 
reduce the number of non-compliant programs in lieu of the current system of 
recompetition. 
The researcher delineates that OHS may need to develop publications and 
webinars to reinforce competencies among Grantees in meeting HSPS, more specifically 
in ongoing monitoring and information sharing of common non-compliances. Study data 
provided evidence that participants were not clear on the complexity of ongoing 
monitoring. The researcher proffers that these recommendation are essential for OHS to 
explore in an effort to transform Head Start programs and create systems for Head Start 
directors to improve programs for Head Start children.  
Implications for Head Start directors. In the absence of Head Start turnaround 
literature, this research study has critical implications for Head Start directors. Head Start 
directors are confronted with the critical need to ensure their programs are providing 
children a high-quality program. The implications are derived from the data from the 
Head Start participants. The participants’ retrospective feedback offers pertinent insights 
in support of directors wanting to guide the successful turnaround.  The researcher posits 
that the Head Start participants achieved turnaround success because the directors 
developed critical competencies in the three areas: Preparing Self, Accessing Resources 
and Leading Others.  
The researcher has invoked meaning from the competencies developed by the 
participants and suggests the participants employed a four-stage competency model. With 
the absence of a competency model to describe Head Start turnaround, the researcher 
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 offers the introduction of a new model, the Four-Stage Turnaround model, to 
operationalize the unique steps the participants engaged in (See figure 4.1).  The findings 
reveal that the participants developed skills related to self-preparation leveraging specific 
knowledge to make improvements. Moreover, the directors employed the skills gained to 
facilitate a process for leading staff and constituents which resulted in improving the 
quality of the program and achieving a successful Federal Monitoring Review.  
Furthermore, the researcher asserts that the participants achieved turnaround success 
because all of the participants employed the Four-Stage Turnaround Model. It is the 
assertion of the researcher that this model provides Head Start directors a roadmap for 
success. The researcher proposes that Head Start directors employ the use of the model, 
therefore, it is critical to examine this model further as it illustrates a road map for Head 
Start directors to follow. The researcher posits that following the steps reviewed will 
provide a strong strategy for achieving turnaround success. 
The Four-Stage Turnaround model, as shown in Figure 4.1, details the action 
steps taken by directors, the researcher contends that the actions steps can be altered 
depending on the operating systems the participants are trying to effect. The actions steps 
are specifically related to the systems that the participants intend to influence.  The Four-
Stage Turnaround model framework is broad enough to accommodate the expanding 
strategic perspectives of Head Start turnaround directors and new research.   
Informal learning circles. Head Start directors have developed a unique 
community of support. Directors have adopted an informal learning community. The 
study revealed that directors supported each other by filling in the gaps where 
information is lacking. These finding imply that OHS is failing directors by not providing 
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 the critical information needed. Participants revealed that they sought the support of other 
directors for information about non-compliance findings and best practices. It appears 
that accessibility of information is a concern for directors.  
This informal system of interpersonal learning developed by Head Start directors 
provides critical learning. Participant data indicated that directors trust other Head Start 
directors who operate programs in good standing. The study reveals that in some 
instances directors provided support via phone calls, on-site visits and exchanged tips 
about maintaining program compliance. The informal learning appears to be desirable 
benefit for directors. The findings imply that Head Start program directors that do not 
engage in local Head Start Association meetings and attend Head Start sessions miss 
opportunities to engage and learn about new updates and best practices within Head Start 
shared by other directors. 
Head Start directors create learning circles through engagement with one another. 
The learning circles developed by directors have contributed to the effectiveness of 
program operations. The study findings imply that Head Start directors feel comfortable 
engaging in nonthreatening social settings, where they can share experiences, skills and 
best practices.  
The current study suggests that relevant learning takes place in informal learning 
circles and directors acquire skills and knowledge to support them in their roles.  
Mezirow (2000) describes this as transformative learning. Throughout transformative 
learning, individuals experience a shift of reference and explore new behaviors, shift their 
attitudes, and build the confidence to lead in the new manner. The researcher proffers that 
this mode of learning is critical to turnaround leaders. The study suggests that participants 
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 gained knowledge that supported their missions. The findings indicate that respondents 
used the learning opportunities to develop actions steps to make improvements within 
their programs. In agreement with Mezirow (2000), study findings support his assertion 
that individuals shift behaviors. Directors that engaged in informal learning circles gained 
valuable learning experiences. The researcher recommends the development of a system 
to formalize learning between directors to create opportunities to expand learning among 
programs and minimize opportunities for programs to repeat mistakes and mitigate the 
risk of common non-compliances. Additionally, directors can establish regular mentoring 
systems to ensure more Head Start directors operate high-quality programs by learning 
from others. Head Start program directors could benefit from a formalized learning 
system in an effort to significantly increase the number of programs achieving Federal 
Monitoring Reviews with no findings operating in full compliance with the HSPS. 
These recommendations, if heeded, are likely to positively impact the quality of 
Head Start programs within the field ultimately improving services for the children and 
families served. Furthermore, the next cohort of Head Start directors scheduled to receive 
a Federal Monitoring Review can benefit and possibly mitigate the risk of being cited by 
OHS with non-compliances and deficiencies.  
Recommendations for Further Research 
The study findings inform the field about how Head Start leaders improve their 
programs and provide data on the specific action steps implemented by the respondents. 
The findings reveal that the Four-Stage Turnaround model (See Figure 4.1) employs 
three critical leadership competencies for Head Start directors conducting turnarounds: 
Preparing Self, Accessing Resources and Leading Others. Future research should 
  141 
 investigate if the three stages can operate independently and yield the successful 
turnaround or affirm the current study’s findings that the four-stage process work 
concomitantly and all steps must be employed to achieve turnaround success. 
Additionally, the findings reveal that the actions steps that the turnaround leaders 
engaged in while employing the four-stage model align with seven of Kotter’s (1996) 
eight-stage change model.  This study presents pioneering research regarding Head Start 
turnaround. It is critical to develop further research to add to the body of knowledge and 
build a representative body of work in the field to expand the discourse regarding Head 
Start turnaround.  
The Report to Congress (2009) reveals that there is an increase in the number of 
Head Start programs with noncompliant findings. Further studies are needed to examine 
if the turnaround practices described by the respondents will yield the same results or 
additional results if a larger pool is examined. Moreover, the study could be expanded by 
investigating if the study participants sustained the improvements and achieved 
subsequent successful Federal Monitoring Reviews with no findings.  
OHS and independent consultants have a critical role in the Managing Self step. 
Findings reveal that that the directors must have an established relationship of trust with 
the consultants in order to successfully gain knowledge and effectively achieve technical 
support. Future research might explore the relationship between consultants and Head 
Start turnaround leaders during the Managing Self stage to examine the practices that 
lead to trust and define relational behaviors that lead to increased turnaround success. 
Further research is recommended to provide an investigation of Head Start 
directors leading high-performing programs to Head Start directors facilitating a 
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 turnaround in low-performing programs contrast the competencies and actions steps 
among the two groups. Additional research is recommended to investigate the turnaround 
practices in non-Head Start settings. However, the current study contributes to a better 
understanding of competencies and actions steps of Head Start directors’ transforming 
their low-performing Head Start program to high performing. In so doing, it suggests a 
new direction for turnaround research and theoretical development.  
Conclusion 
Many Head Start programs are faced with the problem of chronic non-compliance 
and deficient statuses.  Recent Reports to Congress (2009) indicate that chronic poor 
performance is an increasing epidemic for Head Start Grantees. However, there is an 
absence of literature that investigates the action steps of Head Start leaders during the 
turnaround process. This study addressed the urgent need to investigate the approaches 
used in non-compliant and deficient programs to successfully meet the HSPS and achieve 
a Federal Monitoring Review with no findings. Accordingly, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
the purpose of this study is to investigate the turnaround practices as identified by Head 
Start directors that improved their low-performing programs and transformed the 
programs to full compliance with all Head Start Performance Standards to achieve a 
successful Federal Monitoring Review.  
The study relied on data collected from six Head Start directors. The qualitative 
methodology enabled the researcher to analyze the relationship between the strategies the 
leaders engaged in and the changes within their programs.  The researcher analyzed the 
strategies of the Head Start directors interviewed to the practices found in the literature. 
Four themes emerged from the study data: (a) Organizational Noncompliance, (b) 
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 Managing Self, (c) Managing Others, and (d) Systems Turnaround. The first theme 
Organizational Noncompliance included four areas: (a) Finance, (b) Shared Governance, 
(c) Human Resources, and (d) Ongoing Monitoring Systems.  Five of the six directors 
agreed that fiscal procedures and financial matters were not their areas of expertise and 
consequently were disconnected from HSPS and fiscal operations.  
Turnaround leaders stressed the importance of improving shared governance. 
Four of the six respondents detailed the importance of ensuring that governance 
procedures paralleled the HSPS. Program directors identified improvements needed in 
the area of parent participation and ensuring the board was provided clarity on their roles 
and responsibilities. 
In the area of Human Resources, poor performance were attributed to the lack of 
staff qualifications and failure to update policies and procedures to reflect the HSPS. Five 
of the six Head Start leaders identified the lack of ongoing monitoring systems as another 
attributing factor to their programs non-compliant or deficient status. Collectively the six 
programs were cited for 63 non-compliances and seven deficiencies. All of the directors 
implemented a successful strategy to improve their program to achieve a successful 
Federal Monitoring Review with no findings.  
Managing self, the second theme introduces the idea that directors began their 
turnaround trajectory in a process of building inner strength and created personal change 
through self-preparation and self-reflection. Additionally, the directors engaged in formal 
and informal technical assistance.   Formal technical assistance is provided through OHS 
consultants or Independent consultants hired directly by the grantee. Informal technical 
assistance materializes in one or a combination of the following five areas (a) previous 
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 experiences, (b) support from other Head Start directors, (c) Head Start trainings, (d) 
attending Head Start Association meetings, and (e) OHS tools. 
Managing others, the third theme, provides findings that reveal that Head Start 
directors utilize the skills gained in managing self to guide subordinates and constituents 
through the successful turnaround. Directors facilitate their staff through the change 
process by reculturing, improving communication, providing professional development, 
and executing strong monitoring plans.  
Systems turnaround, the last theme, findings imply that the participants applied 
the skills gained and through the application of a four-stage framework. The four-stage 
model, referred to as the Four-Stage Turnaround Model (See Figure 4.1). As described, 
the model includes four stages: Preparing Self, Accessing Resources, Leading Others and 
Turnaround Systems.  
In the first stage, Preparing Self, the participants developed self-efficacy skills 
and generative capabilities to guide the turnaround strategy. The second stage Accessing 
Resources, the participants assessed the types of technical assistance resources necessary 
to guide the turnaround strategy, next Leading Others, the third stage, the participants led 
staff in a reculturing process, improved communication, executed ongoing monitoring 
systems and provided professional development for staff, parents and board members. All 
stages influence the final stage, Turnaround Systems. In this stage, the participants’ 
focused on systems turnaround efforts in human resources, finance, shared governance, 
and ongoing monitoring. The directors’ stories provide evidence that the combination of 
their competencies in Preparing Self, Accessing Resources and Leading Others in tandem 
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 with their specific execution steps situated them to accomplish a successful Federal 
Monitoring Reviews with no finding and in full compliance with the HSPS.  
Based on the findings in this study, the researcher can imply that institutionalizing 
the change requires more than ongoing monitoring systems. It requires consistent 
communication between the Head Start turnaround leader and the staff. Themes in the 
study indicate that the change leader must engage in a process of in preparing self and 
accessing technical assistance resources. It is essential for the Head Start directors to 
engage in training and research to understand new developments on the horizon. Head 
Start directors must ensure that they are connected to changes within the HSPS and its 
implications. The participants achieved training through informal and formal technical 
assistance. Additionally, the participants provide evidence of employing their turnaround 
competencies and the importance of the intersection of the Preparing Self, Accessing 
Resources, and Leading Others stages and its implications in the Turnaround Systems 
stage.  
Six recommendations are presented in the study. The researcher proposes three 
recommendations for OHS: (a) anonymously survey Head Start directors to understand 
their perspectives for causes for chronic noncompliance, (b) establish a sense of trust 
between OHS consultants and Head Start Grantees, (c) develop measures to validate and 
formalize informal learning communities among Head Start directors. Additionally, the 
researcher posits three recommendations for Head Start directors: (a) employ the use of 
the Four-Stage Turnaround model as a road map for turnaround success, (b) development 
of a system to formalize informal learning communities between directors, (c) establish 
mentoring systems between directors. 
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 The Head Start turnaround leaders demonstrate that turnaround leaders reflect 
competencies in understanding Organizational Noncompliance, Managing Self, and 
Managing Others. Managing Self and Managing Others must interact concomitantly in 
order to achieve the successful turnaround.  Head Start directors achieved successful 
turnaround because they engaged in three critical phases during their turnaround effort. 
Directors understood the reasons for their programs non-compliances, managed 
themselves through a process of preparing self and established inner strength in addition 
to engaging in technical assistance and leading others. This process facilitated a path for 
Head Start directors to guide staff in changing behaviors to ensure compliance with the 
HSPS. 
These findings present an important addition to turnaround research. It introduces 
a new model to analyze Head Start turnaround and provides the entry of Head Start 
discourse to the turnaround field. This entry establishes the importance to the work of 
Head Start turnaround directors as change leaders. Implications of these findings are 
encouraging for Head Start directors, Head Start directors have a competency model to 
follow and employ. The specific action steps that the participants engaged in provide a 
roadmap to improve program operations within Head Start programs for the benefit of the 
children and families served. 
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Appendix A 
Dear Head Start Director, 
My name is Sean Tracy and I am a doctoral candidate at St. John Fisher College in 
Rochester, NY. I am writing you to seek your assistance with my dissertation research, in 
an effort to add to the body of knowledge on turnaround theory and its application in 
Head Start programs. I am interested in learning about how Head Start directors describe 
their experiences leading their program to achieving full compliance with the Federal 
Performance Standards for Federal Review accountability. Your program has been 
distinguished as achieving a full compliance finding at your most recent Federal 
Monitoring Review.  This finding provides evidence that your program has implemented 
substantial improvements from your previous Federal Review.  I would like to learn more 
about how you led your team through such substantial program improvements.  Your 
leadership and recent Federal Review findings demonstrate that you have an important 
story to share.  Your story and participation is voluntary.  I will make every attempt to 
ensure that your stories and program identity remain anonymous. I will use pseudonyms 
to protect your program identity. At no time will your name, geographic location or 
identifying program data be identified through the study, completion of the project, or at 
time of publication. 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the St. John Fisher College Institutional 
Review Board (IRB). I would be honored if you would support in my research project by 
participating in one telephone interview and complete a brief demographic survey. The 
interview will last approximately one hour; the survey will take less than ten minutes to 
complete.  I will also request to review your most recent Federal Review documents and 
Program Information Report. With your consent, the interview will be audio taped and 
transcribed. The transcription will be forwarded to you for your review and approval.  
I appreciate your consideration in participating in this research study. You will be helping 
to contribute to the field by introducing a theory that has not been applied to early 
childcare and education. Your survey responses will remain confidential.  
Thank you in advance for contributing to such important research. 
 
Sincerely,  
Sean Tracy 
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Appendix B 
Part 1: Demographic Questions  
Q1 Thank you for agreeing to participate in this ground breaking research 
regarding successful turnaround practices in Head Start Programs. This survey will take 
about ten minutes to complete. Once you have completed the survey, I will contact you to 
schedule your telephone interview. My contact information is as follows: Sean Tracy585 
305-0977 
 
Q2 Please list your current title  
 
Q3 Your program has been identified as making improvements between your most 
recent Federal Review and the Federal Review  prior to your most recent review. Did you 
lead the improvement process? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Q4 When did you begin the improvement process? Please list month and year. 
 
Answer If Did you lead the improvement process? No Is Selected 
Q5 Who led the improvement process? Are they still employed with your program? 
 
Q6 How long have you served in your current position? 
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  less than 6 months (1) 
 6 months -1 year (2) 
 1 year (3) 
 2 years (4) 
 3-5 years (5) 
 6-8 years (6) 
 8-10 years (7) 
 10-15 years (8) 
 15-20 years (9) 
 More than 20 years (10) 
 
Q7 Gender 
 Male (1) 
 Female (2) 
 
Q8 In what age group are you? 
 19 and under (1) 
 20-29 (2) 
 30-39 (3) 
 40-49 (4) 
 50-59 (5) 
 60-69 (6) 
 70+ (7) 
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Q9 Please describe your ethnicity  
 American Indian (1) 
 Asian (2) 
 Biracial (3) 
 Black/African-American (4) 
 Latino/Hispanic (5) 
 White (6) 
 Other (7) 
 
Q10 Describe any professional development that you believe helped you with the 
improvement process.  Please list any in-service, workshops, college courses, or books. 
You may answer none. 
 
Q11 Did you receive any additional support with your improvement process. Please list 
supports. 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Answer If Did you receive any additional support with your improvem... Yes Is Selected 
Q12 Please list the supports your received. 
 Office of Head Start (1) 
 STGI Technical Support (2) 
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  Other Head Start Directors (3) 
 Consultants (4) 
 Other (5) 
 
Answer If Did you receive any additional support with your improvement process... Yes 
Is Selected 
Q13 What did the supports provide you with? Please describe. 
 
Q14 Please list the capacities in which you have served throughout your Head Start 
Career. Please list the positions you have held at any Head Start Program. 
 Maintenance (1) 
 Receptionist (2) 
 Consultant (3) 
 Cook (4) 
 Education Coordinator (5) 
 Assistant Teacher (6) 
 Teacher (7) 
 Assistant Director (8) 
 Director (9) 
 Finance Manager (10) 
 Executive Director (11) 
 Volunteer (12) 
 Other, Please specify (13) 
  160 
  
Q15 What financial resources were available to implement the required changes? 
 
Q16 Briefly describe your Head Start Program reporting structure 
Q17 What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 CDA (1) 
 High School / GED (2) 
 Some College (3) 
 2-year College Degree (4) 
 4-year College Degree (5) 
 Masters Degree (6) 
 Doctoral Degree (7) 
 Professional Degree (JD, MD) (8) 
 
Q18 Please select a response that best describes your program today. 
 Head Start only (1) 
 Head Start and Universal Prekindergarten (PreK) (2) 
 Head Start and wrap-care ( care for children beyond Head Start Program hours) (3) 
 Head Start and Daycare (4) 
 Head Start, daycare, wrap-care, Pre-K, and school-age programs (5) 
 
Q19 List the key staff that you believe were critical to the change process. Please list 
titles not names. 
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Q20 Please provide the best number to contact you for the interview. The questions will 
be provided prior to the interview. 
Q21 Thank you for taking the time to participate in this important research.   
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Appendix C 
Part 2:  Standardized Open-ended Phone Interview Questions  
Introduction 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in the survey today. Your input will be used 
to inform research regarding program improvements. I recognize that you have a busy 
schedule and I will be respectful of your time. Today’s interview will take about 45 
minutes. We’ll talk about your program and its current status as a high quality 
program and what you did to make it the success it is today. I will refer to your 
Federal Review from 20__ as Federal Review 1 and your last Federal Monitoring 
Review as Federal Review 2.  Do you have any questions before we begin?  
Now we will talk about your program: its structure; the strategy you implemented; 
your end results; communication with your stakeholders; management of your 
program; financial management; human resource issues; professional development; 
and wrap up the interview with any recommendations you may have for other 
programs. Are you ready to begin?  
Program Description 
1. Describe your program today compared to Review One? 
a. Were you employed with the program at Review One? If no, go to section 
i. 
i. If not, who was leading the program? 
ii. What was your role?  
iii. When did you begin leading the program? 
iv. Did you make changes in the structure between Review One and 
Review Two? 
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 Professional Development 
2. What professional development did you receive that you implement the 
improvements? Workshops, books, college courses etc.  
a. Staff? 
i. Who provided the training? 
ii. List the topics. 
iii. List the topics. 
3. Describe any support you received from? 
a.  Office of Head Start? 
b. STGI Technical Support? 
c. From other Head Start programs? 
d. Consultants? 
i. What did the consultants provide? 
ii. What did they offer? 
Next we will talk about your improvement strategy and how it was developed. 
Strategy 
4. How did you plan for the improvement process after receiving results from 
review 1? 
a. When did you begin the improvement process? 
b. Was the plan formal or informal? 
c. Did the actions you put in place address the non-compliances? 
d. Tell me about the actions you took?  
e. How did you figure out the sequence of actions to take? 
f. What was the outcome?  
i. Tell me more about what you learned at this stage?  
5. I want to learn more about what factors you believe contributed to your 
overall success?  
a. Did you collaborate with other programs? 
b. Did other programs or individuals help you? If so, who? 
Fiscal  
6. Were there any financial resources available to implement the required 
changes? If yes, how much and from whom? 
7. Did you make any cutbacks to your program from Review One to Review 
Two? If so, what?  
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 8. Did you receive a grant to make improvements? 
9. Did you lose any funding from Review One to Review Two? 
10. What were there any unexpected costs necessary to improve your program? If 
so, what? 
End Results 
11. Think about Review One and Review Two, How did you know you were 
making progression towards the goals prior to Review two?  
a. How did you know you were ready for Review Two?  
b.What were your indicators of program improvement? 
 Now we are going to talk about your stakeholders and their involvement in the 
improvement process 
Stakeholders 
12. Tell me about how staff were involved in the improvement process? 
a. Parents? 
b. Other stakeholders? 
c. Consultants? 
Now we are going to talk about Communication 
Communication 
13. Tell me about any changes in communication pattern from Review 1 in 
comparison to now? 
a. Parents? 
b. Staff? 
c. Board of Directors? 
d. Policy Council/Committee? 
e. With other stakeholders? 
Now were are going to talk about your management of the program 
Management 
14. Did your monitoring procedures change after Review 1. If so, how? 
a.  Describe monitoring procedures now? 
15. Describe how you used the Program Information Report (PIR) to inform your 
improvement plan? 
16. How did the culture change between Review 1 and Review 2? 
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 17. How did you change your organizational structure from Review One to 
Review Two? 
Now we are at the final section. We are going to discuss your staff. 
Staff 
18. Tell me about staff turnover from  Review One to now: 
a. What is turnover like today? 
b. Did you expand or reduce staff between reviews? 
19. How are you and staff held accountable for performance?  
We’re almost done, now we are going to talk about professional development. I would 
like to learn about the trainings that you and your staff were involved in.  
We are at the end of our interview. I’d like to get your final thoughts about any other 
items you believe should be discussed.  
Final thoughts 
20. Are there any things that you would do differently? 
21. Do you have any recommendations for others? 
Closing Statements  
22. Is there anything that I have missed that you would like to share? 
23. Do you have any questions for me? 
 If I have any follow up questions may I call you back? Would you like a copy of my 
dissertation when the research is completed? Thank you again for your patience and 
participation.  
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